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Imagine I tell you that Maddy is bad. Perhaps you infer from my intonation, or the
context in which we are talking, that I mean morally bad. Additionally, you will
probably infer that I am disapproving of Maddy, or saying that I think you should
disapprove of her, or similar, given typical linguistic conventions and assuming I am
sincere. However, you might not get a more detailed sense of the particular sorts of
way in which Maddy is bad, her typical character traits, and the like, since people can
be bad in many ways. In contrast, if I say that Maddy is wicked, then you get more of
a sense of her typical actions and attitudes to others. The word ‘wicked’ is more
speciﬁc than ‘bad’. I have still not exactly pinpointed Maddy’s character since
wickedness takes many forms. But there is more detail nevertheless, perhaps a
stronger connotation of the sort of person Maddy is. In addition, and again assuming
typical linguistic conventions, you should also get a sense that I am disapproving of
Maddy, or saying that you should disapprove of her, or similar, assuming that we are
still discussing her moral character.
This imaginary and somewhat stilted scenario introduces the topic of this study.
Concepts such as BAD and GOOD are normally referred to as thin evaluative concepts
(hereafter just thin concepts), whereas WICKED, SELFISH, KIND, BRAVE, DECEITFUL and
many more examples in ethics, are said to be thick evaluative concepts (hereafter,
thick concepts).1 There are many, many examples of thick concepts beyond the
ethical realm. Artworks can be elegant and jejune, teachers can be wise and ignorant,
children can be angelic and cheeky, adults can be childlike and childish, gardens can
be delicate and cluttered, academics can be modest and pompous, and so on, and so
on, and so on.
The supposed difference between thin and thick concepts is a phenomenon that is
relatively easy to spot: we are picking out evaluative concepts that are more or less
speciﬁc. Matters become harder when we try to capture exactly what is going on.
Here is a rough and ready distinction to get us started. Often the distinction is put so
that whereas thin concepts are primarily or wholly evaluative (in whatever sense is
given to ‘evaluative’), thick concepts mix evaluation, or evaluative conceptual con-
tent, with something that might be called nonevaluative, descriptive conceptual
1 When referring to concepts as concepts, I write them capitalized as here. When referring to and
mentioning associated terms and words, I write them thus: ‘generous’.
content, or mix with it to a more signiﬁcant degree than happens with thin concepts.
In other words, the application of a thin concept is primarily or wholly concerned
with giving a sense of approval or disapproval. In contrast, a thick concept will do
that and give a sense, or more of a sense, of what the thing is like that is so
categorized, a sense beyond the fact that it is to be liked or disliked. Often commen-
tators refer to ‘normativity’—either in addition to evaluative content or as a substi-
tute for it—and thus make reference to the fact that both thin and thick concepts can
provide guidance and reasons for action, even if only defeasibly. Within this frame-
work, thin concepts’ prime or whole function is typically thought to be to provide
such guidance and reasons, while thick concepts do this and additionally reﬂect the
world somehow. So, for example, we could say that it would be (prudentially) wrong
to walk along the cliff edge, and we could also say that the edge is dangerous. The
‘wrong’ is simply an expression of a reason not to do something, while the ‘danger-
ous’ will indicate such a reason and also indicate something about what the edge is
like, such as the fact that it is crumbling, craggy, and high up.
From this rough and ready discussion much philosophical intrigue follows. For
example, how is evaluative content and descriptive content supposed to relate in a
thick concept? What do we mean by these two labels anyway? Is talk of evaluative
and descriptive content the best way of capturing the phenomenon? Perhaps the
evaluative element should be seen as functioning in a different way, not as some
conceptual content that aims to capture or map onto the world, but as an attitude
that we express towards that world, for instance. Is there a difference in kind between
thin and thick concepts, or is the difference only one of degree? Do the differences
between evaluative concepts from different domains (ethical, aesthetic, prudential,
etc.) affect what story we tell about the thin and the thick? Why think there are
different evaluative domains anyway?
Some of these questions and others will be raised and answered in this book. My
chief concern is the nature of evaluative concepts: can we always separate them into
different conceptual contents, and what is the character and function of those
supposed different contents in the ﬁrst place?
In the rest of this Introduction I do ﬁve things. First, I lay out what I discuss and
argue for in this study. Second, I outline each chapter. Third, I offer a brief history of
the distinction between thin and thick concepts that alights on some of the thoughts
mentioned. Fourth, I pick out a few contrasts that are at work in my discussion.
Lastly, I brieﬂy indicate some interesting and relevant questions that, unfortunately,
have to be left aside. In Chapter Two I begin my discussion in earnest.
(a) In this book battle lines are drawn between separationists and nonseparationists.
I argue for a version of nonseparationism.
Separationists believe that all putative thick concepts can be divided into different
elements. Many separationists divide thick concepts into some very thin evaluative
element and some descriptive, nonevaluative element or elements. It is part of their
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picture that not only should we so separate, but also that evaluation and description
are radically different kinds of thing or different kinds of conceptual content. Just
now I wrote of some ‘descriptive, nonevaluative element’. In this debate this phrasing
is strictly a redundancy: descriptive conceptual content just is nonevaluative concep-
tual content.2 But this point is worth making and drawing our attention to. It is also
worth dwelling a little on the English involved. Separationists should typically speak
of evaluative and descriptive elements or parts or components because these words
imply that what are primary are the separable, independently intelligible factors that
make up the thick concept, not the thick concept itself.
Separationists, although united in their core belief, differ on many matters. They
disagree about what the evaluative and descriptive elements are and how thin the
evaluative element needs to be. They also disagree about how many elements are
typically part of a thick concept and about how they are related to each other.
Further, they also disagree as to how to treat the evaluative element. To elaborate,
the most famous types of separationist are noncognitivists. They typically character-
ize the evaluative element as an evinced attitude or command. However, cognitivist
treatments are also possible. Cognitivist-separationists treat some thin evaluative
element, such as GOOD, as a free-standing, independently intelligible concept that is
separable from any nonevaluative concept.3
As mentioned, I argue for a nonseparationist account of thick concepts, and argue
further for a particular understanding of this broad view. All nonseparationists
believe that thick concepts unite in some way both evaluative and descriptive
conceptual content: such content cannot be separated. As such, they may well refer
to evaluative and descriptive aspects (rather than elements or parts), as such phrasing
implies the primacy of the thick concept not its features. However, I am particularly
keen to stress that we should go beyond merely thinking that thick concepts unite
evaluative and descriptive content.4 Why? Expressing matters in this way could be
taken to assume that there is some separation between two things or parts, albeit a
separation that is then overcome. I emphasize strongly and positively that thick
concepts are evaluative concepts, plain and simple; they are as evaluative as thin
concepts are, just that they are more speciﬁc. This theme gives this book its
title, Thick Evaluation. The simple—perhaps seemingly simplistic—way in which
I introduced matters at the start, by saying that thick concepts are more speciﬁc and
that thin concepts are more general, turns out to be the key way of thinking about
thick concepts and their relation to thin ones. So, to put this another way, I worry
whenever I hear other commentators saying that thin concepts are purely evaluative
2 However, innocent and acceptable as this identity is, I do draw attention to it and question it in
Chapter Six when I discuss the labels that one applies to the various conceptual categories that are in play.
3 See Elstein and Hurka (2009), pp. 516–17 for discussion.
4 I use this phrasing myself from time to time. It is just that I do not think we can leave matters there,
and we should not aim only to show that there is this intertwining. That last idea is really the point behind
Chapter Five.
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whereas in contrast thick concepts mix evaluative and descriptive conceptual con-
tent. I think that thick concepts are also ‘purely’ or ‘wholly’ evaluative, simply because
I have a certain view of what it is for something to be evaluative. This idea will be
elaborated and defended throughout my study.5
All nonseparationists are cognitivists. They all think that thick and thin concepts
can be used to describe the world by picking out parts of it—the parts of it that are
good, just, unfair, elegant, and the like—and that in some sense knowledge of the
world might be conveyed by their use. Note that we should not confuse the two
uses of ‘descriptive’ I have introduced. I have just used ‘describe’ to indicate how any
word or idea might function: used in a suitable fashion in a language, any word,
evaluative or not, can be used to try to pick out some aspect of the world. Earlier,
when I wrote of ‘descriptive content’, I meant something different: a type of concep-
tual content that does not capture or convey any value judgement. We should be alive
to this difference throughout.
Despite being united in their cognitivism, nonseparationists also come in several
varieties. To explain how my nonseparationism differs from other types, here are
three further points I argue for. First, and carrying on from the main theme of thick
concepts being purely evaluative, I argue that while there are clearly some non-
evaluative concepts, there is a huge grey area of concepts that cannot be clearly
categorized as either evaluative or descriptive by the lights of a more traditional,
separationist understanding of ‘evaluative’. And, I do stick my neck out: I suggest
strongly that there is this grey area, as opposed to there being a sharp distinction
between the evaluative and the nonevaluative or descriptive. This follows from the
view I develop about thick concepts and the way in which many real-life examples
work. I do not regard the lack of a sharp distinction as a ﬂaw, for to so assume is
partly to buy into the view of evaluation propagated by separationists. Indeed, the
fact that real-life examples threaten such a sharp distinction should indicate the
implausibility of separationism.
The second point elaborates the ﬁrst. I think that there are some concepts that can
be counted as evaluative (on a certain understanding of that notion) that some
theories and theorists think should not be. Some of the most radical contenders
that I suggest are SIMILAR and RELEVANT, but there are far less radical examples such as
MACABRE, CONTORTED, and GROTESQUE. Such examples raise this question: do such
concepts, whenever legitimately applied, have to have either a positive or negative
point to them in order to count as evaluative concepts? My answer to this question is
a clear ‘no’. I set up a disagreement between two broad views. The conservative view
of evaluation restricts evaluation to clear positive and negative judgements alone. In
5 This possibility is barely discussed in the literature. There is a ﬂavour of it in Wiggins (2006),
pp. 378–9, note 20, and more strongly in Dancy (1995), p. 268. The most detailed discussion is Roberts
(2013) which takes the articulation of this view as its main topic. I discuss this last paper in note 29,
Chapter Six.
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more detail, it is the view that a concept can be counted as an evaluative concept only
if in every instance of its use there is a clear and obvious positive or negative stance or
view being expressed. The liberal view—which is the view I favour—claims that a
concept can be evaluative overall and in any particular instance of its use even if in
some instances there is no positive or negative stance being expressed when it is
employed.6 Much of this book is an attempt to move us away from thinking of
evaluation as simply exhausted by the bare, minimal notions of good and bad, right
and wrong, a yes and a no, and, as I frequently put it, the concepts of PRO and CON or of
pro and con evaluation. This last pair of options I use as my barest thin concepts. As
such, this whole work is a meditation on the notion of evaluation and an argument for
a particular conception of what evaluation is.
Third, I argue for ‘evaluative ﬂexibility’. A thick concept can be used to indicate
some pro stance in one case, and a con stance in another, and yet we can still be
talking of the very same concept. (For example, the dangerous nature of a cliff can be
a reason not to walk along it, but it can also, in some contexts, be a reason to do so.)
My view is opposed to the idea that we have two different yet similar concepts being
applied in these two instances, one that is a pro version and one that is a con version.
In my view thick concepts hold together a range of pointed evaluations—basically
pro, con and neither—of various strengths. I suggest that evaluative ﬂexibility ﬁts
very nicely with the nonseparationism I argue for, and nonseparationism in
general. Note that it does not cut against the idea expressed in the previous
paragraph. Positive and negative stances are essential to a thick concept being a
thick concept, that is they are a necessary part of the range. It is just that I do not
think they have to be present and apparent in every single use for a concept to be
treated as an evaluative concept.
With these three points introduced we can contrast my nonseparationism with
other sorts. First, a nonseparationist might say that any and every thick concept only
ever has one type of pointed evaluation, be it pro or con. Second, a nonseparationist
might say that while thick concepts have both evaluative and descriptive aspects, such
concepts are different from, and perhaps clearly and sharply different from, non-
evaluative, descriptive concepts. (And, almost certainly, also different from thin
concepts.) This second, different sort of nonseparationism shows up clearly the
importance and value of the overall position I advocate. Someone may be swept
along with the idea I have already mentioned about evaluative and descriptive
conceptual content being nonseparably intertwined. However, as I have already
said, if we accept this at face value and think that this is the key idea to argue for,
then we seem to be implicitly buying the idea that there are always two sorts of
conceptual content, albeit two sorts that when they come together cannot then be
6 I leave aside throughout this study the complication of speaker versus hearer meaning so we can focus
on the differences between the views themselves. In Chapter Six I sharpen these two views a little more and
contrast them with two more views of evaluation.
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pulled apart. In my view that gives too much to separationism in the ﬁrst place, for
this view essentially relies on there being two sorts of conceptual content and, indeed,
of treating evaluative content as being uniform. The more interesting and better
opposition to separationism is the sort of nonseparationism I favour, one that says
explicitly that thick concepts are just evaluative concepts that are as evaluative as thin
concepts, and that there is a variety of types of evaluation. In addition, I think that my
view makes very good sense of everyday thick concepts. In case it needs underlining,
I think there are thin concepts and nonevaluative concepts as well. It is just that
I believe that thick concepts are not simply products of their combination, nonsepar-
able or otherwise.
I have thought hard about labels. ‘Nonseparationism’ may suggest the type of
position that I have indicated a worry about: two or more parts that cannot be
separated instead of a position that casts doubt on thick concepts being made up of
parts in any fashion. However, I do not want to proliferate labels and my attention is
for the most part focused on arguing against separationism. It is enough for us to be
alive to the difference I have drawn between types of nonseparationism and be aware
that all nonseparationists think of thick concepts as being ‘unitary concepts’.7 It is
just that I wish to emphasize something that others do not, that there are dangers
in being swept along by the phrase ‘nonseparable intertwining of evaluative and
descriptive content’.
(b) Before I summarize each chapter, I should say something about the underlying
currents at work in my writing. I believe strongly that when arguing for a positive
philosophical view it is often vital to understand the whole terrain and begin by
getting under the skin of one’s (seeming) opponents. So it is with this debate. The
whole discussion of thin and thick concepts draws upon a number of ideas and
questions—the distinction between evaluation and description, the nature of their
relation, what it is to be ‘thin’—that are foundational and that can be asked and
answered in a variety of ways. Getting a handle on the terrain itself, and framing
things correctly, is crucial in shaping a decent ﬁnal view. Further, I believe strongly in
this case that one can see the merits of the nonseparationist view I argue for only by
thinking in detail about separationism ﬁrst: what separationists have argued for, and
what they could possibly argue for.
In this spirit, then, the ﬁrst half of the book is devoted wholly to understanding the
terrain. Nonseparationism will emerge as we go through this ﬁrst half, but the focus is
on separationism.
Note also that although I say something about the nature of evaluation at the
start of the next chapter so as to start us off—in effect outlining something of the
conservative view introduced above—I do not begin with a lengthy meditation on
7 This term is from Altham (1995), p. 162.
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the character and conception of the evaluative and then plunge into debates
between separationism and nonseparationism. That would be to put the cart before
the horse. A mature understanding of evaluation has to come later, once other
matters are in place.
This book presents three argumentative strategies by which nonseparationists can
defend their view against separationism: (i) a focus on the (supposed) evaluative
element, arguing that separationists cannot think of thin concepts being prior to
thick concepts; (ii) a focus on the (supposed) descriptive element, arguing that it
cannot be identiﬁed so as to give us a fully formed concept that, when joined with
some thin evaluative element, is enough to mimic a thick concept; and (iii) a focus on
the nature of the evaluative in the ﬁrst place. Strategies (i) and (ii) are not mutually
exclusive and, in fact, they are best viewed as working together. I think they are
important but that they ultimately do not wholly convince. I think that it is (iii) that
is the most important and fertile idea to raise against separationism. Along with
detailing the terrain, I regard my development of (iii) as my main contribution in this
work. As an argumentative strategy it sits on its own, although one can understand it
and how it is supposed to work only if one understands the ﬁrst two and their
limitations, which is why I spend time detailing them. The broad negative thought
that emerges against separationism is that when one reﬂects on the nature of the
evaluative and thinks through examples, separationism is shown to be a very curious
and strange way to understand thick concepts.
That last point is important to understand. This book does not contain any knock-
down arguments against separationism or for nonseparationism. I do not believe
that separationism is incoherent or that it can be revealed as fundamentally incon-
sistent with something we all take to be basic and important in our everyday lives,
for example. Instead, by thinking through various aspects of our everyday evaluative
lives I think that the nonseparationist picture I paint makes better sense of these
aspects, and the separationist picture less sense, indeed that it is a strange way to
view evaluation.
Talk of different pictures may sound pleasant, but it can result in a depressing end
point. A clash between two fundamentally different philosophical views can result in
argumentative moves being made by both sides that simply beg the question. That
can make the heart sink. I think there is no point in denying that there may be
something of that in this debate, however I do prefer to emphasize the positive.
I believe that a deepening of the account provided by nonseparationism proves to be
instructive. Even if no knock-down argument can be given against separationism,
I think that neutrals should be persuaded to my side. That is the task I set myself. If
I am lucky, some separationists will question their afﬁliation in addition.
I begin, in Chapter Two, by thinking about separationism. Separationists believe
that supposed thick concepts can be analysed as containing different elements and
aspects, normally some value-free descriptive conceptual content, and some evalu-
ative content, which is normally very thin. This itself brings with it the idea that to
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evaluate is in some way either simply to approve or to disapprove, and that this is
what marks the difference between evaluative content and descriptive content.
Despite a broad sweep of agreement, separationists disagree about many things,
some of which I have listed earlier. In Chapter Two I discuss two broad types of
separationism and present their advantages and disadvantages. I also think about the
strengths of the position overall while drawing attention to its likely weaknesses.
In Chapter Three I extend our understanding of the terrain by thinking about two
important models of conceptual relations, models that attempt to capture the relation
between families of general and speciﬁc concepts. The two models are the genus–
speciesmodel and the determinable–determinate model. In short I argue that separa-
tionists are committed to the former. Indeed, I argue that the genus–species model
when applied to thin and thick concepts just is an expression of separationism.
Integral to this model is that each individual species concept is created from the
combination of the overall genus concept and some unique differentia.8 In the case of
separationism, some thin evaluative content is the genus concept, while the differen-
tia is the descriptive content seen as unique to each thick concept.
As well as detailing both conceptual models, I suggest that neither is appropriate
for understanding thin and thick concepts. (Although separationism appears to be
the genus–species model in another guise, that does not mean that nonseparationists
should adopt the determinable–determinate model.) Why draw suspicion on both
models? The reason is that both sit badly with evaluative ﬂexibility, the idea
I introduced above. I detail this idea in Chapter Three, cast it in a positive light,
and show why it does not combine well with separationism. Here we have only
‘suggestion’, not ‘conclusive argument’. Evaluative ﬂexibility returns in Chapter Six
because other elements of my view will enrich it and be enriched in turn by it.
Progress is made in Chapter Three, however, because we are beginning to understand
the terrain more and we can see the limitations of the genus–species model and
separationism. At the end of Chapter Three I brieﬂy diagnose where a different way
of understanding thick and thin conceptual relations can enter.
At this point in the book I will have introduced and examined separationism, and
detailed the terrain of the debate. I am then in a position, in Chapter Four, to
introduce and consider the ﬁrst anti-separationist strategy, that which focuses on the
evaluative aspect of thick concepts.
I ﬁrst argue that there is a difference in kind between the thin and the thick; both
our conceptual models depend on that. (I also note, in passing, that the way in which
the boundary should be drawn should in turn make us query whether the separa-
tionist enterprise is as plausible as it initially appears.9 I pick this up again in
8 Or, unique to two thick concepts that share the same differentia but which have a different thin genus.
9 This discussion brings out the difference between saying that thin concepts are ‘wholly’ or ‘mostly’
evaluative. The ﬁrst may indicate a difference in kind between the thin and the thick, while the second
indicates a difference of degree.
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Chapter Six.) I use the barest thin concepts, PRO and CON, a lot here. I argue, through
consideration of the work of Allan Gibbard, that separationists are better off working
with a very thin sort of evaluative element in their analyses of thick concepts.
This builds to the main part of Chapter Four. In order for the genus–speciesmodel
to apply to thin and thick concepts, thin genus concepts have to be thought to be
conceptually prior to thick species concepts, thick concepts being the creation of
‘genus plus some differentia’. I consider what ‘conceptual priority’ might amount to
in this debate, and argue that there is no convincing argument for the conceptual
priority of the thin. But, in addition, I argue that ‘thick prioritarianism’ is not a good
idea either.10 If anything emerges with some plausibility, it is a third position I label
‘no prioritarianism’. This is the assertion that neither thin nor thick concepts have
conceptual priority over the other when considering how these two broad types of
concept relate. That said, although I think that this discussion is instructive and that
it shows the weaknesses of separationism, I also say that at most it stands as a set of
weighty considerations with which separationists have to deal. A neutral may not be
wholly convinced by the best arguments I lay out against ‘thin prioritarianism’, let
alone a separationist.
This is all to the good in my overall discussion, because this ﬁrst argumentative
strategy, while helping to understand the debate more clearly, also shows that more is
required for nonseparationists to challenge separationists successfully.
This takes us to Chapter Five. While the ﬁrst argumentative strategy concentrates
on the genus part of the model, the second concentrates on the differentia that is
supposedly unique to each and every thick concept. This brings in the so-called
disentangling argument and the shapelessness hypothesis. The disentangling argument
is an argument to the effect that we cannot separate evaluative from descriptive
content in the way that separationists envisage for thick concepts. This is because
evaluative concepts are shapeless with respect to descriptive concepts: we cannot
mimic the extension of evaluative concepts by descriptive conceptual content alone.
There is a lot to say about the argument and hypothesis and they have undoubtedly
been inﬂuential. I claim that the argument is not wholly successful, although that
does not mean that separationism walks away unscathed. I suggest a possible
different conclusion from the one often reached. However—and again this chimes
with my overall narrative—this is weaker than ideal for nonseparationists. In short,
they need something more than the ﬁrst two argumentative strategies discussed in
the ﬁrst half of this book.
One idea that emerges from my treatment of the second argumentative strategy is
that it meets separationism on its own terms, something mentioned above. This sets
the scene for Chapter Six. Separationists believe that evaluative and descriptive
conceptual content are not just separate but different. The second strategy, if
10 With apologies for the ugliness of this and other labels.
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adopted, is an attempt by nonseparationists to show that evaluative and descriptive
content can intertwine in some nonseparable fashion. But, as I have already indi-
cated, taken at face value and alone, this phrasing gives away too much to separa-
tionists. It assumes implicitly that one can divide evaluative from descriptive content
in the ﬁrst place. Further, it fails to question explicitly the narrow and conservative
view of the evaluative that is being assumed. It is in Chapter Six where I make good
on the various positive ideas I hold. Much of this chapter concerns how thick
concepts threaten the supposedly clear and obvious distinction between the evalu-
ative and the nonevaluative in part by showing as plausible the liberal view of
evaluation. I also conclude my argument for evaluative ﬂexibility.
As should be apparent, a lot of my discussion comes together in Chapter Six.
Readers will have to forgive me as every so often I say that I will elaborate or discuss
something further in Chapter Six. As also may be apparent as we go through,
Chapters Two to Six are the core of the book. The ﬁnal three chapters are briefer,
and designed to be so, but discuss important topics all the same.
In Chapter Seven I continue my motivation for and defence of the liberal view of
evaluation speciﬁcally by focusing on recent arguments from Pekka Väyrynen. He
argues that thick terms—for he focuses on these rather than concepts—can convey
pro and con evaluations, but it is best to assume that they typically do so only
because of context, tone of voice, and other factors. In effect, he denies the claim
that they are, in his words, ‘inherently evaluative’. What evaluations such terms
carry or convey is a matter of pragmatics, not semantics, and are therefore only
accidental or nonessential to them. This cuts against my view of thick concepts and
my view of evaluation in general, for I do think that pro and con evaluations, and
the more general evaluative conceptual content that thick concepts have (that
which reaches beyond pointed pro and con points) is part of what they essentially
are and marks them as a special part of our everyday thought. Väyrynen lays bare
his view of evaluation that is clearly conservative. Having outlined my positive view
in the previous chapter, in this chapter I deepen it by showing that Väyrynen’s
arguments are questionable.
In Chapter Eight I discuss two more topics, both of which relate to the social
aspect of thick concepts. The ﬁrst is a potential worry for nonseparationists. One
reason people have for believing in the shapelessness hypothesis—and one I accept to
some extent—is that one cannot fully appreciate a thick concept (what it is, how it is
used), unless one somehow appreciates the evaluative point of the concept. But this
raises an interesting question: to what extent does one have to accept and hold
sincerely the evaluative point of the concept? If one answers that an anthropologist
has to hold sincerely the views of the people she is studying, for example, then it might
make many if not all such investigations impossible. I map a way out of this problem
for nonseparationism and this leads me to extend my conclusion of Chapter Six, that
the real problem faces separationism: it makes anthropological understanding look
difﬁcult to achieve because it has a curious way of understanding thick concepts.
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This leads me to a second topic. Bernard Williams argues, quite famously, that
thick concepts form more of our social world than thin ones, and that they offer a
better hope for us maintaining conﬁdence that our evaluative practices are justiﬁed.
This role for thick concepts is contextualized by us imagining how we might treat our
evaluative practices when we confront other groups that think and conceptualize
differently from how we do. I argue that Williams is wrong to think that thick
concepts offer better hope than thin concepts on this point. Overall Williams
presents a fairly pessimistic view of our evaluative practices. I offer something that
is more optimistic.
In Chapter Nine I draw things to a conclusion. Although this is a study of a topic
in the philosophy of value that is quite speciﬁc, it has implications for metaethics
generally. One issue that requires discussion is how we conceive of thick concepts
and terms in relation to (supposed) thick features or properties. That is, how do the
ways in which humans think and communicate relate to the stuff that may exist and
to which we may be trying to refer? In this ﬁnal chapter I consider what my previous
discussion means for evaluative cognitivism and evaluative realism. My aim here is to
set debates about thin and thick concepts in some context and to show what is at
stake when it comes to discussions of realism. My aim is not to argue for the brand of
cognitivism that I favour. That is a topic for another time.
(c) Although I draw upon a number of writers in this study, this is not a historical
treatment of how thick concepts have become a focus of philosophical debate. In this
section, however, I situate my debate in the recent history.
As far as I am aware, Williams coined the term ‘thick concept’, in his Ethics and the
Limits of Philosophy (abbreviated as ELP). Interestingly, in this work the term ‘thin
concept’ never appears. Instead, Williams uses phrases such as ‘the most abstract
concepts’.11 It is worth noting, ﬁrst, that he explicitly deﬁnes thin and thick concepts
differently from how I have done, and instead uses a frame that suggests ‘normativity’
and the possibility of concepts encoding reasons. The slogan often used when
discussing Williams’ view is thus: thin concepts are ‘action-guiding’ while thick
concepts are both ‘action-guiding’ and ‘world-guided’. Despite this difference
between us, we can see that Williams’ chief concern is to argue against the supposed
separation of thick concepts into component parts, no matter how those parts are
captured. He also thinks, as I have said, that thick concepts are more important than
thin ones when it comes to the possibility of evaluative knowledge and understanding
our social world.
Although Williams is famous for exciting interest in thin and thick concepts, to
start our story about thick concepts here would be unwise. Many intellectual histories
11 He mentions ‘thin concepts’ by that label in Williams (1996), p. 25, but does so without any
indication that this is a new development. Samuel Schefﬂer in his 1987 review of ELP talks of ‘thin
concepts’. Schefﬂer tells me that his memory is of Williams happily using ‘thin concept’ at the time of his
writing ELP, so its absence is probably some quirk of no philosophical signiﬁcance.
INTRODUCT ION 
are themselves aimed at telling a particular view.12 Here is my brief, impressionistic
version that notes two other sources.
First, during the late 1950s Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch ran an Oxford seminar
in which they began to question recent work in noncognitivism, speciﬁcally the
prescriptivism of R. M. Hare.13 They also had in their sights the fact–value distinction
more generally. For many prominent thinkers during the twentieth century, the
separation of and clear distinction between facts and values was an article of faith.
When Maddy says that Paddy is wearing brown trousers or that today is Sunday, she
is trying to state facts. When she says that Paddy is good she is ascribing a value to
him. Although it looks as if we can pick out values as much as we pick out facts, and
that they form part of the stuff of the world, for those that hold to the fact–value
distinction the two are very different. Facts are things in the world, while values seem
as if they may well not be. Often the fact–value distinction was given a naturalistic
edge, with theorists thinking that to be a (proper) fact is to be the sort of thing that is
studied, or could be studied, by the natural sciences. Modern natural science has no
room for values: it cannot measure them, or test them, and it seems impossible to
sense them with any of the normal ﬁve human senses. So some other and quite
different explanation is needed of our value judgements. As part of this view, doubt
was cast on the reality of values. Additionally, questions were raised about the
character of our language and psychology when we judge that a particular thing
has a certain value. Some of those that relied on the fact–value distinction explicitly
conceived of it as a development of Hume’s is–ought distinction.14
It is easy to see how Hare’s prescriptivism and, say, A. J. Ayer’s emotivism step in
here. We have some supposed nonevaluative, factual, descriptive stuff. We have
nonevaluative concepts that we use to pick this stuff out and categorize it as different
things. Some of this stuff is further seen as good and some of it as bad. We then have
some theory that tells us how it is that such value judgements are conveyed and what
their exact function is. Some noncognitivists emphasize the emotive stance that such
12 See Appiah (2008), chapter 1 for a nice discussion of this idea.
13 The best discussions of their ideas are in Foot (1958) and (1958–9), and Murdoch (1956), (1957), and
(1962). Williams notes that this seminar was one of the inspirations for his work on thick concepts:
Williams (1985), note 7 pp. 217–18. The precise idea he cites is that one cannot understand an idea unless
one sees its evaluative point, an idea I discuss in Chapter Eight.
14 Putnam (2002), esp. chapter 1, is very good on the history of the development of the fact–value
distinction (although Putnam prefers ‘dichotomy’) and its relation to Hume. One short discussion is worth
repeating. He ends that ﬁrst chapter with thoughts about Carnap and the distinction between observational
and theoretical terms. Observational terms are those that refer to properties for which there is a simple test
procedure that can determine whether the supposed property in question exists. (Examples include ‘blue’,
‘hot’, and ‘warmer than’.) Theoretical terms are those that refer to hypothetical physical properties (such as
‘charge’) that we introduce to explain and predict certain observable phenomena. Putnam (p. 25) imagines
a historian describing someone as cruel. This, instead of being a theoretical term in Carnap’s sense, is a
“term that ﬁgures in a certain kind of reﬂective understanding of the rationale of conduct, in understanding
both how the agent feels and acts and how others perceive the agent’s feelings and actions”. Putnam
imagines Carnap dismissing cruelty, therefore, as some “metaphysical nonsense”.
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judgements have, and get us to think about evinced Boos and Hurrahs. Others, such
as Hare, get us to think about commands and prescriptions.
Present-day philosophers are used to the fact–value distinction coming under
pressure from a number of sources. Foot and Murdoch, through concentration on
Hare, can be seen as questioning whether there is such a distinction, and what one
might mean by talking of the ‘factual’ in particular. When we say of Paddy that he is
honest, or fair, or wicked, or stylish, are we trying to pick out some fact about him
or ascribe a value to him? For Foot and Murdoch it is very likely that we are
ascribing values. But it is not so obvious that we are not also picking out something
factual and, further, that it would be unwise to separate these two aspects of the
one thing. Their reasons—or at least Foot’s—for thinking this will be outlined in
Chapter Six.
A second point worth noting in our brief history is that although Williams coined
‘thick concept’, before him Gilbert Ryle used the phrase ‘thick description’ to describe
ideas in the general ballpark.15 A thick description is simply a more speciﬁc sort of
description that is required in order to categorize an action or thing. To give a hint of
the idea, consider the difference between the more general THINKING and the more
speciﬁc REFLECTING, MEDITATING, and DAYDREAMING. Ryle mixes this with his idea that
among relevantly similar actions and things, described in similar ways, there need
not be a separable and identiﬁable core or base thing that they all have in common.
So reﬂection, meditation, and daydreaming are all types of thinking, but it is not as if
there is a speciﬁc isolatable thing—thinking—that is common to all of the individual
instances and which is attached to three other (separable) things in turn to create
those three instances of thinking.
I mention Ryle here, not just because of his use of the word ‘thick’, but also
because he thinks of some descriptions as being abstractions from other, thicker
descriptions, echoing Williams’ labelling in ELP. Williams would have been aware of
Ryle’s work and a comparison of their ideas is instructive. I discuss Ryle’s view of thick
descriptions and compare his thoughts withWilliams’ views of thick concepts, again in
Chapter Six.
Alongside these points, it is worth remarking that writers other than Williams—
prominently Simon Blackburn, Jonathan Dancy, Allan Gibbard, Susan Hurley, John
McDowell, Hilary Putnam, and David Wiggins—were making interesting points
about thick concepts during the 1980s and 1990s. Although my study is primarily
ahistorical, I will draw on the work of some of these writers in the coming chapters.16
15 Ryle (1966–7) and (1968). Although the phrase features prominently in these late papers, the idea of
there being higher-levels of description that contrast with bare or minimal descriptions is something that
runs through a lot of Ryle’s work. I have not been able to ascertain the extent to which Ryle—or Hare—
knew of the Foot–Murdoch seminar, let alone whether they attended.
16 It is also worth mentioning Clifford Geertz who, in Geertz (1973), used Ryle’s ideas to great effect in
reﬂecting on what goes on when one attempts to understand other cultures. Although I do not discuss her
work, Lovibond (1983) is also relevant.
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Key to their discussions was the aforementioned idea of whether evaluative and
descriptive conceptual content were separable and, hence, whether thick concepts
could be reduced to more basic concepts.
(d) In the previous few pages, and certainly in what is to come, a number of contrasts
and ideas appear. Here I highlight three so as to orientate the reader.
(i) The fact–value distinction. I have just mentioned this. I do not speculate as to the
origins of the distinction, nor as to how scientiﬁcally respectable it is.17 Sufﬁce it to
say, in this study I assume a fairly simple-minded characterization: there is stuff in
and of the world, and there are values that humans attach to some of that stuff that
take either a positive or negative cast. There is assumed to be a distinction between
stuff and how we value that stuff, and that distinction is thought to be very deep and
unbridgeable. Once the distinction is accepted, another question looms: even if facts
and values are radically different types of thing, do values exist and, indeed, are they
as ontologically respectable as facts?18 Some modern theorists may accept the
distinction while trying to show that values, or evaluative properties, are still onto-
logically respectable. However, many who wielded the distinction originally did so
with the explicit or implicit intent of casting doubt on the reality of values. These
theorists thought it unwise to think of values as being part of the world of stuff really
(and their theories may further explain this point), and that such values are in the
world merely in some broader sense, namely in the sense that humans create values
and humans are themselves part of the world.
There are different ways of charactering the fact–value distinction.19 Most discus-
sions are based on this assumption: we are trying to characterize the world and what
is fundamental to our ontology (and some discussions drop the ‘fundamental’; they
just care about what exists, fundamental or not). Our language and our concepts are
essential to that, for reﬂection on our concepts and how we carve the world reveals to
us what our ontological commitments are.
I take it that the broad distinction I am interested in shows up essentially with
other terms and phrases: in the ‘evaluative’ and the ‘descriptive’, obviously, but also
in the ‘normative’ and the ‘positive’ used in the social sciences, and in Hume’s
distinction between is and ought, which in modern-day terms has a narrower focus
on normativity and the guidance of action. No matter what labels we use, there is
17 For example, we might think ﬁrst of all about what facts are, and whether they can be respectable to
and in modern science. The fact that the chair is over there is very different from the chair itself, and
different again from the atoms that make up a chair. Often ‘fact’ in the mouths of some thinkers was just a
placeholder for ‘a thing that exists’.
18 And further, if they are assumed to be real, should they be thought of naturalistically or nonnatur-
alistically? There are many discussions of this in modern metaethics. For a brief ﬂavour see Brink (1989),
Enoch (2011), and Shafer-Landau (2003). Kirchin (2012) discusses many positions in metaethics.
19 As well as Putnam (2002) on this topic see both Blackburn (2013) and Väyrynen (2013), pp. 15–18
for responses.
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assumed to be some sharp distinction between how things are, on the one hand, and
how we positively or negatively react to those things and how we might like things to
be in the future, on the other. Use of Hume’s distinction will emphasize this latter idea,
where the focus may be on reasoning: ‘if this is the case, then what ought to be done?’20
In this book my focus is not on arguing for the reality of evaluative properties. My
aim is to question the fact–value distinction in the ﬁrst place, and to provide but one
building block in a defence (in fact, a family of different defences) of the reality of
values and of a certain view of what happens when we reason and judge. The
introduction of thick concepts, or their promise, is designed to cast doubt on the
plausibility of the distinction between facts and values. The aim is to make us question
what is going on in our language and concepts, our judgement and reasoning that uses
them, and what we can conclude about the structure and character of our ontology.
(ii) Concepts and properties. This whole study is focused on thinking about concep-
tual content. I use ‘stuff ’ as a colloquial and general term to indicate things in the
world, with concepts being thought of in a simple way: they are the tools by which we
characterize and capture that stuff.
Although this book is not a defence of (my version of) evaluative realism, as
mentioned I indicate what implications my thoughts have for properties and reality
in Chapter Nine, given that I discuss matters wholly in terms of concepts.
(iii) Concepts and terms. Again I am assuming something simple here. Terms are the
linguistic tools by which we represent the world to ourselves, while concepts are the
non-linguistic tools by which we do the same. The philosophical characterization of
concepts is a controversial matter, and in this study I want to bracket this dispute
because otherwise it will divert us from the main issues between separationists and
nonseparationists.21 Indeed, it is fair to say that this has been the approach that most
writers on thick concepts have taken. However, I will say here that I do not think of
concepts as literal mental representations, as may be found in cognitive psychology.
More positively, I think both that concepts are those non-linguistic entities that help
us to present the world in a certain way to ourselves (such that they can be contrasted
with the referents of such modes of presentation) and that they can be and are
revealed in how people use terms to identify, categorize, communicate, and the like.
20 There is a very interesting and different frame to be used for all of these discussions: perhaps there
could be a three-way distinction between facts, value, and reasons (or similar ideas), and perhaps we should
be casting doubt on clear distinctions between these three notions. Or perhaps we should simply be
interested in exploring the relations more. Why put values and reasons on the same side against facts?
Perhaps they are as different from each other as either is from facts. This is really interesting, but in order to
make some progress I choose to focus just on the evaluative and the descriptive, although reasons and
actions do make appearances every so often. A focus on the relation between and differences between
reasons and values is a matter for another time.
21 See Margolis and Laurence (2014), especially §1 for a ﬂavour. Note that after they list three main
views, including the family of ‘concepts as mental representations’ Margolis and Lawrence indicate that
one could try to combine them.
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One important distinction between concepts and terms is this. Just as a single word
can have more than one meaning and more than one concept—think of ‘bank’—so a
number of words can have a single concept standing behind them. For example, a
number of words such as ‘fair’, ‘ﬁne’, ‘good’, and ‘great’ can be used not only to
indicate the concepts linked explicitly to those terms, but they can all be used, in
everyday conversation, to pick out some same, general concept PRO. Note something
already mentioned in passing: Pekka Väyrynen, one of my chief interlocutors, casts
the debates using ‘thick terms’, but I take it that our debate is about the same issues.
(e) One last set of comments. There are topics I would like to have discussed in detail
but have decided to leave out for matters of space. Here are three. First, thick
concepts are traditionally thought of as one word ‘things’, reﬂecting one word
terms. But there is no reason to think that matters have to be like this; there could
easily be, and probably are, inseparable evaluative concepts that require a number of
words to express them, be they in English or any other language. Indeed, further, we
might then think that all sorts of linguistic device, such as simile, metaphor, and the
like might be useful (or necessary) in indicating some thick evaluations. For simpli-
city’s sake, however, I deal only with one word concepts in this study.22 Second,
because of my language throughout this book I may give the impression that we have
distinct evaluative domains, such as the ethical, the aesthetic, and so on. While some
concepts and ideas are solidly within one domain, I do not believe for one moment
that there are hard and clear demarcations between various types of evaluation and
that every evaluative concept sits squarely in one domain and no others. For example,
we can call an artwork grotesque, offensive, heroic, and the like. Such claims can be
meant non-metaphorically and may have both aesthetic and ethical connotations.
Other such examples abound when considering other borders, such as the ethical–
prudential and the aesthetic–epistemic. Further to this, ethical evaluations can be
offered without using clear and obvious ethical terminology.23 These are all interest-
ing ideas, but I do not detail them here. I hope that all I say in this book is both
consistent with these ideas and conducive to them.
Lastly, I keep to one side, as much as possible, the idea that if there are concepts
then there are very likely to be different conceptions of those concepts and, hence, we
need some way to distinguish when a concept is a conception of another concept, and
when it is a different concept altogether. Making good on this task is crucial in
understanding, for example, whether people are in genuine dispute with one another,
and in understanding the very conditions for agreement ﬁrst of all. I ﬁnd this whole
topic of great interest, but I leave it aside here for another time.
Having indicated ideas that do not get detailed in this book, I now start on those
questions I do wish to discuss.
22 See Zangwill (2013) for more on this idea.






The main aim of this chapter is to detail one of the two main accounts that seek to
characterize thick concepts. As mentioned in Chapter One, I label this account
‘separationism’. Although I list and explore some of its advantages towards the end
of this chapter, I do not advocate it. In later chapters I do argue against separation-
ism, but my present task is to describe and understand it so as to outline its appeal.
There are some ghosts at our feast. The ﬁrst is mentioned in passing a few times
and it made an appearance in Chapter One. The disentangling argument, which
employs the shapelessness hypothesis, is often raised against separationism. Some of
the points made by separationists will make sense only once we have considered this
argument and hypothesis in Chapter Five. But we must start somewhere; we would
ﬁnd it hard to understand the disentangling argument without understanding what it
was an argument against. I trust that what I say below makes enough sense for now
without articulating what the argument and hypothesis are.
Two other ghosts are evaluative conceptual content (or ‘evaluation’ generally) and
descriptive conceptual content. As mentioned in Chapter One, I do not begin by
examining these labels in detail, but will merely employ them after a little discussion.
For a start, I think the difference is something that can be said only once we have
discussed the various battles between separationists and nonseparationists. Thick
concepts are interesting because they call into question the claim that there is a hard
and fast boundary between evaluation and descriptive conceptual content. So it
would get matters the wrong way round to think that we have to articulate fully
what evaluation is before we began to discuss thick concepts. In addition, it seems a
fool’s task to aim to give detailed necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, say, to mark the
difference between evaluative and descriptive content; or so I will suggest in this
study.1 It therefore seems good enough for our purposes to rely on rules of thumb
and intuitions about familiar examples to tell the difference between thin and thick
concepts. It seems better to let a view of the evaluative and the descriptive emerge
1 Aristotle’s advice from Nicomachean Ethics 1094b–1095a about the precision of explanation being
appropriate for the subject matter seems apt here; Aristotle (2000). Furthermore, in what language would
such necessary and sufﬁcient conditions be spelt out? Descriptive language? This would obviously be
viciously circular.
through examples and attempts at characterization, and then try to make that view
more concrete.
In that spirit let me begin by saying that evaluative content seems to be the sort of
content which expresses, or is, our approval and disapproval of certain things.2 Its
most basic and bare form can be expressed by two concepts that I mentioned in
Chapter One, PRO and CON. I assume throughout that these are the most basic and
minimal positive and negative stances we can take towards things. Philosophers may
often talk of simple approval and disapproval in this regard, or like and dislike, and
both distinctions seem good enough. Alternatively, we might be inclined to refer to
PRO, say, as a ‘positive preference’, but that may pack too much into the idea. As we
will see later in this book, a positive view may not imply that we want the thing, or
want to do something with the thing, or that we prefer the thing to something else,
and ‘preference’ carries these connotations. (Or, it does in my view, anyway.) We
may not wish to do anything with something we think of positively; we may simply
think and feel positively about it. Whatever our view about what a preference is, or if
similar worries plague approval and likings, all I mean by PRO and CON is, again, the
most minimal positive and negative views we can imagine.
I emphasize a point made in passing in Chapter One. Although we may not use
the words ‘pro’ and ‘con’ very much, I think that we use the concepts, explicitly
or implicitly, all the time. We might use various words to express PRO, for example,
words such as ‘good’, ‘fair’, ‘ﬁne’, ‘cool’, ‘wicked’, the many various slang words that
come and go, and various linguistic expressions and tics such as ‘uh-huh’, ‘alright’,
and ‘yeah’. These words and expressions can obviously be used of other concepts, but
in some contexts they are used to indicate only PRO.3 I will have more to say about PRO
and CON throughout this book.
Although we may use PRO and CON every day, evaluation is not conﬁned simply to
such bare evaluation. We can express our attractions and repulsions, our joys and
annoyances, and so on. Our thick concepts in particular seem to be indicating
content that is pro-in-a-way and con-in-a-way. For example, to label something as
generous is to praise it for being a certain way, and the way in which it exists is what
gives—or is—the reason for the praise. This praise and the ‘certain way’ in which
something exists are united in or by a thick concept. The debate between separa-
tionists and nonseparationists centres on how to understand that uniting. Such
content can alter in strength, of course; if something is excellent it is typically better
than if it is just nice, okay, or acceptable.
2 Here I loosely articulate the conservative view of evaluation, mentioned in Chapter One. I tighten this
up and compare it with the liberal view in Chapter Six.
3 For a different view about such thin concepts—that they are merely a philosopher’s construct—see
Chappell (2013). I think that Chappell is correct that very often philosophers are not alive to the
encrustation that supposed thin concepts have, and that this may render such concepts less thin than is
usually thought. However, I also think this paper misses something else that is of the everyday and
ordinary, namely the sort of positive and negative judgement that I indicate in the main text.
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Although I argue in this book for an understanding of evaluation which is not
exhausted by pro and con stances, this starting idea is not a bad one. This idea of
evaluation provides a nice, clear contrast with descriptive content, which seems to be
the sort of content that describes features of things in a value-free way. This starting
characterization might not be that helpful since I have deﬁned descriptive content in
relation to evaluative content, rather than giving it a characterization that stands free.
But this interdeﬁning, or rough-characterization-of-one-broad-family-of-concept-
only-after-the-other-is-introduced, might well be inevitable. At least some clear-cut
examples of descriptive content are easy to give. After all, there does not seem to be
any evaluation involved in saying that some piece of Paddy’s clothing is brown or
that the table is ‘over there’. However and as advertised, once we think harder about
matters, we should see that the domain of evaluative is larger than we may at ﬁrst
think. That idea will occupy us in Chapter Six. For now, we should think about
separationism, and in doing so assume that we have a good initial grasp of the
distinction between evaluative and descriptive conceptual content.
One ﬁnal word of warning. Chapter One started us off quite gently, and Chapters
Three and Four should also be relatively easy to follow even if both contain a few
detailed topics. This present chapter, however, is more technical and abstract. If one
is uninterested in the niceties of different sorts of separationism, then the main
message to take from this chapter is that separationism is not a single, narrow
position. It contains within itself scope for splintering into different accounts.
2.2 Introducing Separationism
In Chapter One I described brieﬂy the very essence of a thick concept, namely a
concept that in some way has both an evaluative aspect and a descriptive aspect or, as
separationists may prefer to say, evaluative and descriptive elements or parts. A key
question for all theorists is how the evaluative and descriptive combine. What unites
all separationist theories is the thought that any story about evaluative and descrip-
tive conceptual content must assume that these are two distinct and separable sorts of
content.
Alongside this ﬁrst idea, further points need stating. Separationists do not claim,
ﬁrst, that thick concepts feel phenomenologically disjointed or feel as if they are a
mixture. Nor do they claim, second, that it is easy for everyday users of thick concepts
to note exactly where the descriptive starts and the evaluative begins. What they
claim is that any thick concept contains parts that can be separated in the abstract, in
theory, upon reﬂection. Nor, third, are they claiming that the relation between the
evaluative and descriptive parts of all thick concepts is exactly the same. Separa-
tionists can and do state that while some thick concepts have to carry the same sort of
evaluation, even to the same strength, in most or all contexts, others do not. An
example of the former might be JUST (or JUSTICE). Can we ever imagine something
being just and being bad for that reason? The positive evaluation seems quite tightly
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wedded to the overall concept. An example of the latter might be ELEGANT (or
ELEGANCE). The elegance of one poem might add positively to its value, whereas the
elegance of another might be neither here nor there, or might be its greatest failing.
Some poems’ ideas and moods are better expressed through a rough style and messy
structure so as to convey urgency or rawness.4
Fourth, separationists do not routinely claim that thick concepts are bogus or
useless. They might claim that it is erroneous to characterize thick concepts in the
way that nonseparationists do, but that is a different point. We can legitimately
describe institutions as just and poems as elegant, just as we describe them as old or
long. It is just that we should understand what lies behind the use of such terms
and concepts. So, returning to the general point, separationists’ key claim is simply
that thick concepts are not unitary concepts, and are instead the product of
separable conceptual contents or other elements, which in turn might themselves
be full-blown concepts.
Fifth, it is open to separationists to cast evaluation in different ways. I have
switched in my introductory comments from ‘evaluative conceptual content’ to
‘evaluation’ and ‘evaluative element’. The ﬁrst idea is something that cognitivist-
separationists will happily embrace, but is something that their noncognitivist
cousins will reject. (We met this distinction in Chapter One.) Although a lot of the
discussion in this chapter is run in terms of attitudes that are evinced, I am not so
concerned at all with how the evaluation is treated; I am more concerned with other
ways in which separationists differ.
That is the general position. Why should we adopt it? I detail various reasons for
doing so at the end of this chapter, reasons that can be expressed better after my
discussion of the positions. But in essence all of these reasons stem from an idea
I have already voiced, namely the difference between evaluation and descriptive
conceptual content, between facts and values. These seem to be two radically
different ways of responding to or capturing the world. It makes sense, goes the
thought, to be suspicious of the claim that any conceptual content that has aspects of
both evaluation and descriptive content is a unitary concept, a concept that cannot be
analysed into separable parts. The positive, separationist views that stem from this
suspicion try to make sense of how we can go about analysing thick concepts into
component parts.
In what follows I detail various sorts of separationism, using two broad headings.
I consider their rival merits, both in comparison to one another and in comparison to
a general form of nonseparationism. Towards the end I sow seeds of doubt regarding
separationism as a whole.
4 I use JUST and ELEGANT only to illustrate the general contention. Things can be said against the claims
made about both examples. For instance, maintaining a strict form of justice can at times be detrimental to
friendship and familial love. However, this point should not detain us.
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One last point. My set-up has a ﬁctional quality. It is easy to indicate views that
constitute our two broad headings and associate them with particular philosophers.
However, there is a grey area where it is not so clear what sort of separationism we
have, and my talk of two headings may mislead. This greyness is partly because of the
philosophical issues involved, and partly because people have ﬁne-tuned their views
over time. I have Simon Blackburn particularly in mind regarding this last point.
I sort this issue out towards the end, but we ﬁrst need to understand the broad views.
2.3 Simple Separationism
The ﬁrst sort of separationism I label ‘simple separationism’. I take work by Black-
burn during the 1980s and 1990s as my main example.5 ‘Simple’ here indicates that
this position is less complicated than its rival. It is not being used pejoratively; indeed,
the position has virtues.
The idea is this. Imagine we have a wholly nonevaluative, purely descriptive
concept, such as CHAIR.6 A certain extension of the concept will be ﬁxed: these things
will be chairs and those things will not be. Imagine now that we begin to ﬁnd some
chairs completely lovely for whatever reason. We could write this as ‘chair↑’, which
indicates the descriptive term ‘chair’ said sincerely with a positive tone of voice. We
then introduce this term and tone into our vocabulary. Indeed, imagine that it
becomes so entrenched in what we and our peer group think and do that a new
concept develops, CHAIR-PRO. (We might not literally say ‘chair-pro’, but this is the
concept standing behind ‘chair↑’.) CHAIR-PRO could be used of all chairs, although it
will probably be used of only a subset. We can imagine a related term and concept,
‘chair↓’ and CHAIR-CON that cover some of the other chairs, as well as our original
CHAIR.7 We can imagine further examples that indicate toleration, infatuation (with
two arrows) and the like. This proposal identiﬁes the evaluative content in the
concept as some thin concept throughout, typically PRO or CON depending on whether
the evaluation is positive or negative. Note that what has happened in this scenario is
that we have started with a certain tone of voice or evinced attitude and, because of
5 See Blackburn (1984), pp. 148–51; (1992), pp. 285–99; and (1998), pp. 92–104. Across these pieces
there is a ﬁne-tuning of Blackburn’s view, which culminates in something he says in Blackburn (1998)
and something he says in Blackburn (2013). I discuss this in §2.4. Thinking about his central and earlier
work on the topic will be instructive, however, as many ideas still hold. Other examples of simple
separationism include Stevenson (1944), chapter 3, and Hare (1952), p. 121; and (1963), pp. 21–9. Daniel
Elstein and Thomas Hurka seem to cast Blackburn as a simple separationist in Elstein and Hurka (2009),
notes 10 and 11, and do not comment on the ﬁne-tuning of his view that I pick out. Another notable
separationist paper is Smith (2013), which draws on Hare’s work.
6 I believe that CHAIR is a pretty good bet for being a nonevaluative, descriptive concept, and that stands
despite my arguments in Chapter Six that are designed to make us question what the difference is between
the evaluative and the descriptive.
7 A new concept, CHAIR-NEUTRAL, may come about, which serves to indicate no evaluation where one
could be expected to be given. That would be a different concept from that which involved just ‘no
evaluation’, that is just CHAIR.
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some cultural entrenching, we have begun to think that we have some evaluative
conceptual content. This content has become connected to or, better, has become
intertwined with some descriptive content.
Concepts such as CHAIR-PRO are interesting because they unite what are two
separate sorts of conceptual content and they do so obviously. Such examples are
odd, however, since they are mere philosophical constructs. Of course, we may on an
odd occasion say ‘chair↑’. Imagine, for example, a situation where you are relieved
that ﬁnally someone has brought in the chair you have been requesting for ages,
rather than the unwanted tables with which you have been left. An exclamation of
‘chair↑!’ might be perfectly natural. But despite such rare examples, we do not have a
fully ﬂedged concept of CHAIR-PRO. We simply do not need such a thing. We manage
perfectly well with CHAIR and when the occasion arises indicate a positive or negative
attitude with tone of voice or through other things. The evaluation connected to
‘chair’ and CHAIR is only accidental. So CHAIR-PRO is most deﬁnitely a strange philo-
sophical construct.
This matters because surely the aim of such examples is to make vivid what is
going on with familiar, everyday thick concepts. We do not really care about silly
concepts made up by philosophers. What have they to teach us?
Luckily, Blackburn constructs a quite famous case that has exactly the same
structure as ‘chair↓’, but which is far closer to familiar concerns.8 His example is
‘fat↓’. He imagines a culture in which it is perfectly ﬁne to be fat, perhaps it is even
admirable. Then, some people—“slim, active, lithe teenagers, perhaps”—begin to be
disgusted by fat people, and describe them as ‘fat↓’.9 It is clear from this example that
‘fat↓’ should be separated into two distinct parts, ‘description+tone’ as Blackburn
puts it.10 We can imagine the story extending and the group carrying on speaking in
this way, perhaps inﬂuencing others, so that over time or because of signiﬁcant
incidents a new concept is born, FAT-CON.11 It is clear from what Blackburn says about
‘fat↓’, and his comments about the work of chief nonseparationist John McDowell,
that he is committed to thinking that we should separate concepts such as FAT-CON
into their evaluative and descriptive elements, and that we should further see the
evaluation as something that should be given a noncognitivist treatment of some sort.
Perhaps other concepts might be forthcoming in an extended scenario. Perhaps some
8 The example is ﬁrst introduced in Blackburn (1992), p. 290, but is given more detail in (1998),
speciﬁcally pp. 94–7 and with other points made across pp. 97–104.
9 Blackburn (1998), p. 95. 10 This is used primarily in Blackburn (1992).
11 Blackburn sticks throughout his writings to ‘fat↓’ and emphasizes tone of voice and the like. Nowhere
does he refer to a possible concept, with some attached evaluation, which is entirely in keeping with his
noncognitivism. To keep things strict, and because it helps with points I make later, I introduce FAT-CON.
I use this concept a lot in this chapter because ‘fat↓’ is a well-used example in Blackburn’s writings and it is
easy to manipulate so as to make points. We could worry that FAT is itself an evaluative concept, but I leave
that nicety aside and employ it as Blackburn intends it, as a nonevaluative concept. (Thanks to Graeme
A. Forbes for this ﬁnal point.)
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rejoice in being fat and the concept FAT-PRO is born. There might be a range of
reactions attached to the same descriptive content of fat. And, as always, all of these
attitudes can be indicated through tone of voice, body language, and the like.12
We can characterize other concepts similarly. For example, Blackburn, following
R. M. Hare, has drawn attention to the fact that while some people’s industry is a
good thing, we often bemoan others’ industry. Perhaps in the latter case what is being
worked towards is disagreeable or, more pertinently, the industry itself is holding the
person back. Perhaps a graduate student is working too hard and cannot see the
wood for the trees. She needs to relax and lighten up.13 Blackburn says similar things
about tidiness. An insistence that my university ofﬁce is kept impeccably tidy aids my
work, but keeping to this ideal at home can drive my family mad.14
The point of such examples should be obvious. Blackburn, Hare, and others are
trying to show that familiar everyday thick concepts such as KIND and WICKED work in
the same way. We have some descriptive content to which some evaluative element is
conjoined. This evaluative element can be signalled through tone of voice and other
things. In some cases the evaluative element we might expect is cancelled or reversed,
for example when someone speaks sarcastically. In other cases, we might expect an
evaluation of some sort, but it is not clear what the ‘typical’ attitude would be. (And
so on.) Furthermore, the history of certain thick concepts might be quite different
from that of ‘fat↓’ and FAT-CON. We no longer have to signal with tone of voice that we
approve of just things. Given typical conventions, judging something to be just in a
normal speaking voice is enough to imply that we approve of the thing. But this
difference, be it genetic or otherwise, should not put us off the main scent. Everyday,
familiar thick concepts should be characterized as involving two distinct and separ-
able sorts of element, the descriptive and the evaluative, where the latter is taken to be
something thin.
Hence, the conclusion that Blackburn reaches is that there are, strictly, no thick
concepts because there is no thick conceptual content. All familiar, everyday thick
concepts can be broken into non-thick component elements. It just so happens that
these elements are sometimes conjoined together. So we can talk of FAT-PRO as a
concept, but really it is the concept FAT conjoined with something else. Some theorists
will choose to give a noncognitive analysis of that evaluation, as Blackburn and Hare
famously choose to. But, as I have mentioned in Chapter One, we could give the
12 Blackburn discusses this point at length in Blackburn (1992).
13 Blackburn (1992), p. 286 and Hare (1952), p. 121. Blackburn’s example of ‘industry of which we
disapprove’ is some people’s attitude towards Margaret Thatcher when she was Prime Minister of the
UK. Yet that negative attitude might be focused on her aims, indeed this is how Blackburn portrays it, and
any disapproval of the industry may well ride on that rather than being directed at the industry itself. This
is not quite what Blackburn needs to support his claim about the ﬂexibility of the evaluative element, hence
my example of the student in which the industry itself is viewed negatively.
14 Which it does.
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evaluation element a cognitive analysis while still maintaining the separation of the
two parts.15
This is all very well, yet I want to expose immediately a slide to avoid. Clearly some
people disapprove of people who are fat while others revel in largeness. We have a
range of terms in this area—some affectionate, some distasteful—from which we may
draw concepts: ‘fat’, ‘obese’, ‘chunky’, ‘cuddly’, ‘gross’, ‘whale’. Some words can be
used nonevaluatively, as in medical charts. Some are typically used positively, while
others are typically used negatively. (‘Obese’ is a medical term, but it can be used by
people to chastise and bully.) No one should deny this. Nor should we deny that there
is a difference between ‘chair↑’ and ‘fat↓’: one example taps into familiar concerns
and language use, while the other does not. Similarly, we can readily see that INDUSTRY
and TIDY may work in the way Blackburn suggests. We seem to have some fairly clear
descriptive conceptual content in both cases; indeed such contents form familiar
stand-alone concepts.16 But just because a concept such as FAT-CON taps into familiar
concerns, we should not therefore conclude straightaway that all familiar thick
concepts work in this way. That would be to slide from one sort of example to
another while unthinkingly accepting that they have the same structure, when so far
we have not really thought hard about the case that interests us. TIDY and INDUSTRY
might be different from KIND and CRUEL.
That said, if we dig a little we can see that this model appeals. We have already
uncovered some nice aspects of this proposal. We have a determinate descriptive
concept that, in principle, is accessible to everyone. We then have evaluations that are
attached to it in some fashion. Such evaluations are allowed to alter in direction
(positive, negative, perhaps none at all) and strength, depending on the context. This
seems to reﬂect the reality of our use of some thick concepts. Where there is a ﬁxed
attitude, perhaps with things that are deemed just, this is either a phenomenon to be
merely noted, or something to be explained simply because we humans are built so as
to like the (descriptive) features that form the justice of just things. The strength of
this proposal is that we have a simple picture which allows for ﬂexibility of evaluative
attitude, and this seems a key feature of our thick concepts.
There are other virtues as well, which we will come to. Before I end this section,
however, it is worth exposing the ways in which simple separationism might further
divide. We have some distinct and separable descriptive and evaluative elements. But
these two elements can combine differently. Here are two models.17 We could
conjoin the two elements: we say that something is a descriptive way, then attach
an attitude. This is what is going on with Blackburn’s example of ‘fat↓’ as so far
15 See again Elstein and Hurka (2009), pp. 516–17.
16 Again, reﬂecting on and questioning this will be done in Chapter Six.
17 The labels are from Allan Gibbard in Gibbard (1992). See also Blackburn (1984), pp. 148–9 for a full
discussion of conjunction and (something very much like) licensing. Blackburn suggests the point about
indeteminancy in my next paragraph. Gibbard brieﬂy deﬁnes a third model, presuppositional. I ignore it
here for simplicity’s sake but it will appear in Chapter Seven.
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presented. A different view is where we say that someone is licensed (by rules of
language, by conventions) to use a thick term, and say that an item is a certain
descriptive way, only if she attaches a particular evaluation to that descriptive content.
Perhaps this is what is going on with JUST, at least as presented so far. By convention, we
simply cannot pick out the features of the item in that sort of descriptive way and use
the concept unless we are prepared to evaluate the group of such features positively.
Simple separationists are not forced to choose between these models as an
explanation for all (supposed) thick concepts. They can say that some concepts
work one way while others work another. (And they can introduce more models.)
Furthermore, simple separationists might say that talk of two models suggests a sharp
contrast, but that need not be the case. Actual use of many concepts might be
indeterminate between these two models. The extent to which the descriptive part
of a concept can be put forward without a particular evaluation or evaluations being
present might be something unclear to concept users. Or, it might be clear, but be
dependent on context thus leading to different models being appropriate at different
times to explain what is happening. Perhaps in many contexts, where the conjunction
model applies, people who disagree about someone being fat-con can at least agree
that the person is fat and agree precisely on the descriptive nature of the case; they
just have different evaluations. Perhaps in some other contexts it is the licensing
model that is appropriate.
On that last point, consider this example. Two people—Betty and Frank—are in
the audience of a beauty pageant and it is the convention in their community that in
such situations disapproval has to follow if one of the contestants is thought to be fat;
it is FAT-CON or nothing. So because one of them, Betty, wishes to refrain from
disapproving, she takes issue with whether the descriptive content is instantiated
or exempliﬁed. She simply refrains from calling a contestant fat because she does
not have a negative evaluation. Frank is different. He takes a negative view of the
contestant and so the descriptive content is licensed.18 In this case, of course, words
such as ‘cuddly’ and ‘gross’ develop. Frank can legitimately say of a contestant that he
is gross, while Betty can legitimately say that he is not gross ‘but cuddly instead’.
(Realistically, Betty may not be able to deny the relative largeness of the contestant,
but she does not conceptualize him straightforwardly as fat.) Frank and Betty
differ not just in attitude but in the descriptive content of the concept they employ.
The descriptive content of gross is licensed only if users disapprove of things seen
to embody it; if they approve of them, they are not allowed to employ that
particular descriptive content.19 Perhaps in other communities and different
18 In reality, things might be complex in both cases. I say ‘negative view’, but Frank might be laughing
helplessly at the large contestant and enjoying the experience. But here his positive view is a function of the
presence of a fat person in a beauty contest; he thinks the fatness itself is deﬁnitely not to be admired.
19 It is harder to develop examples with ‘fat’ where the licensing model is appropriate. If you ﬁnd
yourself thinking that this example is too far-fetched, then that is no opposition to the validity of the
licensing model. It might indicate that this model ﬁts concepts such as KIND better.
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contexts the conjunction model is better. Perhaps Terry and June are straightfor-
wardly arguing about some contestant, and agree wholly in the descriptive content.
The difference between them is one of difference in attitude alone. Or, in other
words, Terry’s use of ‘cuddly’ and June’s use of ‘gross’ are used as synonyms for
‘fat-pro’ and ‘fat-con’, where the ‘fat’ part is exactly the same. This is not the case
with Betty and Frank.
These end comments set up a few things for later. Before we contrast all of this
with complex separationism, I should repeat that we have so far not seen any change
in Blackburn’s thinking, although we will do later. For now we can add, after the
discussion thus far, that Blackburn thinks of standard thick concepts as typically
better explained by using the licensing model, rather than thinking that both models
are probably equally applicable.
It is now time to consider two rival views.
2.4 Two Kinds of Complex Separationism
There are a number of ways in which we could oppose simple separationism. As a
way of running certain thoughts I am going to use a discussion by Daniel Elstein
and Thomas Hurka as representative. Recall that simple separationism holds that
the best way of characterizing all thick concepts with which we are familiar is to
assume that we have a fully determinate descriptive concept that in some way is
connected to an evaluation. Elstein and Hurka outline two separationist accounts
that are alternatives to this. I refer to Elstein and Hurka’s position overall as
‘complex separationism’.
(a) Their ﬁrst account can be introduced in their own words.
We have discussed two types of concept: at one extreme is a thin concept like ‘good’, which
says nothing about the good-making properties of items falling under it, at the other extreme is
a descriptively determinate concept like ‘Kraut’, which speciﬁes those properties completely,
and therefore fully determines the concept’s extension. Surely there is room between these
extremes for a category of thick (or ‘thick-ish’) concepts whose descriptive component speciﬁes
good- or right-making properties to some degree but not completely, saying only that they
must be of some speciﬁed general type but not selecting speciﬁc properties within that type—
that is left to evaluation. Or, to put the point slightly differently, there can be concepts whose
descriptive component deﬁnes an area in conceptual space within which admissible good- or
right-making properties must be found, so any use of the concept associating it with
properties outside that area is a misuse, but does not identify any speciﬁc point within the
area as uniquely correct, as a concept like ‘Kraut’ does. The concept therefore has descriptive
content, but this content is not completely determinate. The pattern of this analysis is
something like ‘x is good, and there are properties X, Y, and Z (not speciﬁed) of general
type A (speciﬁed), such that x has X, Y, and Z make anything that has them good’. This
pattern is reductive, because it uses only the thin concept ‘good’ and the descriptive concept
‘A’. But it accommodates the key disentangling argument, because determining which
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properties of type A are the good-making ones, which we must do to determine the concept’s
extension, is a matter for evaluative judgement.20
Elstein and Hurka view simple separationism as treating all thick concepts as akin to
KRAUT. We have some descriptively determinate concept, in this case ‘is a German’,
which is allied to some negative attitude.21 But why think that all thick concepts
should be analysed in this way? Among many examples, Elstein and Hurka consider
JUST or, more speciﬁcally, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE. Should we characterize this concept as
having a clearly and fully determinate descriptive content to which some (typically
positive) evaluation is then added? Or, alternatively, should it be characterized as
being a positive evaluation which licenses a certain fully determinate descriptive
content? We could choose either. But if we did we would not be able to analyse
disagreements between different theorists of distributive justice in the correct way,
something that is clearly desirable.
Why not? Some people think that just distributions are those that are equal
distributions in some sense of the term ‘equal’, and good for being so, while some
others think that just distributions are those that are proportionally distributed
according to merit, and good for being so. If we characterized these two conceptions
as being two distinct descriptive contents, to which positive evaluations were applied,
we would not be able to say that an egalitarian and a desert theorist could meaning-
fully argue with each other about whether a proposed distribution was just. On this
analysis JUST or DISTRIBUTIVE justice would mean different things to different theorists
and they would be talking past each other, as the philosophical cliché has it. Although
political theorists differ, there is some locus of agreement about what counts as a just
distribution, and this should be captured by our philosophical characterization. So
even if their conceptions of DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE differ, political theorists agree about
what the general concept is concerned with.22
20 Elstein and Hurka (2009), p. 521. Elstein and Hurka’s starting motivation is to show that separation-
ism can accommodate the disentangling argument. They worry that simple separationism cannot, and this
is a ﬂaw both in terms of strategy, since it is the main argument against separationism, and a ﬂaw generally,
since they think that there is something correct that lies behind the argument. I believe that they do not
fully understand the argument and that their position is also vulnerable to it, as I show in Chapter Five.
I also believe that what they think of as being the argument can be accommodated to some extent by simple
separationism, as I show later in this chapter.
21
KRAUT is discussed in Blackburn (1984), pp. 148–51, although the context is slightly different. For
what it is worth, I dislike Elstein and Hurka’s bracketed suggestion in the quotation that what they might be
developing is a characterization of ‘thick-ish’ concepts that lie in the middle, as if KRAUT were ‘fully thick’.
As far as I am concerned, even if the descriptive aspect or part of a thick concept is less speciﬁc than related
concepts, I still take it to be ‘fully’ thick, since this is just a matter of there being some sort of union of
descriptive content and evaluation. For example, COMPASSIONATE is more speciﬁc than KIND, yet both are
standardly assumed to be fully ﬂedged thick concepts, as are the concepts characterized by Elstein and
Hurka that have less than completely speciﬁed descriptive content. I return to this point in Chapter Four.
22 Both the example and the distinction between concepts and conceptions calls to mind John Rawls’
discussion in Rawls (1971), p. 5.
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Elstein and Hurka suggest the following as a ﬁrst stab: ‘x is distributively just’ will
mean something such as ‘x is good, and there are properties X, Y, Z (not speciﬁed)
that distributions have as distributions, or in virtue of their distributive shape, such
that x has X, Y, and Z, and X, Y, and Z make any distribution that has them good’.23
There are some restrictions on our concept: it cannot be used of generous actions,
say, or at least it cannot be used of them in so far as they are generous. But such
restrictions do not completely determine the extension of the concept. The descrip-
tive part of the concept only partly determines the extension of the concept since we
have to plug descriptive ideas into the X, Y, and Z. We get those once we approve of
certain elements being part of our concept and exclude others. Importantly, our
approval is not just an approval of an element being part of a concept that allows us
to ﬁne-tune it. In approving of a feature we are saying that any distribution that has
this sort of feature will be a distribution that is good, and be so for that reason.
This ﬁnal point sets this separationist position apart from simple separationism.
We might have to think hard about where the boundary lies between the fat and the
thin. This is not just a matter of thinking about one thing: we might have to think
about the balance between (obvious) bodily shape, and something more scientiﬁc,
such as height–weight ratios. However, when we make such decisions—decisions
about what is to be included in the descriptive content of the concept—according to
simple separationism the evaluation is separate. This is obviously so according to the
conjunction model. We have some fully determinate descriptive content to which an
evaluation is added. Even in the licensing model, what is licensed by a certain sort of
evaluation is a fully formed determinate descriptive content. In contrast, complex
separationism says that many thick concepts should be characterized such that when
we pick out certain descriptive features as being part of the concept, this picking out
is an evaluation. Why? Such features directly feed into explaining why the item that
falls under the concept is seen as good or bad (or, more minimally, pro or con). In the
case of DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, it is not only that the egalitarian picks out a feature—equal
treatment in respect of X—which helps to locate the purely descriptive contours of
the concept and then further says that an item that falls under this concept is just, as if
she could choose to withhold such an assessment. The distribution is seen as just, and
hence good, precisely because it has the feature picked out, and the picking out of this
feature is a matter of approving of it in the ﬁrst place.
In all of this we supposedly still have a separationist account, as Elstein and Hurka
state. At every stage, and across the whole concept, we are dealing with (supposed)
descriptive content—equal treatment, things given according to merit, distributions—
and concepts such as GOODNESS (or, I think better, PRO) are applied to and mixed with
such descriptive ideas.24
23 Elstein and Hurka (2009), p. 522.
24 Elstein and Hurka’s ﬁrst account is also found in Gibbard (1992). His account incorporates an
element concerned with whether a reaction—typically a more speciﬁc reaction than pro or con—is
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(b) Elstein and Hurka’s second account is more complicated than the ﬁrst. They are
unsure whether their ﬁrst account ﬁts thick virtue concepts adequately, and they see a
further account as necessary. As they say:
This second pattern involves a three-part analysis, because it supplements the global thin
evaluation that governs the whole concept (the ‘x is good . . . ’ or ‘x is right . . . ’ of the ﬁrst
pattern) with a further thin evaluation that is embedded within the descriptive content. Its
presence means we cannot determine the extension of the thick concept without determining
the extensions of the embedded thin one, that is, without making evaluations.25
They illustrate this using a number of concepts. Here I pick their example of
INTEGRITY. Integrity involves sticking to one’s goals, but not just any goals count, at
least on certain conceptions of integrity. These goals themselves have to be seen as
important ones, ﬁrst of all. Elstein and Hurka’s example of a non-starter is someone
who persistently adds to her beer-mat collection which draws her energies away from
preventing the rise of Nazism. Furthermore, even among the signiﬁcant goals we
then have to consider which ones are good, and this will generate many disputes.
Think of people who stand up for what they believe is morally right, even in the face
of strong disagreement or danger. People will disagree about whether, for example, it
is worth sticking up for the rights of abortion doctors to live peaceful lives, or whether
certain words and images should be banned from television. On this particular
characterization of integrity, then, we have to make an evaluation about which
goals are the good ones.
Elstein and Hurka’s stab at INTEGRITY is: ‘x is an act of integrity’ means that ‘x is
good, and x involves sticking to a signiﬁcantly good goal despite distractions and
temptations, where this property makes any act that has it good’.26 So anything that
falls under the description is seen as good, but within the description we have made
another evaluation, an evaluation of the goal. This clearly sets it apart from simple
separationism, since with that account there is no mention of an embedded evalu-
ation within the description that needs to be satisﬁed and which can be a point of
dispute. It is also different from Elstein and Hurka’s ﬁrst account since in that
account, like that of simple separationism, there is only one evaluation that governs
the whole concept. Or, to put it another way, it is true that according to their ﬁrst
account, Elstein and Hurka think that we evaluate when we are picking out certain
descriptive features to be part of the content. However, there is still only one, clear,
explicit evaluation that governs the concept. In this second account we allow for
another evaluation that explicitly checks or moulds the concept’s boundary. In the
case of INTEGRITY the suggestion is that the goal aimed at has to be good.
warranted. (Gibbard’s main example is LEWD, and the relevant feeling is labelled L-censoriousness.) But it is
essentially the same account.
25 Elstein and Hurka (2009), p. 526. 26 Elstein and Hurka (2009), p. 526.
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However, Elstein and Hurka note that we could combine the ﬁrst and second
accounts. The key point about their ﬁrst account is that the descriptive is not fully
determinate, whereas the second embeds an evaluation that does not govern the
whole concept. It seems obvious that some thick concepts might require a charac-
terization that embodies both ideas. As Elstein and Hurka suggest, perhaps there is a
dispute about exactly what integrity involves: is it based on the goal of being good, or
is it based on a person’s belief that the goal is good (assuming the belief to be non-
culpable), or both? We might require a conception of INTEGRITY that has a descriptive
element that leaves this open, not least because different contexts might require us to
prioritize different speciﬁc ideas. Similarly, we might say for some conceptions of
DISTRIBUTIVE justice that not every distribution in which things are equalized is a just
distribution, for we might need to approve those things as being appropriate for such a
characterization. It might—might—be seen as just to equalize the number of hairs on
people’s forearms, but most people would not consider such an equal distribution just,
since JUST should be reserved for more important things.27
Elstein and Hurka’s two accounts, and their combination, show that thick con-
cepts might need more nuanced treatment than simple separationism provides: a
separationist treatment might need to do more than wholly divide the descriptive
from the evaluative, even if one thinks of the two sorts of content as distinct and
separable. The way in which we mix those elements is very important. This takes us
to a critical comparison of the accounts.
2.5 A Grey Area
I have mentioned that assuming that we have two clear and distinct sorts of separ-
ationism is a ﬁction. There is some grey area. Why would one think this? After all, it
seems as if we have a clear dividing line: one sort of separationism assumes some
descriptive content that is fully determined aside from any evaluations, while another
allows evaluations to help mould the (still separable) descriptive content.
Consider the following from Blackburn, published recently, where he distinguishes
a strong and a weak sense of the disentanglement of thick terms into an evaluative
element and some descriptive conceptual content.
One sense would require that the extension of the term is one thing, given by a purely
descriptive concept, while the other dimension (usually an evaluative one) simply attaches to
what is thereby described. This is roughly the case with, for instance, terms of racial or national
abuse: the members of the race or nation are identiﬁable in empirical terms, and the abuse
added. The extension can be identiﬁed independently of the ‘evaluation’ (or abuse). As far as
I am aware, nobody now thinks that this model applies to interesting candidates for thickness,
such as ‘cruel’ or ‘courageous’.
27 Elstein and Hurka (2009), p. 531.
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However there is a much more interesting, but weaker sense of disentangling, in which it is
still an open question whether such terms can be disentangled. In this sense, the claim is that
there are two vectors or dimensions in question, but that they interact. Most obviously, the
evaluative element can help to determine what is put into the extension. So, for instance, you
do not call someone ‘pig-headed’ unless you wish to imply a criticism of them, and this fact
goes some way into determining who is so-called. The descriptive dimension is that of being
resolute or ﬁrm, disinclined to change your mind under discursive pressure from others; the
other dimension is that of being so unduly or inappropriately. The term signals both things,
but there is no identifying its extension without employing the evaluative side. There is still
disentangling, since there are so clearly two different vectors, and there is predictably going to
be disagreement over when ‘unduly’ kicks in. One man’s admirable resolution is another man’s
pig-headedness. So the descriptions and the valuations interact, and only when they harmon-
ise, in one mind or another, will the term get used. Clearly the common argument that there is
no determining the extension of any particular term without deploying an evaluation (or
piggy-backing on an evaluation that one does not share) is of no force whatsoever against this
view, since it simply seizes on exactly what the view describes.28
This is a version of the licensing model. A certain attitude helps to determine the
descriptive content of the concept one is using. The difference between what Black-
burn says here and what we imagined happening before is that in this passage he now
notes that there may be some general description that ﬁts the speciﬁc descriptive
contents that are licensed by the various attitudes and which together form the
various concepts in play. In the case of the beauty contest, perhaps that general
description is BIG or BIG FOR A PERSON. Betty’s positive view means that she is licensed
to ﬁll in the descriptive content by picking out certain things and ignoring others,
perhaps, and uses words such as ‘cuddly’. Frank’s negative view licenses him in
assuming different speciﬁc descriptive content, and this results in him using deroga-
tory words.
This comes close to saying what Elstein and Hurka say in their ﬁrst model. We
have some evaluative attitude which does not just license a description, but inﬂuences
what that precise descriptive content is. However, there is a difference. Elstein and
Hurka explicitly assume that we have some general description that can be held by all
disputants, and then the differences between them are a function of clearly isolatable
and different Xs, Ys, and Zs. Blackburn does not go down this route. Instead, we have
a general description: in the case imagined ‘being resolute or ﬁrm’. Once that is in
place we have people being placed on some descriptive dimension according to their
attitudes towards any candidate example, and the strength of such attitudes.
This difference may just be a matter of presentation.29 But given some of their
examples, such as DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, it is clear that Elstein and Hurka think their
28 Blackburn (2013), p. 122.
29 Indeed, in personal communication Blackburn said that he quite liked Elstein and Hurka’s ﬁrst
proposal, although he also said that he did not want to backtrack on what he said in Blackburn (1984).
I hope that my discussion pitches his view neatly between these two thoughts.
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analysis as presented is needed. Even if we have a general description common to all
disputants, that does not mean we have a single dimension or scale along which such
disputants then plant themselves. The content of the speciﬁc descriptions that are
covered by the general description may be quite different, even radically so, and this
may be best captured by talking of quite different Xs, Ys, and Zs, isolatable in this
analysis because they are so different.30 In contrast, even though Blackburn is
indicating some general content, which then gets speciﬁed differently because of
the evaluation, it seems fair to describe him as thinking that this general content is
determinate, and that the evaluation just helps to locate what sort of exact content
one gets. Or, in other words, one can specify the descriptive content of a concept, and
this itself will give a good indication of the descriptive content of the concept even if
that content needs to be speciﬁed. The general description given in Elstein and
Hurka’s ﬁrst model needs some speciﬁc ideas to move us beyond any general ballpark
idea: a general ballpark descriptive content on its own is not enough to ﬁll out the
concept. This is enough to justify initial discussion of two broad models, and to retain
our idea of two models when looking at the details of various theories.31
30 The different speciﬁcs of the rival theories of Rawls and Nozick come readily to mind again here. One
could not capture the differences between Rawls and Nozick in disputing whether something was just or
unjust by thinking in terms of a single and general descriptive dimension along which Rawls and Nozick
planted themselves because of their attitudes towards certain instances.
31 If more justiﬁcation is needed, consider this. At no point in his writings does Blackburn clearly state
something along the lines of Elstein and Hurka’s ﬁrst form of complex separationism. We might imagine
that ‘fat↓’ gives him ample opportunity to do so. Perhaps some think of FAT as having something to do with
bodily shape, while others prefer to prioritize clear medical measures. Or just with regards to the former,
some might think that someone qualiﬁes as fat if his stomach is large and bulging, while others look in
addition to the thickness of the limbs and the neck. These differences, particularly the ﬁrst, would require
different dimensions, I think.
At one point in Blackburn (1992) he compares his account with Gibbard’s. (In note 24 I mentioned
that Gibbard’s account can be seen as a version of the ﬁrst sort of complex separationism.) It seems as if
he will come close to agreeing with Gibbard, but in doing so only conﬁrms their differences. He says,
“So far, it might seem that examples of description+tone must be distinct from those of ‘gopa’ and
‘lewd’ [Gibbard’s main examples] in that the descriptive side is ﬁxed, and the sneer or other tone
optional. . . . But that is not quite right. For we can easily imagine just the same kinds of dispute over
terms of description+tone. Amanda and Beryl may have been card-carrying fattists until Amanda met
Clive. ‘Clive is so fat↓’ challenges Beryl. ‘No, not fat↓—stocky, well-built’ dreams Amanda. The dispute
need not be one about vagueness, as we can see if we play it through with Pavarotti instead of Clive.
Pavarotti is unquestionably fat, but many fattists would recoil from calling him fat↓. . . . ‘fat↓’ shares with
other derog. terms the property that where you do not want to express or endorse the attitude, you will
refuse application of the term” (p. 290). Or, in other words, Blackburn’s explanation of the dispute between
Amanda and Clive relies on the licensing model. Amanda will not call Clive ‘fat↓’, simply because she does
not have the negative attitude towards him that licenses the associated descriptive content. By implication,
Blackburn thinks that this, or the conjunction model, or some combination, can explain all such
disagreements.
As well as the quotation in the main text, see also Blackburn (1998), p. 103. Here Blackburn comes close
to advocating the ﬁrst model of complex separationism, but again, when thinking about the general
description of something being lewd, he claims that the evaluative and descriptive elements can be
“moulded in different ways”, claiming, I think, that we have two sorts of range here that collide and
which result in different but related concepts being applied by different people.
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However, two points are pertinent here. First, I leave it open as to whether (if one is
a separationist) just one of these models should be thought to ﬁt all concepts or, as
I suspect, some models are better suited to some concepts and some contexts, and
other models are better suited to others. After all, it is this reasoning which leads
Elstein and Hurka to develop two models, and as Blackburn says, in some contexts
use might be indeterminate between the conjunction and licensing models.
Second, although it is still helpful to think in terms of there being two models, it is
pretty obvious now that there is some grey area. How the evaluation is used to pick
out the descriptive content is a complicated issue, and it may not produce stark
contrasts. Similarly, how the speciﬁc descriptive content is to be analysed may not be
something that can be packaged as isolatable Xs and Ys, and it may be unclear what
the descriptive scale is like along which judges ﬁnd themselves. What is meant by
‘general’ here and what is meant by ‘speciﬁc’ is unclear. All of this suggests untidy
mess rather than clear-cut difference. We should be alive to the fact that the two
sorts of separationism introduced may be closer than may appear at ﬁrst, both to
outsiders and even separationists themselves.
So we have some mess. However, we can think about the criticisms separationists
give of each other, at least to indicate an interesting trade-off that has implications for
the whole terrain and debate about thick concepts.
2.6 Some Critical Points
I pursue two points of critical comparison: Elstein and Hurka’s ﬁrst account is
designed to explain disagreements, while simple separationism allows for ﬂexibility
of evaluative attitude. After this I introduce a worry with separationism more
generally, to sow some seeds of doubt. I end by listing reasons why one might wish
to be a separationist.
(a) I ﬁrst consider how simple separationism fares against Elstein and Hurka’s idea
that disagreements cannot be analysed properly.
Note immediately the difference between the conjunction and licensing models.
The licensing model has it that by convention some evaluation has to be in place
before a descriptive content is licensed. We imagined both models applying to
people’s disagreements concerning fat people. In the licensing scenario we noted
that because an evaluation has to be in place for a certain descriptive content to be
licensed, then this model applies only if we were happy to say that the two concepts
employed—CUDDLY and GROSS—also had slightly different descriptive content. If not,
the conjunction model would capture things better. So on the licensing model, we
can still talk of there being ﬂexibility of attitude, but only if we also admit that the
speciﬁc descriptive content is ﬂexible.
This means, further, that on this characterization we have to be careful when
speaking of there being disagreement. When Frank says that a beauty contestant is
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gross, while Betty says that he is cuddly, and where both concepts are interpreted as
‘licensed’ concepts, then we can say that the concepts are opposed in a sense. But it is
not as if Frank and Betty agree that the person is fat yet differ only in attitude. (That
was why I introduced Terry and June.) Rather, Frank and Betty are partly disagreeing
about what exactly it is to be fat and what the term ‘fat’ means in the ﬁrst place, and
that will probably be inﬂuenced by what sort of attitude they take towards fat people
in certain contexts. Frank is conceptualizing, encoding, and communicating speciﬁc
descriptive content different from the content Betty is working with. If we are
unhappy with this characterization of any particular debate and use of a concept
(or concepts)—if we want to say that there is complete agreement in descriptive
content—we need to choose the conjunction model to provide explanation.
With that said, let us see how each model fares when compared with Elstein and
Hurka’s worry. (Note that Elstein and Hurka do not explicitly consider each model in
turn.) First, consider the conjunction model with its assumed sameness of speciﬁc
descriptive content in disputes. That model is all very well in explaining disagree-
ments where the disputants agree (exactly) about descriptive content but disagree in
attitude. Yet, there are other sorts of disagreement—surely a large number—where
the two disputants agree in attitude about the general concept that they wish to
employ and agree with the general contours of the concept, but still disagree about
whether the concept applies in a particular case. That is the point lying behind Elstein
and Hurka’s ﬁrst account and examples such as DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE. It seems obvious
that the conjunction model fails to capture many disagreements for many uses of
concepts.
What of the licensing model, as understood by Blackburn in the more recent piece
I quoted? Its prospects are a lot better. When Betty and Frank are exchanging terms
and concepts when they are at the beauty pageant (and where we interpret their use
of CUDDLY and GROSS along the lines of the licensing model), there is some general
dimension which they have in common that inﬂuences their terms, and this seems
enough to ward off the challenge. Elstein and Hurka analyse what happens as there
being a general and common descriptive element that is made more speciﬁc with the
introduction of isolatable elements, indicated by X, Y, and Z. The fact that Blackburn
chooses to have some general descriptive dimension and eschews talk of further
isolatable elements in his analysis does not mean at all that he cannot meet their
challenge about disagreements.
A further worry may crop up, which should be raised if only to be dealt with.
Elstein and Hurka’s analysis gives equal weight and importance to the descriptive and
evaluative elements, or at least the overall pattern of analysis is ﬂexible enough to
allow different weightings for different concepts in different contexts. It seems right
that there be this ﬂexibility and likely equal weighting. A theorist thinks of this
distribution as just because of how she sees it descriptively and her overall positive
impression. But, in contrast, the licensing model seems to see the evaluation as prime,
at least symbolically. This is suggested by the label: the evaluation licenses—allows,
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admits of, gives access to—the descriptive content. The evaluation is in place and this
licenses the description. It can certainly seem that things are this way when compared
to the conjunction model. However, again I think we have a worry that can be cleared
up. After all, it is not as if Frank and Betty have some evaluation and then ﬁll in the
descriptive details when they are arguing. (Well, phenomenologically speaking this
might happen, but this seems wrong as a theoretical characterization of their concept
use.) Sure, they adopt a certain descriptive content only because they have a certain
evaluation. But one reason that they adopt the evaluation is because they are inclined
to pick out and conceptualize the descriptive features of a contestant in a certain way.
To my mind, the licensing model can admit that the descriptive part of the concept,
and any particular conception of it, is as important as the evaluation that licenses it.
So I am not so sure that simple separationism for those cases where the licensing
model applies fully (or somewhat) lacks the resources to be adapted to answer Elstein
and Hurka’s worry. Of course, the extent to which the licensing model is applicable to
our concepts, even if separationism is correct overall, is moot.
(b) How do Elstein and Hurka fare against the strength already mentioned of simple
separationism, namely the ﬂexibility of attitude?32
Let us begin with their ﬁrst analysis. In the deﬁnitions cited from them we had
only one thin concept mentioned, namely GOOD, and this is the case with other
analyses. Is it possible for them to develop analyses of concepts where the ﬂexibility
of attitude is explicitly encoded? For a start, one might challenge whether we should
be interested in the ﬂexibility of attitude. A familiar general position in ethics has it
that our everyday virtue (and vice) concepts have only one attitude attached: it is
conceptually impossible for something to be just and bad for that reason. But this is a
controversial position for such concepts, and there seem plenty of thick concepts
that are not virtue or vice concepts, so I think the challenge to Elstein and Hurka
needs to be followed.
So how might their analysis, suitably developed, work for a concept such as
ELEGANT?33 We might say that ‘x is elegant’ means something such as ‘x is either
good or bad or neutral, and there are properties X, Y, Z (not speciﬁed) that things (in
a wide sense) have in virtue of appearing to the eye as reﬁned and efﬁcient, such that
x has X, Y, and Z, and X, Y, and Z make any object that has them good or bad or
neutral’. (The ‘appearing to the eye as reﬁned and efﬁcient’ part is obviously my
initial stab at getting us into the right ballpark. It is imperfect, but our focus should
rest on other matters.) In some respect this analysis is not itself bad. We just have
some additional stuff—more evaluations and how they link to the Xs and Ys—to take
32 As with the conjunction and licensing models, Elstein and Hurka do not consider this issue explicitly.
Note that they are neutral between cognitivist- and noncognitivist-separationist analyses, but I retain
‘attitude’ here for continuity with Blackburn’s criticism.
33 I am taking this as a prima facie good example of a concept where we want to have ﬂexibility of
attitude.
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into account when trying to analyse a concept. And it might be something that,
before we consider nonseparationism, seems to capture the phenomena perfectly
well. But, despite this, there is a general worry, which is only a hunch for now. With
this analysis there is now more stuff to account for and ﬁll in or, in other words, we
have far less anchoring and far more ﬂexibility then we had previously. There may be
no way in advance of predicting how the different evaluations and different Xs, Ys,
and Zs interact. It is certainly going to bemore complex thenwas envisaged previously.
How can we be conﬁdent that we understand the concept and its application without
understanding how the descriptive and the evaluative can connect in the ﬁrst place,
particularly when the contours of the concept as given are so loose? As we will see, this
inchoate suspicion will develop into the disentangling argument.
At this stage we can raise a similar worry for Blackburn. He has ﬁne-tuned his
licensing model to include a general descriptive dimension linking two related
concepts and their uses. This hides a problem and is in tune with that just raised
against Elstein and Hurka. How can we be certain that Betty and Frank are using
concepts that are related such that when Betty says that someone is cuddly and Frank
says he is gross we can say that they are in a real dispute? What is this descriptive
dimension along which they both lie? It seems as if the interplay between the
(separable) evaluations and this general but common descriptive content may be
complex. Again, I will make good on this inchoate worry later in the book.
Does this worry about evaluative ﬂexibility apply to Elstein and Hurka’s second
analysis? Probably not, since they introduce it explicitly for cases where there is a thin
concept embedded in the descriptive part that, roughly speaking, helps us to make
sense of it. Think of the account of INTEGRITY: an action is one of integrity only if we
approve of it. It would be odd, following Elstein and Hurka, to have something such
as ‘x is an act of integrity’ meaning ‘x is good or bad and x involves sticking to a
signiﬁcantly good or bad goal despite distractions and temptations, where this
property makes any act that has it good or bad or neutral’. This does not ﬁt what
they are trying to do with integrity (and similar concepts), because including two
‘bad’s would make an action one of foolhardiness, or zealotry, or something worse.
This changes the concept being analysed, rather than accounting for one concept
accommodating the ﬂexibility of attitude or evaluation.
Of course, a defence of Elstein and Hurka on this score works only in so far as
there are concepts that we think need to be analysed in the way they do with their
second account. We could imagine someone saying that integrity and other concepts
should be analysed differently, perhaps in terms of the licensing model. But, as a
neutral between these two sorts of separationism, I have to say I side with Elstein and
Hurka here, at least given how people use a concept such as INTEGRITY. If I were given
to separationist analyses, I would concur that the descriptive content has to embed an
evaluation: people do not have in mind just any goal when thinking about integrity.
So, thus far, a score draw: Elstein and Hurka’s best point works very well against
one model that can be favoured by simple separationists, but not at all well
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against another. Similarly, only one of their two analyses fails when it comes to the
point about ﬂexibility of attitude. We can see this as indicative of a trade-off when it
comes to separationism: the more we play up the idea that some separable evaluation
can be ﬂexible, the harder it is to develop an understanding of how disputes work,
while the more we try to harness and nail elements in our characterization of
concepts, the harder it is to accommodate the supposed phenomenon of evaluative
ﬂexibility.
The main point here—and the main point to emerge from this whole chapter
as we move from looking at the details of the position to look at its overall nature
and point—is to realize that ideally an account of thick concepts would aim to
satisfy both demands: we want an account that allows us to talk meaningfully
about disagreement and also one that accommodates evaluative ﬂexibility (if one
indeed thinks it is a desideratum). These twin demands will come back later in
the book.
(c) Here is one further point. I discuss it brieﬂy so as to set up a worry that links to
my discussion of shapelessness in Chapter Five.
In note 20 I mentioned that Elstein and Hurka believe that their separationist
analysis can accommodate the best point ranged against simple separationist accounts
from nonseparationists. This connects with the aforementioned point about disen-
tangling and shapelessness. We will concentrate on this later in Chapter Five. For
now, we need merely discuss that Elstein and Hurka believe the key part of the
nonseparationist challenge is that separationism cannot accommodate the idea that
evaluative content determines concepts’ extensions.34 (It is obvious that both of their
analyses do take this into account.) Now, I do not believe this idea, as stated this
simply, is the main nonseparationist point. We can see quite easily that in some sense
even simple separationists can accommodate this idea of extension, and so Elstein and
Hurka’s criticism of their rivals fails.
Simple separationists think quite plainly that we will have to have knowledge of the
evaluative point or points of a concept in order to predict its extension. After all, it is
very likely, even determined, that CHAIR-PRO and FAT-CON have more limited extension
than CHAIR and FAT. Knowledge of the evaluative content in our ﬁrst pair of concepts
is crucial to knowing the boundaries of the whole concept since it provides limits.
Only a certain number of chairs will have CHAIR-PRO applied to them, and which ones
are so categorized will be determined by the evaluation. So, strictly, what Elstein and
Hurka say is false.
That said, they are attempting to cope with the spirit of the nonseparationist
charge much more. The spirit of the charge, in their eyes, is that evaluative content
is more involved than a simple conjunction or licensing account will allow. This is
particularly apparent in their second model, where some evaluative element is
34 Elstein and Hurka (2009), pp. 519–20.
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embedded in the descriptive content. But this leads to another worry. If Elstein and
Hurka think that nonseparationists will be dissatisﬁed with the response by simple
separationists—because what they are requesting is some acknowledgement that
concept users have to appreciate the evaluative point of the concept as a whole—
then nonseparationists will also be left dissatisﬁed with what Elstein and Hurka say.
This is because, in brief, one cannot really understand what descriptions are relevant
to the concept as a whole unless one ‘imbues’ the whole of the concept with
evaluation; inserting a separable pro or con evaluation to govern some of the
separable description does not cut it. This is a more reﬁned echo of the ‘inchoate
suspicion’ raised in the middle of (b). I elaborate on and deepen this idea in
Chapter Five.
(d) Why should we adopt separationism in the ﬁrst place? As mentioned in
Chapter One, the general adoption of the fact–value distinction has much to do
with it. This leads to four points. First, adoption of the fact–value distinction is seen
by some as uncontroversial since it seems to encapsulate much of modern thinking,
especially that encapsulated by the rise of modern science. Any philosophical analysis
worth its salt cannot afford to ignore the demands and intellectual currents of
modern science. If we agree that the evaluative and the descriptive should be held
apart, then it seems that any analysis of evaluative concepts—especially thick ones—
has to place this idea at the very centre. The second point in favour of separationism
links nicely to the ﬁrst: not only is the separation of evaluation and description
supposedly reﬂected in much of modern thinking, it is simple and clear. These things
are values, those things are (nonevaluative) facts, and never the twain shall meet.
The third point in favour of separationism is easiest to understand when focused
on simple separationism. Making the descriptive part fully determinate allows for a
relative ease of understanding on the part of people only slightly familiar or very
unfamiliar with the concept. Let me explain. Sometimes it is easy to understand what
a concept is and how it is applied by others. But sometimes it can be very hard and
can take much time and energy. For example, an anthropologist might take months
or years when investigating some alien tribe and how they conceive of the world. The
concepts that the members of the tribe employ might be quite different from the
anthropologist’s; they might not simply apply TABOO to different things, but they
might have a new and strange concept, such as SCHMABOO, the contours of which may
be difﬁcult to discern. We typically think that understanding is possible, even in hard
cases. Simple separationism supposedly gives a nice account of how such under-
standing is possible. There are two things we need to do. First, we have only to work
out what the descriptive content of the concept is, perhaps by considering a number
of cases and having some dialogue with a user, in order to understand the whole
concept. Second, we have to work out, or simply be given the knowledge of, which
evaluation accompanies the descriptive content or, more complicatedly, which
evaluations are appropriate in which context. If we parcel things up in this way,
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it seems that understanding others’ concepts will be a fairly easy matter. The part of
the concept that is nonevaluative seems to be the driving force and senior partner in
many cases; just think back to our CHAIR and FAT examples where some thin
evaluation is simply tacked on.35 By deﬁnition, apparently, nonevaluative, descriptive
content is something that is accessible and understandable to everyone. We can have
any value system we like and still be able to understand which thing is a chair and
which thing is a table. So although some work will have to be done, and some
anthropologists may have to ﬁnd some friendly insiders to help them navigate their
way through which thin evaluations are given at which times, understanding others
is, in principle, no great mystery.
In contrast, if nonseparationists really think that the evaluative is intertwined in some
nonseparable fashion with the descriptive and, hence, further, that we need to appre-
ciate and even share the evaluation of those that sincerely employ the value concepts
we are trying to understand, then the seemingly routine task of understanding others
does become a great mystery. Do anthropologists really have to share and sincerely
apply SCHMABOO in order to understand this concept? Surely not. So why not assume
that the key part of the concept is something accessible and understandable to all?
Although I have run this third point in terms of simple separationism, the moral
holds for complex versions. Complexity is introduced because we have to have more
knowledge of which nonevaluative elements are being seen in a positive or negative
light. But those evaluations are still thin and the building blocks are still simple, as in
the ﬁrst version of separationism. The concepts we investigate as ‘outsiders’ should
still be fairly easy to grasp, especially if we have an insider friend to help guide us
through the concepts.
This links to a fourth reason in favour of separationism. Blackburn argues that a
point in favour of his account—which applies to all separationist accounts—is that it
allows for normative criticism.36 We can all agree that this descriptive element is ‘the’
or ‘a’ part of a concept or, alternatively, that some nonevaluative stuff can be grouped
in a certain way using a concept. And then, as a separate process, some people will
wish to approve of the part included in the concept or approve of the stuff that is
being categorized. Some will disapprove of it. According to Blackburn this is the basis
for normative criticism. Here is what he says about CUTE as applied to women:
Now it is morally vital that we proceed by splitting the input from the output in [the case of
CUTE]. By refusing to split we fail to open an essentially speciﬁcally normative dimension of
criticism. If the last word is that these people perceive cuteness and react to it with the
appropriate cuteness reaction, whereas other people do not, we have lost the analytic tools
with which to recognize what is wrong with them. What is wrong with them is along these
lines: they react to an infantile, unthreatening appearance or self-presentation in women, or
35 Hare in Hare (1952), pp. 121ff thinks that the descriptive meaning of TIDY and INDUSTRIOUS, for
example, as being more important than the evaluative meaning.
36 Blackburn (1998), pp. 101–5. He repeats this idea early on in Blackburn (2013).
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overt indications of willingness to be subservient to men, with admiration or desire (the men)
or envy and emulation (the women). Cute things are those to which we can show affection
without threat, or patronizingly, or even with contempt. Children and pets are quintessentially
cute. Applied to women, I say, this is a bad thing. Once we can separate input from output
enough to see that this is what is going on, the talk of whirls of organism, or single ‘thick’ rules,
or a special perception available only to those who have been acculturated, simply sounds
hollow: disguises for a conservative and ultimately self-serving complacency.37
His worry is that nonseparationist accounts of the thick just accept concepts and
their applications as they are. But that cannot be the end of the matter, for some
concepts are bad and are applied in a bad way. It is important that we are able to note
what the concept is about, and this appreciation be available to people outside of
those that use the concept in a certain social milieu. (Think back to the third point.)
From that we can then see whether a certain sort of categorization applied with
approval to a certain sort of thing is itself good or bad. This is all supposedly made a
lot easier if we can separate evaluation from descriptive content.
The introduction of complex separationism—and Blackburn’s recent points about
simple separationism—may seem to muddy the waters, things are in fact still clear.
To repeat a word introduced by Blackburn earlier, we have two separate vectors. And
it is perfectly to the point regarding normative criticism to think whether the
attachment of that evaluation to that speciﬁc sort of description (along that general
descriptive vector) when applied to that person or thing or action is itself good.
I think all four of these challenges can be met. The ﬁrst challenge is the largest and
broadest. It will be addressed in Chapter Six, as will the second. In response to both
points, I can say now that I do not think the reality of our use of concepts is as simple and
clear as separationists think. The third and fourth points are discussed in Chapter Eight.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have begun to understand how one might capture thick concepts.
We now have some handle on separationism. We can see how it might splinter into
different views and we can appreciate that there is some grey area between those
views. I have also introduced some advantages of the overall position. Lastly, we are
getting a sense of the terrain and at the end of §2.6(b) I introduced a trade-off which
itself introduces two desiderata: we may wish to accommodate evaluative ﬂexibility,
and we need also to ensure that we can account for how disputes work. Those two
desiderata will return: the ﬁrst in Chapter Three and the second in Chapter Eight.
I now turn my attention to what unites separationists in Chapter Three, in order to
prepare the ground for how one can argue against their position. How exactly do they
understand and model the relationship between thin and thick concepts?




We now have an idea of what separationism amounts to, the form of some of its
varieties, and its appeal. The aim of this chapter is to dig deeper and put us in a
position—in Chapters Four and Five—to introduce and understand arguments that
have been raised against it.
In this chapter I introduce two models of conceptual relations: ‘genus–species’ and
‘determinable–determinate’. Both models tell us how exactly the relations are to be
conceived between families of general and speciﬁc concepts. Given that thin concepts
are thought to be general concepts and thick concepts are thought to be speciﬁc
concepts, and given also that both thin and thick concepts are evaluative and, thus,
related, then it stands to reason that these models are worth investigation.
My overall claim is that neither model applies to thin and thick concepts.
I believe that neither model can satisfactorily accommodate evaluative ﬂexibility,
and I believe that doing so is highly desirable. In addition, I believe that the genus–
species model is separationism in disguise. That additional belief is important, for
the introduction of the genus–species model will enable us both to understand
separationism better and to put pressure on it in Chapters Four and Five.
The structure and aims of this chapter are as follows. In §3.2 I outline the genus–
speciesmodel. In §3.3 I outline the determinable–determinate model. In §3.4 I brieﬂy
show why we should think the two models are distinct. (Although keeping them
distinct is not crucial to my overall argument because I disregard both, keeping them
apart makes my argumentative narrative cleaner.) In §3.5 I explain evaluative ﬂexi-
bility and motivate it. My case for evaluative ﬂexibility concludes when we reach
Chapter Six where I show how it relates to other parts of my view. So I aim only to
show evaluative ﬂexibility in a positive light in this chapter, not conclusively show it
as correct. Even with that modest aim, this present chapter still makes progress. First,
I show that separationists who wish to adopt evaluative ﬂexibility need to pause, as
this idea seems to be in tension with the genus–species model. The tension can be
resolved only by changing the idea of evaluative ﬂexibility into something different
from the idea I argue for. Second, I also show why nonseparationists should be wary
of the determinable–determinate model, because it also is in tension with evaluative
ﬂexibility and this is something they should think of adopting. In §3.6 I discuss
evaluative ﬂexibility and the genus–species model, and in §3.7 I discuss it in relation
to the determinable–determinate model.1 Having shown problems with both models,
I brieﬂy suggest what sort of model of conceptual relations nonseparationists
should ﬁnd agreeable.
One ﬁnal note. The idea of there being relations involves the idea that there are
relata—in this case thin and thick concepts—and it is natural and essential to assume
that the relata differ in kind in such relations. I will not argue in this chapter that thin
and thick concepts differ in kind, but it will be the ﬁrst claim argued for in the next
chapter. I discuss it later rather than now because what I say in connection with it
immediately opens up a criticism of separationism. So, for now, when entertaining
the idea of conceptual relations I assume that thin and thick concepts differ in kind.
3.2 The Genus–Species Model
The genus–species model has it that we begin with some general concept, which is
assumed to be our genus concept, and then, in order to derive a speciﬁc concept
assumed to be the species concept, we have to be able to isolate some unique
differentia that picks out that species concept from the other species concepts that
belong to the same genus.2 For example, we might begin with the genus concept
ANIMAL or ANIMALHOOD. Howmight we capture what it is to be homo sapiens? One way
in which to distinguish homo sapiens from other animals is to introduce the idea of
rationality. That is, homo sapiens are, uniquely, the rational animals.
Two features of this model mark it as the model it is. First, we begin with the genus
concept and then we derive the species concept. The idea is that the genus concept is
thought to be conceptually or logically prior to the species concept. The one is deﬁned
in terms of the other. In everyday thought we clearly have knowledge both of what it
is to be an animal and of various animals. But in order for the model to apply to this
case, we must in theory have to have understanding of what it is to be an animal,
understanding that makes no reference to any particular animals and their traits,
such that it then makes sense to think of the relationship between the general and
speciﬁc concepts in terms of conceptual priority and derivation. Second, not only has
1 Some writers have suggested that we should apply the determinable–determinate model to thin and
thick concepts. GrahamOddie in Oddie (2005), pp. 160–2 introduces the application of the model, albeit in
a brief fashion with no discussion of the genus–speciesmodel. Christine Tappolet in Tappolet (2004) argues
for its application primarily because she argues against applying its rival. Edward Harcourt and Alan
Thomas in Harcourt and Thomas (2013) think that thin and thick concepts fulﬁl the minimal require-
ments for the determinable–determinate relation, and in doing so explicitly cite Tappolet as an inspiration,
although they also criticize her.
2 It could be that two or more concepts can have the same differentia, but their genus would be different.
This may be the case for thick concepts. So on this view—although I do not believe this at all—BRAVE and
FOOLHARDY look like they have the same differentia, but one belongs to the genus GOOD or PRO, and the other
belongs to BAD or CON. Although I sometimes talk of a unique differentia in the main text for simplicity’s
sake, I always have this clause in mind.
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the differentia to be unique to the species, but it also has to be something that can be
understood separately from, and prior to, the species concept, otherwise talk of
derivation is misplaced. In other words, we have two independent ingredients that
are prior to our outcome and which come together to form it.
There are problems with this model. First, we might worry how widely applicable
it is. For a start, we need to make sure that the genus concept really is understood in a
way that is decent enough to enable the derivation. Perhaps in the case of homo
sapiens we can avoid this worry by concentrating on matters of reproduction,
respiration, and the like when trying to characterize what it is to be an animal. But,
besides this, we need to think about the differentia. Talking simply of rationality in
the case of humans seems inadequate since, arguably, other animals are rational in
some fashion. Recall that the differentia has to be characterized prior to the species
concept, so we cannot say that the rationality in which we are interested is the
rationality typical of homo sapiens. Finding some way of picking out the differentia
can be harder than it seems in some cases.3 These points do not threaten the
distinctive nature of the model, but they do threaten the extent of its applicability.
Second, and aside from this general issue of applicability, we might worry whether
this model applies to thin and thick concepts. As mentioned, it is natural enough that
our thin concepts will be the genus concepts and our thick ones will be the species
concepts. KIND, COMPASSIONATE, WISE, and BEAUTIFUL all seem to be species of GOOD. If we
think that the model applies then it seems, brieﬂy, that we assume that we have some
decent understanding of what it is for something to be good apart from any
understanding of what it is for anything to be kind, wise, and so on. Also, it seems
that we will have to think that there will be some particular differentia that
will uniquely pick out the kind, and some particular differentia that will uniquely
pick out the wise, and so on. Adoption of this model should strongly incline us
towards viewing thick concepts as constructed from separable elements. In fact, on
further reﬂection we can see that adoption of this model entails this view of the thick
or even—my view in this study—that this model when applied to the thick simply is
separationism by another name. We have our evaluative thin genus concept, we
add to it a differentia—characterized in wholly nonevaluative, descriptive terms,
presumably—and, hence, a thick concept is constructed and captured. On this
understanding thick concepts are concepts that can be decomposed into separable,
smaller elements.4
This idea holds whether we adopt simple separationism or a more complex
version. The basic idea behind any type of separationism is that we have distinct
elements that are added together to create thick concepts, and which are intelligible
independently of our understanding of the thick. It is this run of ideas that I take to
be key in providing the link between separationism and the genus–species model.
3 Sanford (2006), §3 points this out, citing among others Aristotle (1994), pp. 176–84.
4 Tappolet (2004), pp. 213–17 discusses this point. See also Hurley (1989), chapter 2.
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Of course, there are different ways of construing the elements that constitute thick
concepts. Many separationists, as we know, are noncognitivists. As I pointed out in
the previous chapter, it is not quite right to talk of them thinking there is some thin
conceptual content that is the genus. Rather, there is some thin attitude, characterized
as something evinced by judges, that plays the role as our genus. But the general point
remains. In order to analyse what thick concepts are, we have two (or more) types of
element that are thought to be conceptually or logically prior to the thick, and which
are moulded together to create it.
Another way in which separationists disagree among themselves is how thin they
characterize the genus thin concept or element. Some construe it in a very thin way.
Although they may use GOOD or BAD in their analyses and discussion, they pretty
obviously really mean PRO or CON. Alternatively, we could identify it with some
noncognitive feeling that is more speciﬁc than a bare approval. As mentioned in
note 24 in Chapter Two, Gibbard, in his analysis of LEWD, imagines a feeling that he
labels ‘L-censoriousness’.5 I discuss this in Chapter Four, but it is worth noting the
issue now. The key point, again, is that thick concepts are created and constructed
from ingredients that are independently intelligible and conceptually prior to thick
concepts, so they cannot be understood, characterized, isolated, or identiﬁed by using
thick concepts.
Because the genus–species model is so clearly in tune with separationism, non-
separationists need to think about other models of conceptual relations.
3.3 The Determinable–Determinate Model
The modern characterization and labelling of the determinable–determinate model is
due to W. E. Johnson, primarily in Johnson (1921), chapter XI, supplemented by
discussions spread around Johnson (1922) and (1924).6 This model links general and
speciﬁc concepts, but we do not have to understand the general concept prior to the
speciﬁc one, and there is no separable, prior differentiae that uniquely pick out
individual speciﬁc concepts. For illustration, consider the canonical example of
COLOUR (or COLOURED or BEING A COLOUR) and various colour concepts such as RED
(or REDNESS or BEING RED).7 Do these concepts ﬁt the genus–species model? One worry
is whether we have enough understanding of what it is to be coloured aside from
understanding what it is to be any of the speciﬁc colours. Even if that can be solved,
the possibility of supplying differentia is considered highly problematic. If the genus–
species model is applicable, we should be able to claim that RED is the ‘X sort of
colour’, or ‘the colour with X-ness’, say, where the uniquely identifying X is
5 Gibbard (1992).
6 For commentary see Prior (1949), and Searle (1959) and (1967), as well as the aforementioned Sanford
(2006).
7 For ease of writing I stick to COLOUR and RED, but clearly we may wish to adjust our English.
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something independently intelligible from and conceptually prior to RED. But there
seems to be nothing to ﬁll this role. Saying ‘RED is the colour with this sort of
wavelength’ will not do, it is commonly supposed, because talk of wavelengths is
simply a different presentation of RED itself, not something independent of and
conceptually prior to it. Hence, we need a different model to accommodate such
an example.
According to the determinable–determinate model we simply state that there is
some link, but that the general concept (the determinable) is not conceptually prior
to any speciﬁc concept (some determinate), nor is there any differentia. As well as the
case of colours, other examples that ﬁt this model are lengths, ages, and sizes. For
example, A LENGTH OF 5 METRES and A LENGTH OF 6 METRES are both determinates of the
determinable A LENGTH BETWEEN 4 METRES AND 7 METRES. It is clear also that the
application of this model to thin and thick concepts will be amenable to those who
think that thick concepts are, in some fashion, concepts that admit of no separation
into component parts.
There are two further points that it is useful to make in readiness for later
discussion. First, a concept can be both a determinable and a determinate. RED is a
determinate of COLOUR, but it is a determinable towards other colour determinates,
such as SCARLET and CHERRY. Second, we might ask what links various concepts
together in a family. With the genus–species model the answer is obvious: various
species concepts are linked by being derived from the same genus concept. What of
this model? Why are RED and BLUE, but not SQUARE, deemed to be determinates of a
common determinable concept?
Here is the commonly given explanation. We cannot pursue any strategy that
explains why RED and BLUE are part of the same family in terms of a commonality or
commonalities between them, and further say they are distinguished from each other
by something unique to them individually, for this is simply a restatement of the
genus–species model. Instead, Johnson and subsequent writers pursued a different
strategy, by focusing not on commonality but on exclusivity or, in David Armstrong’s
words, by considering ‘mutual detestation societies’.8 What makes it the case that RED
and BLUE are determinates of a common determinable is that both concepts cannot
apply, or be instantiated if one prefers, at the same time in the same place (or, at
the same time by the same object). Similarly, in the case of lengths, nothing can
instantiate the same concepts (ONLY) A LENGTH OF 5 METRES and (ONLY) A LENGTH OF 6
METRES at the same time, at least along the same side. However, it is clear that
something can be both red and square at the same time. We can link this to our
ﬁrst point. Some colour patch cannot be both red and blue at the same time, and this
reﬂects our intuitive thought that RED and BLUE are at the same ‘conceptual level’. But
clearly something can be both red and scarlet at the same time. This simply reﬂects
8 Armstrong (1978), p. 112.
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another common intuition, namely that RED and SCARLET are at different conceptual
levels. One is more speciﬁc than the other, just as COLOUR and RED are. I return to the
phenomenon of exclusion below.
3.4 Are the Models Distinct?
In this section I raise and brieﬂy answer this question: are the two models distinct?9
I have followed many commentators in assuming they are. But this assumption is
arguable. In a moment I consider and brieﬂy reject two reasons for thinking that the
distinction can be questioned. As I have mentioned, whether or not we keep to a
sharp dividing line between the models does not affect my overall argumentative
narrative, since in the end I reject both models for thin and thick concepts. My main
target is the genus–speciesmodel since it seems so obviously in tune with separation-
ism. If the determinable–determinate model is closer to it than appears, then it may
also be affected by my general arguments in later chapters. That is something I do not
mind. It is just cleaner for my narrative to keep them apart.
Here are two reasons for not thinking them distinct, both found in Sanford (2006),
especially §1.3 and §3.10 First, it is not as if the two models have nothing in common:
they both deal with general and speciﬁc concepts and, importantly, they both have
exclusion as part of what they say. So perhaps they are a lot closer than we may think.
But we should also note, contra Sanford’s simple challenge, that the explanation of
exclusion provided by the two models is very different. On the genus–species model
homo sapiens and cats exclude each other in the sense that no animal can be both,
and this is just because the differentia for each is unique. Exclusion works differently
in the case of the determinable–determinate model. While it is true that no object can
instantiate both red and blue at the same time for example, this is just what exclusion
means. In the case of this model, the phenomenon of exclusion does not depend on
there being a speciﬁc element being different in the case of the two (supposedly)
exclusionary concepts which are, in turn, linked by having an element in common.
Second, Sanford thinks that we can construct various conjunctive and disjunctive
deﬁnitions of some supposedly clear-cut determinable–determinate examples. These
deﬁnitions show how easy it is to transform these examples into genus–species
examples, and thus our conﬁdence in the sharpness of the division between the
two models should be undermined. For example, he characterizes, that is deﬁnes, RED
as: ‘x is red = (df.) (x is colored) & (x is red or x is not colored)’. We have a unique
differentia, which is a (gerrymandered) concept (or predicate) that is not RED. One
quick and fatal counter to this, however, is that this concept still includes RED and
so presupposes some understanding of it. This clearly cuts against applying the
9 This short section adds nothing to my overall argumentative narrative, so readers who are uninter-
ested in this question can skip ahead to §3.5.
10 Sanford notes that Johnson himself provides only equivocal support for the distinction.
 CONCEPTUAL RELAT IONS
genus–species model. It is still very unclear whether we will be able to construct
differentiae for staple determinable–determinate examples, and hence cast doubt on
the division between the two models.
There is more to say on this complicated matter, but I am conﬁdent that we can
proceed in thinking the two models are distinct. As I say, given I reject both of them
for thin and thick concepts, then their division is of little importance to me. It just
keeps my narrative cleaner if we treat them separately.
3.5 Evaluative Flexibility
I return to the two models in a while. For now we need to establish that it is attractive
to think that thick concepts exhibit evaluative ﬂexibility, for this has a bearing on
both models. Remember that the point of this section is not to argue conclusively for
this phenomenon. As I have indicated, I argue for evaluative ﬂexibility by seeing how
well it ﬁts with other aspects of my position, something we will appreciate only in
later chapters. For now, it is enough merely to show evaluative ﬂexibility in a positive
light. In the following sections I indicate why the two models cannot accommodate
evaluative ﬂexibility, at least as I deﬁne it.
We have met this phenomenon earlier, in Chapter Two, when I talked of simple
separationists thinking about the ﬂexibility of the evaluative or attitudinative part of
thick concepts. Recall an example from Chapter Two, mentioned brieﬂy. We may
often praise a poem for its elegance, and its elegance can be manifested in a number
of ways: the words chosen, the mood created to capture the topic, the lay-out on the
page, or the rhythms of the spoken word. But we often damn a poem and do so
because it is elegant. We have a certain sort of topic that really cries out for raw and
earthy words, or a disjointed, jerky presentation, or something else. The poem’s
elegance is completely out of place and spoils what could be something good. To
employ some technical words, we might say that in some contexts elegance is bad- or
wrong-making: it contributes negatively in some way to the overall thing of which
it is a part.
When we start to think like this, examples abound. Cherubic children can often be
a bore. Cheekiness and even naughtiness in children have their rightful place: such
children show spirit, independence, and invention. We are often sick of crotchety
people. But crotchetiness can be a virtue in some cases, in refusing to suffer or
compromise with foolishness, and the exhibited temper may be just the right thing to
shock those with whom one is arguing into a better course of action. We have
previously met, in Chapter Two, Blackburn’s and Hare’s examples of people being
industrious and tidy. It appears that we can create such examples at will. It appears
that many, if not all, thick evaluative concepts can vary in the evaluations that they
carry or embody.
This appears ﬁne. But can our case for evaluative ﬂexibility lie here? No. For
evaluative ﬂexibility to be correct then the very same concept has to alter in
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evaluation depending on context. What if, instead, we have a range of evaluations
(broadly positive, negative, and neutral) across a range of concepts, albeit concepts
that are related and where in some instances the concepts in the range are covered by
the same word?
Consider the following train of thought. We can call a poem ‘too elegant’ implying
that it would be okay if it was elegant to some extent, but in this instance we have too
much of it. We have the same concept in play, but we acknowledge that we can have
too much of what is normally a good thing which results in a bad thing. (Similarly, we
can have too little of a good thing, which results in something bad.) For some
concepts, these excesses and deﬁciencies might themselves have neat, different
English words. When it comes to ELEGANT we might hear people talk of something
being ‘over-styled’ or ‘affected’. So even though we have the same concept, we should
not forget that concepts can be used in this way.
This might lead us to wonder whether we have, in fact, the same concept. Perhaps
what we really have are two concepts, ELEGANT-PRO and ELEGANT-CON. (We may have
more than that. There may be some concept which is ‘extremely-pro’, for example,
but I will keep things simple.) My talk of excesses and deﬁciencies just now was
deliberate, for this way of thinking recalls Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics. In some
contexts, too much of something (or the wrong amount of something in the wrong
context) means that what could have been brave is in fact rash or reckless; giving us
not just new words, but also new concepts, even if they are clearly related to BRAVE.11
This takes us back to Blackburn and the idea of the licensing model. We earlier had
CUDDLY and GROSS, but we discussed them to death so I shall switch examples. When
someone is short-tempered and is so unreasonably—perhaps it is not so obvious that
other people are being foolish and annoying—we might call them crotchety, or
awkward, or petulant, or gruff, or many other such things. When we admire some-
one’s stance and their refusal to be sweet and polite to those they should be quick to
be angry with, we might prefer to describe such behaviour with softer words, such as
‘indignant’, or ‘riled’, or employ the more neutral ‘angry’, and even use ‘heroic’ if
their aims and the situation demand it. So, goes the thought, it seems that if some
behaviour or object is deemed good, one sort of concept will apply, while if it is
deemed bad then another sort will apply. Why bother with talk of the ﬂexibility of a
single concept? Crotchety behaviour is always bad. That is a central reason it gets to
be crotchety. Indeed, our debate about whether or not an action is crotchety is a way
of debating whether or not it is good. In conclusion—and this is the important
thought—this analysis generalizes for most or all thick concepts.
This train of thought raises a few issues and gives us a few ways of capturing the
various phenomena. I will deal with a nonseparationist option I do not like ﬁrst of all,
11 I prefer something along the lines in the parentheses to explain what Aristotle is getting at in his
doctrine of the mean, but I do not push it as this is not a book of Aristotelian scholarship.
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and then separationism afterwards. That will allow me to say something about my
positive view.
First of all, here is the nonseparationist option that I introduce only to cover the
logical terrain. It is possible to agree with the previous train of thought and be a
nonseparationist about thick concepts. That is, we will multiply and allow various
ELEGANCE concepts—ELEGANT-PRO and ELEGANT-CON, for example—but for each one say
it is impossible to separate the evaluative from the descriptive. Note that the English
presentation of these more speciﬁc concepts would be judged misleading by advo-
cates of this view, for the hyphen clearly separates what might be thought descriptive
content from an evaluation. Crucial to this nonseparationist view, however, is that we
can say that there is something that these two concepts share—they are both types of
ELEGANT after all—but we should not think of there being some isolatable descriptive
content that is the shared element.
I do not like this view at all. True, the qualiﬁers at the end distinguish it in logical
space from separationist views. But how is one to argue for the idea that our two
concepts are both nonseparable and yet they have shared, common content that can
seemingly be seen as distinct from the two different evaluative points? Arguing for
this seems very difﬁcult. Further to that, who is to say that we have just two concepts,
ELEGANT-PRO and ELEGANT-CON? What are we also to make of ELEGANT-VERY-PRO? Is it a
different (nonseparable) concept, or just a stronger version of the ﬁrst example?
Similarly, what are we to make of how our elegance concepts are linked to STYLISH-PRO
and STYLISH-CON? And what are we to make of poems being HARMONIOUS-PRO and
HARMONIOUS-CON, CONSTRAINED-PRO and CONSTRAINED-CON, JERKY-PRO and JERKY-CON,
and so on?
To my mind, if you think that an evaluative concept is nonseparable, then it is far
easier to imagine that the evaluative aspect of the concept can itself alter—in terms of
speciﬁc positive or negative view that is conveyed—depending on context and this
not require you to multiply the number of concepts you have. There is no reason to
pursue the nonseparationist view that we are allowed only one distinct sort of
evaluative content per each concept because the alternative is too messy to contem-
plate. On the contrary, I think this alternative is beautifully simple.
Now consider separationism. Separationists will argue that it is routine to analyse
thick concepts into more speciﬁc varieties to reﬂect the separation of evaluation from
description. We will get some differences between separationists beyond this. The
difference for Elstein and Hurka between ELEGANT and contrary concepts such as
AFFECTED and CONSTRAINED when applied to our poem might be analysed in terms of
isolatable conceptual elements, that is in terms of some Xs and Ys. For Blackburn,
there may be some general descriptive dimension along which judges and their
evaluations plant themselves, but then we get different speciﬁcations of this general
vector because of the different attitudes to which they are conjoined. In both cases we
may have many words that are used, as in our ELEGANT example. These may well
indicate different concepts. In other words, and to summarize, behind the everyday
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English words that may be used, what unites all of these separationist positions is the
idea that putting matters in terms of ELEGANT-PRO and ELEGANT-CON is not a misleading
presentation in the least.
Both separationism and the nonseparationist alternative I have considered just
before include the idea that once we have a different evaluation—strictly, a different
bare thin concept or elements—then this justiﬁes us in speaking of two (or more)
concepts. It may even entail it. My suggested view is different.
When we call two poems elegant, yet praise one for being elegant and damn the
other in the same way, we can still note and pick out the elegance. We are using the
same word in the same sort of way, at least, and despite the theoretical possibility of
there being different concepts (ELEGANCE-PRO and ELEGANCE-CON) standing behind this
word, the ease with which we can in many everyday contexts see the similarity and
compare in that light is surely telling. This is a ﬁrst suggested point in my view’s
favour, designed to show that what I am entertaining is not so strange. Second, we
should note that the two opposing views I have canvassed seem based only on the
overly quick thought that if we have different, speciﬁc evaluations being employed—
in terms of PRO and CON—that automatically means we must have at least two
concepts in play. Where is the argument for that? We surely need some extensive
argument, for this is a fundamental point. Further and third, I worry that adopting
the position I oppose will lead to an over-multiplication of concepts, all separate and
all performing their very speciﬁc role. My worry here mirrors my ﬁrst point. The idea
standing behind both, perhaps, is this. Those that oppose my view seem to think that
if one has a variation in function or speciﬁc evaluative stance that is expressed, then
one must have different concepts. I do not see that at all. Indeed, in Chapter Six
I illustrate, through discussion of Williams and Ryle, that a concept—especially an
evaluative concept—can have a number of functions across a range of instances, and
yet it be natural to assume that it is the same concept. As I express it there, an
evaluative concept can be such that it holds together a range of speciﬁc evaluative
stances of varying strengths, and this be part of the evaluative aspect of the concept;
indeed and further, such evaluative stances are of and express the entire concept.
(I add this rider to underline the point that the entire concept is evaluative, not just
some aspect of it.)
These few thoughts are not enough to argue against separationism as yet. But they,
and the previous examples, should make us pause to let evaluative ﬂexibility in as a
live possibility at least. It is also important to see that evaluative ﬂexibility as I have
characterized it slots very nicely into a nonseparationist view that I favour (and not
the one from logical terrain canvassed earlier). We have a single, evaluative concept,
even if we initially capture this idea by saying that it has aspects of evaluation
and description. Further, a key argument raised by nonseparationists against
separationists—one which has cropped up every so often—is that one can under-
stand the descriptive aspect of a thick concept (that is, why it applies to items with
certain sorts of feature) only by understanding its evaluation or evaluative point, in
 CONCEPTUAL RELAT IONS
part because such concepts are so complex. We shall see this develop into the thought
that the best way of understanding what nonseparationists have been saying is that
this is true because we have a range of speciﬁc evaluations, and appreciation of this
range is required to understand which concepts apply and why.
We have enough motivation to think how our two conceptual models fare when
we see if they can accommodate it. Evaluative ﬂexibility has some attraction, and it
seems to sit nicely with nonseparationism.
One ﬁnal note before I return to those two models. I talked of Blackburn advo-
cating evaluative ﬂexibility, but what he supports is different from what I advocate.
He thinks of there being a separable descriptive content, to which different attitudes
can be conjoined; recall his ‘description+tone’ from Chapter Two. So even though we
may sloppily say that ELEGANT can change its evaluation on his view, what we really
mean is that there is some general descriptive dimension along which certain
different attitudes are placed, resulting in different words (‘elegant’, ‘constrained’,
‘prim’, ‘stiﬂed’).12 They have something general in common, but the ‘description
+tone’s that result are different. This may also result in us saying, for convenience’s
sake, that we have ‘evaluative ﬂexibility’, even if, strictly, what we have is the same
general descriptive concept with different attitudes attached, thus resulting in
different things with different attitudes, not the same thing embracing different
evaluative points.13
3.6 The Genus–Species Model and Separationism
If evaluative ﬂexibility turns out to be a real phenomenon, where it is understood as
I have characterized it as referring to the ﬂexible evaluative nature of a single concept,
then we cannot adopt either of the two conceptual models discussed earlier. The
same reasoning applies to both models, although it is easier to show in the case of the
genus–species model.
Recall that in order to get a thick concept we supposedly have a thin genus concept
to which some differentia is added. If we adopt evaluative ﬂexibility (for a single
12 What that general descriptive dimension might be I do not know. If one thinks of it purely
descriptively, one might well call it ‘elegant’.
13 This whole discussion of evaluative ﬂexibility calls to mind the debate between particularists and
generalists. The two best books on the subject are Dancy (2004) and McKeever and Ridge (2006).
Particularists come in varieties, and discussion of what the dispute between the two camps amounts to is
thorny. However, for simplicity’s sake we can note that some particularists, including Dancy, argue that
features (or reasons) can vary in their valency in a way that is inﬂuenced by context: sometimes a feature
can be right-making and sometimes it can be wrong-making. This short claim can then be given a modal
edge, and particularists can choose to say that it is not necessary for moral reasoning having a rational
structure that it be based on codiﬁed principles in which features are deemed to be either always right-
making or always wrong-making. This is not a book on the intricacies of the debate about particularism.
Sufﬁce it to say that one can be a particularist about thick concepts or thick features. My discussion in the
main text is an expression of my acceptance of this sort of particularism. I have defended this view in more
detail in Kirchin (2003b), which is a response to Crisp (2000) and McNaughton and Rawling (2000).
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concept), then we are imagining that we can have at times a PRO genus and at times a
CON genus to which some differentia is added, which then results in something which
is the same concept in both additions. That plainly makes no sense. This is why
putting things explicitly in terms of ELEGANT-PRO and ELEGANT-CON is so right for this
model. ELEGANT-PRO and BRAVE-PRO, say, have the same genus, but are distinguished
by their descriptive differentiae, and our two elegance concepts are distinguished by
belonging to different genera.14
This is not to say that separationism and the genus–species model come apart. We
should remind ourselves what is meant by evaluative ﬂexibility in the mouths of
separationists and, chieﬂy, Blackburn. The point was just made, but I make it again in
case it was lost.
There is no tension here for Blackburn simply because he does not in the end think
of evaluative ﬂexibility as being something to do with the same concept. What we
have is a general descriptive concept to which different attitudes, often conveyed
through tone of voice, are then added. He might then not even want to say that we
have different concepts that are constructed, strictly, although he might allow that we
can talk loosely as if there are. The attitudes are placed along a descriptive dimension
and we have different words that pick out those different and distinct placings. There
is no notion here of the very same concept changing its evaluative aspect. By
changing the evaluative part, as separationists conceive of it, you change the concept,
or whatever it is that we call it.
The moral, from this simple review of Blackburn’s position, is that this goes for all
separationist positions: by changing one of the ingredients, you thereby change the
product, rather than alter the very same product from one instance to another.
For completeness, here is what happens with complex separationism. Complex
separationists are committed to there being independent ingredients that result in a
product, but the descriptive ingredient is not ‘fully’ determinate. I made play in
Chapter Two with the thought that Elstein and Hurka’s analysis for ELEGANT would
get more complicated if we had both a GOOD and a BAD, or both a PRO and a CON. Here
we can see that it would be unwise to think that we would end up with the same
concept. Part of the worry with the analysis I presented was that it was so vague and
so general as to cover very many different expressions of ‘elegant’. True it helps us to
see that there will be some connection between ELEGANT-PRO and ELEGANT-CON—
namely the ‘ELEGANT’ part—but then we would be better off with two distinct sorts
of concept. (Or, if our language and thought typically expressed a need for a
separation between ELEGANT-PRO and ELEGANT-VERY-PRO, say, then more than two
distinct sorts of concept.)
14 We can carve things differently by having the descriptive ‘ELEGANT’ part as the genus, and the
evaluation as the differentia, but in our imagined scenario that will not result in many concepts. Given
the prevalence of the number of pro- and con-concepts, and given that genus is supposed to be a general
idea, then it is better to conceive things as I have done in the main text.
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Thus, to summarize, there seems to be tension between the adoption of the genus–
species model and evaluative ﬂexibility of some sort, but this is only a passing worry.
As a separationist one can adopt the genus–species model, and one can sign up to
some general idea of evaluative ﬂexibility, but the key rider is that this second idea
cannot be the evaluative ﬂexibility of a single concept. The view has instead to be that
there is some descriptive core, which itself may be tagged with the typical thick term
such as ‘elegant’ or ‘brave’, and then we end up with different resulting products,
distinguished because of different evaluations, indicated by different tones of voice
and the like.
This little discussion may seem unimportant. But it will help set things up for the
next section, and it helps to build up a picture of separationism and the genus–species
model. With that in mind, I summarize what has gone on in the rest of this chapter.
The genus–species model as applied to thin and thick concepts is simply separ-
ationism with a different name. Four aspects seem pertinent: (i) There are two or
more elements that go to make any concept deemed to be a species concept. (ii) All
elements that are assumed to be ingredients of the species concept have to be
intelligible independently of our understanding of any species concept. (iii) All
elements have to be conceptually prior to the species concept. (iv) The differentia
has to be unique to the species concept. Given that the genus concept is likely to be
shared, it is the differentia that will typically mark the species concept out as being
different from other concepts.15
It would be easy to slide between (ii) and (iii). Undoubtedly they are linked and
go nicely together. But aspect (ii) concerns the content of the two concepts, as it
were, whereas aspect (iii) concerns which element, if any, comes ﬁrst and which
should be seen as being constructed from the other. I discuss ‘conceptual priority’ in
Chapter Four. Furthermore, although I will often have simple separationism in mind
when criticizing separationism generally, my comments will apply equally to various
forms of complex separationism. Putting things in terms of the genus–species model
sets the scene for two main sorts of criticism that I have already advertised. In
Chapter Four I concentrate on the thin, genus element: what is it for something to
be thin and what is involved in assuming that thin concepts or elements are
conceptually prior to thick concepts? In Chapter Five I concentrate on the differentia.
3.7 Nonseparationism and the
Determinable–Determinate Model
Before that, one last question. I shall soon begin, in Chapter Four, to argue directly
that separationism and the genus–speciesmodel should not be used to understand the
relationship between thin and thick concepts. (I have, thus far, cast suspicion only,
15 The ‘typically’ is designed to cope with analyses such as Gibbard’s, which I discuss in Chapter Four.
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since evaluative ﬂexibility of a single concept cannot be accommodated within
separationism.) So, therefore, does that mean that nonseparationists should adopt
the determinable–determinate model? I think the answer is ‘no’.16
On the face of it there is a very strong reason for nonseparationists to adopt the
determinable–determinate model. It seems that the two models exhaust the choices
that face us when choosing between models of conceptual relations where we are
assuming a link between general and speciﬁc concepts. Given that separationism just
is the genus–species model applied to thin and thick concepts, then it seems non-
separationists must choose the determinable–determinate model. However, why
should we think that the two models exhaust the options?
It goes back to the phenomenon of exclusion. Recall that our aim is to explain how
general and speciﬁc concepts that are assumed to be families are linked. The genus–
speciesmodel encapsulates one very natural answer to that question, namely common-
ality. That commonality is of a particular kind: namely a deﬁned and isolatable common
element that can be identiﬁed as appearing in each and every one of the concepts that
are, therefore, treated as species of the genus, or species of the common element or root.
(That will be important in a moment.) Against this, the determinable–determinate
model bases relations on exclusion. So it appears as if we have only two choices: relations
can be based either on commonality or exclusion.
Some nonseparationists may be happy to leave things there. But I am not because
evaluative ﬂexibility cannot be handled by the determinable–determinate model.
Why not? As with the genus–species model, the determinable–determinate model is
a model between concepts considered as whole things. Thus, for example, when we
say that RED is a determinate of the determinable COLOUR, what we mean to say is that
every red thing is also a coloured thing or, if one prefers, every time the concept RED is
instantiated, then COLOUR is instantiated. So if we want to say that, for example,
HONEST is a determinate of the determinable GOOD, then we have to be committed to
saying that every honest thing is also a good thing, not merely that some honest
things are good things and some other honest things are not. Thus, the commitment
to HONEST, for example, being a determinate of GOOD, does not respect evaluative
ﬂexibility. And, to repeat, it is not just a matter of these speciﬁc examples: we have a
general commitment about determinates always being linked to some determinable.
Just for completeness, let us consider very brieﬂy one possible defence. There is
nothing in the model that says that a concept cannot be a determinate of more than
one determinable. SCARLET is a determinate of both RED and COLOUR. It even works for
determinables that are at the same conceptual level. A LENGTH OF 6 METRES is always a
determinate of many different determinables of the form BETWEEN X METRES AND Y
METRES. So, if we favour evaluative ﬂexibility, it seems as if we could say that HONEST is
a determinate of both GOOD and BAD. However, the case of value is different from
16 I used to think that they should. I am grateful to Debbie Roberts for convincing me that I was
wrong.
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the case of lengths. It is plausible to assume—and perhaps necessary to our use of
these concepts to assume—that paired thin concepts such as GOOD and BAD, and RIGHT
and WRONG, are opposed. Although it may not appear to be at ﬁrst glance, saying that
a concept can be both always good-making and always bad-making (or even be
always good-making and occasionally bad-making) is as contradictory as saying that
red things can be both always coloured and occasionally not-coloured. So this avenue
is closed. And, in short, the determinable–determinate model is inconsistent with
evaluative ﬂexibility of a single concept.
Having said all of this, there is a gaping hole in my story. If I sign up to evaluative
ﬂexibility, and assume that this cannot be accommodated by either model of con-
ceptual relations, then what model of conceptual relations between the general and
the speciﬁc do I favour? This point presses a great deal given that I have set things up
so that the two models that have preoccupied us apparently exhaust the options.
I here offer a broad response. We should revisit what it means to say that some
general concept, for example GOOD, is a concept that is ‘held in common by’, or
‘which is part of ’, or ‘which is exhibited by’, or ‘which is shown in’ more speciﬁc
evaluative concepts. The genus–species model has it that this can be understood only
if the conceptual content is something that itself is an independent ingredient that
retains this character even when brought into contact with some differentia, thereby
producing a new concept. But it need not be like that at all. Thoughts familiar from
the later Wittgenstein on family resemblance teach us that there may be many
concepts—or ‘things’, understood very broadly—that go together and which, some-
times, can be seen as speciﬁc versions of some general thing by exhibiting it or by
some other relation. Even if we can say, conﬁdently, that all of these examples are
examples of X, in doing so we need not be committed to saying that the way in which
X is in each example is exactly the same way such that we can isolate and identify the
X part, thus justifying us in separating it. Perhaps instead we can abstract from the
various examples and get a sense of what X or the X is like, even if that sense is not to
be found in each example in exactly the same way. Wittgenstein’s idea can be
exempliﬁed literally: this is how things often work when it comes to the noses and
cheekbones of certain family members. The same is true of certain concepts, I think.
This general sort of stance can unite speciﬁc concepts with general concepts. We
can say that this group of speciﬁc concepts exhibit or are linked to a general concept,
although those other speciﬁc concepts do not. We can also say that these speciﬁc
concepts can exhibit more than one general concept; some speciﬁc evaluative con-
cepts can even exhibit both GOOD and BAD, although they need not do it at the very
same time with regards to the very same thing being categorized. We can say this sort
of thing because there is no tie or recipe independent of and different from our
exercise of evaluative judgement between concepts considered as general types. We
have, instead, thoughts about judgement that allows for more ﬂexibility in the nature
of concepts and the relations they can form with other concepts. The justiﬁcation for
a speciﬁc concept being a member of a family of general concepts need not rely on an
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individual, isolatable, separable part that is held in common by both parent and child
and which, in the extreme case, is wholly the parent concept itself.
This is a broadbrush treatment of judgement. Although I will return to this sort of
stance (in Chapters Six and Eight), it will remain broadbrush throughout. For even
when we return to it, much of my commentary will be negative, pointing out—as
I have done in this chapter—the difﬁculties we get into when we divert from this
general stance for evaluative concepts. Indeed, although this is clearly inﬂuenced by
thoughts from the later Wittgenstein, I will not offer any Wittgensteinian exegesis in
this book. One point I will return to in the next chapter is worth ﬂagging. One might
wonder whether the more general—that is, thin—sorts of evaluative concepts are
only ever mere abstractions of the thicker ones, as was suggested just now. Some
theorists have thought this but, despite what I have just written, I do not believe this
to be the case; we can think of the thin differently while retaining the idea of a model
of conceptual relations different from the two models that have preoccupied us in
this chapter.
3.8 Conclusion
Understanding the genus–species and determinable–determinate models was import-
ant for understanding separationism, and giving us the start of some insight into
nonseparationism. As part of this I have also got us thinking about evaluative
ﬂexibility.
As I mentioned, thinking in terms of the genus–species model will help us to
understand how we can criticize separationism and the ways in which it is vulnerable.
We now need to turn to think about the type of concept typically thought by
separationists to be the genus concept, namely the thin.
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4The Thin
4.1 Introduction
One key attack on separationism is to argue that separationists’ notion of the thin is
wrong. More speciﬁcally it can be argued that it does not show enough appreciation
of what it is for something to be a thin concept. Furthermore, separationists are
committed to the idea that thin concepts enjoy some form of conceptual priority
over thick ones: the latter are explicitly assumed to be constructed from the former plus
some differentia. But what are the reasons for this view and howmight one question it?
This chapter has two main topics. First, I investigate the notion of the thin and
think about what notion of the thin is best employed by separationists. In order to do
this I think about whether there is a dividing line between two broad types of
evaluative concept. (I suggest there is.) This itself does not result in an argument,
but it does resonate with the line of argument I pursue in Chapter Six: in brief, some
so-called thin concepts may be thicker than others. Furthermore, through looking at
the work of Allan Gibbard I argue that separationists are better off thinking of the
thin as very thin. Having established that, I move to my second main topic: what does
it mean to say, as separationists have to say, that the thin is conceptually prior to the
thick? Not only do I think about what that means, I also ask whether such a
conceptual priority is true. In my view the arguments for it are weak indeed, although
crucially I think that much of what I say is inconclusive. My main conclusion is that
nonseparationists need to ﬁnd different ground on which to ﬁght.
In §4.2 and §4.3 I argue for the idea that we can talk with conﬁdence of there being
two types of concept, although my end point is designed only to be strongly suggestive
not conclusive. In §4.4 I reﬂect on the argumentative narrative that leads from the ﬁrst
two sections. In §4.5 I argue that separationists should assume that the evaluative
element in their analyses has to be construed as very thin, and as mentioned I think
about Gibbard’s work here. I then consider conceptual priority in §4.6 and §4.7. Even if
we assume—as I do—that there are thin concepts, why assume that they are concep-
tually prior to thick ones, as the genus–species model requires? In §4.8 I conclude.
4.2 Two Types of Concept?
It is routine to assume in discussions of thin and thick concepts that we have two
broad types of concept: the thin and the thick. However, it is worth challenging that
assumption since we can learn a lot. I believe we can understand the thick only if we
understand the thin. Indeed, in this and the next section I start to sow seeds that will
unsettle the separationist view in later chapters. Despite my challenging the ‘binary’
assumption of thin and thick concepts, the reader should note that at the end of my
discussion I suggest that we should keep to the view that there are two broad types of
concept. My aim is to show what we can learn from thinking about the thin.
Writers normally introduce thin concepts and talk of GOOD and BAD, RIGHT and
WRONG, and then move quickly onto the whole run of thick concepts. I did the same
in my Introduction. It also often happens that these thin concepts are described as
being evaluative only, and the thick ones are thought to be both evaluative and
descriptive. But all of this is simply too quick. Compare two of our thin concepts,
GOOD and RIGHT. That these concepts are different concepts is surely unarguable. For a
start, philosophical and other writers normally namecheck both of them rather than
use one to stand for the other. And, second, they do so because the vast majority of
writers and ordinary people think there is a difference, even if, in the end, some
theorists might argue that the two come together in an interesting way. The whole
of modern normative ethics—and much of our everyday thought that it is supposed
to reﬂect—makes no sense unless we assume, at least at the start, that there is a
difference between GOOD and RIGHT.
What is that difference? The following may not be exactly correct, but it is decent
enough for our purposes. If something is good then it indicates that we both approve
of the thing and that we are open to the possibility of other relevantly similar things
being things that we can approve of, be that approval stronger, weaker, or the same.1
If something is right, then we approve of the thing and we think that it is the only
thing among all relevantly similar things that we can approve of or want to approve
of. In short, we ordinarily think that in a given context or situation there can be many
good things but only one right one.2
Two points ﬂow from this. First, GOOD and RIGHT are both positive concepts, yet
they differ. In what respect do they differ? If we have bought into the idea that
evaluative and descriptive content are completely separate, and if we think that
evaluative content is exhausted by mere likes and dislikes, then we will have to say
that GOOD and RIGHT differ in terms of descriptive content. In which case, we
straightaway threaten the thought that these traditionally cast thin concepts are
evaluative only and ‘purely’, at least on our introductory understanding of thin and
thick concepts. That idea is reinforced by a second point. We have another evaluative
1 We could frame all of this in terms of ‘should be approved of ’, or similar. That does not make any
difference to what I say.
2 As I said, this is rough. I am sensitive to the idea that ‘right’ might be used in everyday speech as a
synonym for ‘good’, where people are picking out something that they approve of and want to indicate that
they approve of it strongly, not that it is the only approvable thing. However, I reckon that such use is either
non-standard or easy to interpret as indicating GOOD. On reﬂection, my distinction, or something like it,
holds.
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concept in the mix now, namely PRO. GOOD and RIGHT differ from PRO. They are
concepts which we employ to approve of things, but when we approve we do more
than simply say ‘pro’. We approve of things in a certain way, with extra information.3
The way in which we approve of good things is different from the way in which we
approve of right things.
That, again, should make us worry about how we classify thin concepts. Are they
all ‘simply’ and ‘merely’ and ‘purely’ evaluative, with thick concepts being something
else? Perhaps the evaluative way in which thin concepts are evaluative can differ. Or,
in other words, perhaps thin concepts come in a range of ‘thicknesses’? After all,
some seem slightly more speciﬁc than others; indeed, perhaps we should just drop the
inverted commas around ‘thicknesses’.
I think that we can class thin concepts as being ‘simply’ and ‘purely’ evaluative but
that is because I have a certain view of the evaluative that allows me to say that thick
concepts are also ‘simply’ and ‘purely’ evaluative. We could really pursue this current
line of thought in a way that becomes a full frontal attack on separationism, by
questioning what separationists mean by and include in their notion of ‘the evalu-
ative’ and from that argue that thick concepts can also be fundamentally and simply
evaluative. I do that in Chapter Six and park the argument just mentioned for the
present. Right now I stress a different idea. We are concerned only with whether we
should assume such a clear division between the thin and the thick.
I should point out that the discussion just now can be run for concepts other than
just GOOD and RIGHT. Consider a range of concepts that pick out pro-concepts in any
language and indicate strength of approval. In English we might have a run of
concepts from OUTSTANDING to OKAY and ADEQUATE, that takes in EXCELLENT, FINE,
DECENT, and ACCEPTABLE along the way, among other examples.4 Again, the key idea
is that these are all pro-concepts, yet they do more than just indicate approval of
something. If that is all they did, we would have the same concept, but we do not.
Something else must be going on.
There is another point often missing from the literature. We would surely say that
there is a difference between the concepts ETHICALLY GOOD, AESTHETICALLY GOOD,
PRUDENTIALLY GOOD, and the like.5 Yet clearly all of them differ from PRO and
CON, and it would take a brave person to argue that they were not more speciﬁc
versions of GOOD. Are we then committed to the idea that they are all thick
concepts? Perhaps. But doing so is unnerving. It seems also possible and justiﬁable
3 As mentioned in Chapter One, we can use all sorts of word in everyday language to indicate PRO and
CON. I am thinking here of the many cases where we are doing something different from merely indicating
bare approval or disapproval.
4 I am well aware that these concepts might themselves be thicker and that some of them may be
imperfect for this present point. The thought is simply that some words and concepts in everyday speech
are used to indicate a pro-attitude, and some to indicate a con-attitude, where such concepts differ only in
terms of strength.
5 Some might not think there are clear differences in kind here. But surely most will think it plausible
that there are at least differences of degree here that are philosophically signiﬁcant.
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to think that we have now added to our range of concepts that can be labelled thin,
and that this group is growing as we continue to reﬂect.
Having thought a little about the thin and exposed the possibility of there being
differences, let us do the same with the thick. Compare this family of concepts: KIND,
CARING, COMPASSIONATE, EMPATHETIC, SYMPATHETIC, THOUGHTFUL, and CONSIDERATE. It is
impossible to be precise here, but to mymind it seems obvious that KIND is thinner and
more general than, say, EMPATHETIC and SYMPATHETIC. THOUGHTFUL, at least as meant as
part of this family, seems to lie in the middle, it being a certain way in which one can
exercise kindness, although I am prepared to be argued out of this claim. The main
idea is that there is a host of different thicknesses among all those concepts classed
as thick concepts.
In a review of Williams’ ELP, Samuel Schefﬂer makes essentially the same point.
He notes that Williams assumes that there are just two sorts of concept: the thick and
the more abstract. ContraWilliams, Schefﬂer gives a list of concepts that seem to fall
under neither heading, grouped in families.6 For example, JUSTICE, FAIRNESS, and
IMPARTIALITY form one little family; PRIVACY, SELF-RESPECT, and ENVY form another;
and NEEDS, WELL-BEING, AND INTERESTS form a third. Schefﬂer notes that Williams’
bifurcation of thick concepts as being both world-guided and action-guiding, and
thin concepts as being action-guiding alone, appears unjustiﬁed. In fact, he calls this
divide ‘incoherent’. Williams, Schefﬂer claims, ties world-guidedness to agreement
in application, but it appears that Williams is not so strict as to see widespread
agreement as either necessary or sufﬁcient for a concept being world-guided.
Indeed, given that strengths and types of agreement can vary depending on concept
(and context), it seems as if we are in territory where it is unwise to think of
strict conditions and of clear dividing lines between one type of thing and
another. Schefﬂer explicitly talks of various relevant considerations here being
‘matters of degree’.
These preceding comments can now be put together to deﬁne the challenge of this
section. So far I have done two things. I have indicated that it may be less than
obvious that all traditional thin concepts should be lumped together and assumed to
be the same. In particular we saw that concepts that are traditionally labelled as thin
might differ from PRO (or CON) and do so because some other conceptual content (or
something) is added to PRO (or CON), and/or the strength of approval or disapproval
changes. A concept traditionally classed as thin may well not be a simple or
bare approval or disapproval. This ﬁrst point can itself be used as a starting point
to try to unseat the separationist view of the thin, but here I am using it simply to
pursue the idea that the thin comes in a range of thicknesses. I have also, second,
6 Schefﬂer (1987), pp. 417ff. One of Schefﬂer’s other main worries is that Williams charges modern
professional moral philosophy with being interested only in thin concepts such as GOOD and RIGHT, whereas
in fact many modern moral philosophers are interested in a whole host of concepts. A note from
Chapter One bears repetition: Schefﬂer, unlike Williams in ELP, uses the label ‘thin concept’.
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indicated that thick concepts can come in a variety of thicknesses. It is very tempting
at this stage to put these two ideas together and argue that the distinction between
the thin and the thick is only a convenient starting point, an idea that we should
look beyond.
This comes into view when we work away at the possible boundary of the thin and
the thick. Consider OUGHT, DUTY, DECENT, ACCEPTABLE, and JUST. Are these thin? The
ﬁrst two are often classiﬁed in this way, the third and fourth appeared brieﬂy in my
discussion of the thin (but I noted that they could be thought to be thick), and the last
was included in my brief discussion of thick concepts. The point is that it is not clear
that there is any difference between them in terms of their thicknesses. Or, if there is
it will take a lot of argumentation, and there may still remain disagreements at the
end. Why not, then, just eschew the distinction between the thin and the thick, as
Schefﬂer suggests? Instead of a difference in kind between two types, why not just
embrace a difference of degree among our evaluative concepts? Why not just assume
some sort of continuum in this matter? It seems likely that our evaluative concepts
range from the barely thin at one end to the very thick at the other, taking in all
manner of concepts along the way.
The conclusion is just that we have evaluative concepts and that some are more
speciﬁc than others. (Or if you prefer, for emphasis, some are more general than
others.) That is all that can be said. Placing a dividing line to indicate some difference
in kind is simply unjustiﬁed and a result of sloppy, lazy thinking.
4.3 Back to the Distinction
But is this a product of sloppy, lazy thinking? There seems something to the idea that
we have general and speciﬁc evaluative concepts and there is something important
about the difference between them, so much so that we can talk of a dividing line.
Think again about GOOD and RIGHT. When we apply these concepts we approve
in both cases. The difference between them comes only in what attitude we take
towards those other things that are classed as being relevantly similar to our target
things. We do not say anything more about the target things themselves aside from
indicating our approval of them. A similar point can be made about our range of
concepts that indicate strengths of approval and disapproval, at least on one con-
ception of such matters. One attractive view is that all such judgements are essentially
comparative. We can understand the approval of this thing only in the light of our
consideration of that other thing. In a case—an ‘odd universe’ sort of case—where we
approve of only one thing, we cannot really say how strongly we approve of the thing,
since we can reach such a view only in the light of approvals towards other things.7
7 One alternative is to say that comparisons between different sorts of approval, such as those indicated
by OUTSTANDING and OKAY, can be understood fully without the need for comparison. This relies on us being
able to understand ‘strong approval’ on its own, without any reference to, or experience of, say, ‘weak
THE THIN 
In contrast, think of standard thick concepts. When we say that someone is
generous or obnoxious we are not only approving or disapproving of her, if that is
what we are doing. We are also approving or disapproving of her in a certain way,
where ‘that certain way’ is focused on her, the target thing. Crucially, unlike the story
I have just told for GOOD and RIGHT, our application and understanding of standard
thick concepts to one thing does not depend essentially on our view of other things.
Note, that we might say, in general, that people can fully understand GENEROUS,
say, only by applying it to many things. But that is a different point. The point
I am making here is that, even if there has to be a background of many uses of a thick
concept in order for understanding to be decent or mature, once that background is
in place, any single use of a thick concept need involve reference only to the
particular thing that is being characterized. In contrast, any single application of
GOOD will involve essential reference to a person’s view of other things (or reference to
how she might view other things, given the context, task, or question facing her). The
way in which we view those other things will be crucial in distinguishing GOOD from
RIGHT according to my starting deﬁnitions. In other words, with thick concepts we are
indicating something more speciﬁc than approval and disapproval of the thing in
question in a way that is clearly different from how we do so when applying concepts
such as GOOD and RIGHT.
Let me summarize this in a different way, as this may be quite abstract. The
distinction between the thin and the thick may be thus. Thick concepts pick out
certain sorts of liking towards certain things and they carry or can be speciﬁc sorts of
those likings where such likings are not dependent on us drawing comparisons with
other things and their characterizations, or on other matters. On the other hand,
when thin concepts pick out or are likings towards certain things, they may give us
more information about the thing than a bare approval will, but if so this is achieved
only through some comparison with other things and their characterizations or some
other matter not to do with the target things themselves. Or, in other words, thick
concepts can be used to voice approvals and disapprovals towards things and can do
so speciﬁcally with a focus, sometimes, only on the things themselves. Thin concepts
are not like that. If they do go beyond PRO and CON, the extra information is conveyed
through something else, such as a comparison with other objects.
As advertised, I do not believe that this distinction in kind is deﬁnitively correct.
But I cannot help thinking that just as I imagined an opponent to the distinction
between thick and thin saying that it is a product of lazy and sloppy thinking, we
might also judge that it is too quick to move from the idea that there is a ‘range of
thicknesses’ in our evaluative concepts to the idea that there can be no difference in
kind between them. The idea of thin and thick, of being general and speciﬁc, has
approval’. I am sceptical about this, but even if I am wrong, then my example of GOOD and RIGHT still works.
Thinking in this way about thin concepts is, to my mind, all to the good and shows my worry that more
thought about the thin is required.
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some roots. We would do well to pause and think about the ways in which concepts
work to see if we can uncover some general trends that help mark interesting
differences. The one I have marked out above may be imperfect and is certainly
not fully worked out. But it is a decent start that should stop us from blithely
assuming only differences of degree between our evaluative concepts, even if we
assume a range of thicknesses across them.
If my distinction is onto something, we should revisit other examples. ETHICALLY
GOOD, AESTHETICALLY GOOD and the others may not be as thin as I ﬁrst suggested they
could be. When we pick out something as ethically good we are giving some
information about the thing beyond the fact that we think it is good and which is
not itself wholly comparative. I ﬁnd it intuitive that we can pick out the ethical
character of an ethical liking without comparison with other things, which may or
may not be ethical. And the same is true of things deemed aesthetically good.
What of concepts such as JUST and DECENT? If we are to follow my distinction in
some form, then it appears that these concepts turn out to be thick, albeit thinner
than some others. Things get trickier when we talk of OUGHT and DUTY, APPROPRIATE
and ADEQUATE. OUGHT seems really rather thin and could be as thin as RIGHT or at
least close to it. Yet, if we follow most philosophers we can note that ‘ought implies
can’. We have, then, an additional element not standardly included in RIGHT. Some
action ought to be pursued if it is positively endorsed, so long as it is the only thing
that can be positively endorsed from a range of relevantly similar options and it can be
pursued. We have thickened up RIGHT ever so slightly. Perhaps the invocation of what
can be pursued is sufﬁcient to push it into the camp of thick concepts as I have just
drawn them, but perhaps it should stay on the thin side of things because we have an
essential comparative judgement, albeit with an additional clause, which shows the
connection of OUGHT to RIGHT. Similar comments could be made of the other concepts
mentioned at the start of this paragraph.
The philosophical moral hereabouts is simply that if we wish to maintain some
distinction in kind among evaluative concepts, and label the two camps ‘thin’ and
‘thick’, we need to think hard about a number of examples and decide where to place
them. In doing so, we will bring into focus exactly what the basis is of the distinction
between the thick and the thin. We will also see, I strongly think, that within both of
the two broad camps there is a range of thicknesses. (Schefﬂer was absolutely correct
to emphasize this range.) Assuming that what we deﬁne as being thin is not
exhausted by the minimally thin concepts PRO and CON, this point applies to thin
concepts and not just the thick.
4.4 A Pause
The argument of the previous chapter assumed that there was going to be a difference
in kind between the thin and the thick. I hope that my previous section has at least
provided enough inspiration to think that the distinction retains plausibility. It
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matters somewhat for my discussion. I think that separationism is wrong, but not
because separationists erroneously believe that there is a distinction in kind between
the thin and the thick. They are wrong for other reasons.
However, if you do not think that the distinction is plausible, that should not stop
the interest in this book. True, the structure of my discussion with its talk of the
genus–species model and how I use that to introduce the arguments will seem beside
the point. Yet, the topics that I discuss in what follows will not be. We still need to
understand the thinner concepts and how they relate to more speciﬁc ones, and we
need to understand how, if at all, one can disentangle the thinner sorts of approval
from the information and connotations that thicker concepts convey and carry. Even
those that believe in a difference only of degree believe in a difference, and so they
should think hard about how the more and less speciﬁc evaluative concepts relate.
One thing we have learned from the previous discussion is that evaluative content
is more varied than might at ﬁrst appear; it may be more than just PRO and CON. As
the reader is already aware, this is a key claim of this book. Even by focusing only on
thin concepts—which are so often introduced and then quickly ignored in discus-
sions of the thick—we can see that there is more to be said about evaluative content.
The difference between GOOD and RIGHT, and the question of where DUTY, OUGHT,
and AESTHETICALLY GOOD ﬁt in to the thin/thick divide are questions that require
serious thought.
Before we turn our attention to separationism explicitly, I engage with one of the
most interesting moral philosophers of recent times. This is partly to position him in
relation to the ideas of the previous chapter, but it is mainly to introduce a point of
his analysis that is pertinent to how I am treating separationist uses of the thin.
4.5 Gibbard and L-censoriousness
Allan Gibbard, in a 1992 debate with Blackburn, introduces his analysis of thick
concepts, which itself is an expansion of his brief discussion in Gibbard (1990). He
rejects what he calls ‘two component’ analyses of thick concepts of the sort we
investigated in Chapter Two when looking at conjunction and licensing. Among
other reasons for rejection, he mentions that if such analyses were applied, then
disputants could end up (incorrectly) characterized as talking past one another.8 In
the end he draws up something like Elstein and Hurka’s proposal, in so far as his
analysis also has some looseness to the descriptive component. However, as we saw in
Chapter Two Blackburn’s favoured analysis now accommodates some looseness, so
even though some difference between the two writers remains as we shall shortly see,
there may not be as much of a difference between Gibbard in 1992 and Blackburn’s
more recent view as there was in the 1992 debate.
8 Gibbard (1992), p. 277.
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I do not pursue all of the details of Gibbard’s analysis here. Instead, I focus on one
aspect of it. Here, for illustration, is Gibbard’s analysis of his target example, LEWD.
So, ‘Act X is lewd’ means this: L-censoriousness toward the agent is warranted, for passing
beyond those limits on sexual display such that (i) in general, passing beyond those limits
warrants feelings of L-censoriousness toward the person doing so, and (ii) this holds either on
no further grounds or on grounds that apply specially to sexual displays as sexual displays.9
What I focus on is Gibbard’s ‘feeling of L-censoriousness’.
Clearly what we have here is something explicitly different from the PRO and GOOD
elements with which I have so far been working. I am not so bothered about the fact
that Gibbard’s analysis explicitly introduces the idea of a feeling; that is to be expected
from someone who is working within the noncognitivist tradition. What is interest-
ing is the fact that the noncognitive feeling cited is not as thin as we have been used
to. Perhaps this fact exposes something wrong in my discussion thus far.
My discussion has saddled separationists with a view of the thin that is under-
developed, both in the sense of there being not much thought about it, but also in the
sense that there is an explicit assumption that there is not much to it. I began to poke
and prod that idea in §4.2 by showing that there may be a range of thin concepts (or
thin elements) that we might wish to work with. That is supposed to introduce us
gently to the idea that evaluative content can come in a range of thicknesses, and that
be a perfectly natural idea. But with Gibbard we see a separationist who has a very
speciﬁc sort of noncognitive element explicitly encoded into his analysis. So perhaps
I should not keep on working with something really thin when criticizing separation-
ism. Perhaps I am attacking a straw man.
I applaud Gibbard’s analysis in that it does not work with PRO or some other very
thin element. Although he makes hardly anything of this move, it is important to
realize that separationists need not be committed, at least prima facie, to a very thin
element in their analysis. As separationists, all that they are committed to is this
familiar run of ideas: thick concepts are created from separable elements that
themselves are not thick, typically some thin (or thinner) element (often conceptual
content, often noncognitive feeling), plus some descriptive, nonevaluative conceptual
content. Gibbard’s analysis plumps for an element that is more speciﬁc than what we
are used to, but—before criticism—that is itself not enough to stop his analysis from
being separationist.
However, now I come to that criticism. I raise two general points, and then tie them
to what Gibbard says. I assume for the moment that separationists will be noncogni-
tivists of some sort, but what I say in relation to this will then allow for a criticism of
cognitivist-separationists, one that ties to the ﬁrst two sections of this chapter.
9 Gibbard (1992), pp. 280–1. The looseness, for example, comes with the “passing beyond those limits”,
but it leaves it open as to what the limits are and the extent to which passing beyond them gives us
something like a lewd action rather than something different and/or even worse.
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First, a point about how concepts are supposed to work according to separation-
ists. Recall that separationists are trying to provide an analysis of what is involved in a
thick concept, and recall also that any ingredients that go to make the thick concept
are, by deﬁnition, conceptually prior to their product. In which case, although we can
talk, perhaps in an offhand manner, of the thin element in terms of the thick one, we
need to be absolutely clear that in the ﬁnal analysis this thin element cannot be
identiﬁed and isolated by a theorist simply by their using the target thick concept or
term. This is because the target thick concept is what we are trying to characterize in
the ﬁrst place.
This is strictly a point about the thin element and a particular, individual thick
concept product. It could be that we identify a thin element using a different thick
concept or term that has already been analysed. But, of course, the same stricture
would apply when characterizing that concept. Unless we want to embrace a vicious
regress, at some point there has to be some analysis of some thick concept where no
thick concept or term is used, even if that thick concept is then used to help deﬁne
further thick concepts.
My worry with regards to Gibbard is that his invocation of L-censoriousness falls
obviously foul of this ﬁrst point. We are picking out a feeling by explicitly using the
thick concept, LEWD, that we are trying to analyse. This seems illegitimate. However,
there may be a way out of this thought, for both Gibbard and other noncognitivist-
separationists who wish to include in their analysis a ‘thicker-than-bare-thin’ evalu-
ative element. This brings me to my second point.
The second point concerns psychology. The rescuing move for Gibbard and
separationists like him is to say that we can pick out and have knowledge of a speciﬁc
sort of element without ﬁrst identifying it through use of any thick concept or term.
Sure, we might label it by using some thick term, but that is only for convenience’s
sake and happens only after we have got used to isolating the feeling. Indeed, the
thick concept gets formed because we are so used to the feeling. The key point is
that certain sorts of feeling are psychologically real and are clearly felt things that
we can isolate and identify in the right way. We can easily see them as prior to any
thick concept.
This defence of this sort of separationism stands and falls on the plausibility of the
claim about psychology. There is no doubt at all that humans, even just ‘typical
humans’, have a wide range of experiences and feelings and that these could be
used as the building blocks in the way envisaged by Gibbard. But—and this is a big
‘but’—are we conﬁdent that we have a large variety of experiences sufﬁcient to help
build all of the thick concepts we wish to build?
Gibbard’s own analysis is of an extreme form. It suggests that there is a one-to-
one mapping from speciﬁc feeling to speciﬁc concept. There is no way that
L-censoriousness will be involved in any other sort of thick concept. It is true that
there is some descriptive content involved in Gibbard’s analysis and that will help to
deﬁne the thick concept. But, even then, if we changed the descriptive content it is
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hard to imagine a different sort of thick concept emerging once we have plugged in
L-censoriousness.10
In which case, it seems that we will need as many speciﬁc feelings that we can
isolate as there are speciﬁc concepts to be analysed. This is the ﬁrst worry we can raise
against Gibbard’s view. Is there a speciﬁc feeling associated with JUST, with ELEGANT,
with ILLUMINATING, and with many, many more examples? I doubt this very strongly.
Moreover and second, we will have to be conﬁdent that there is some ﬁne degree of
agreement in feeling across all people such that we can speak of there being common
concepts of LEWD and all the rest. In advance of a huge psychological-cum-sociological
research programme that investigates this philosophical issue, we should refrain from
drawing any deﬁnitive conclusion. But I am highly doubtful that we have this range of
feelings sufﬁcient to justify this sort of analysis.
A third, connected worry is raised by Blackburn against Gibbard.11 Blackburn
thinks that there is a large variety of feelings (or ‘attitudes’) that attend to most sorts
of thick concept; in short he accuses Gibbard of failing to take account of evaluative
ﬂexibility.12 This familiar point indeed strikes home. We might rejoice in something
being lewd, and it “comes from the same neck of the woods as provocative, fruity,
naughty, salacious, racy . . . ”.13 Blackburn questions why lewdness should be por-
trayed in negative terms with talk of ‘censoriousness’. As part of that, his examples
support my ﬁrst criticism: are we conﬁdent that we can tightly isolate different sorts
of ﬁne-grained feeling such that we have the feeling associated only with lewdness,
the feeling associated only with raciness, the feeling associated only with naughtiness
(and the right sort of naughtiness at that), and so on? Again, I emphasize the point:
Gibbard’s analysis may work for some thick concept families; the family of KIND,
SYMPATHETIC, EMPATHETIC comes to mind. There are families and individual concepts
that are obviously based on certain sorts of common feeling and emotion. But I do
not think it will work for other examples.
So there is a large question mark hanging over the thought that separationists
can and should employ highly ﬁne-grained feelings in their analyses of thick
concepts.
10 Perhaps a rewording while retaining L-censoriousness might give us some concept that maps onto
the idea of sexual activity and display that is acceptable. ‘The feeling of L-censoriousness would be
warranted if . . . but this is not one of those occasions and the feeling is not warranted and the sexual
display is acceptable.’ I am not sure what concept this would be, exactly, in English, and the wording is not
quite correct anyway, since I think that separationists should be wary of assuming that terms such as
‘warranted’ and ‘acceptable’ are nonevaluative. Putting these matters aside, if some feelings do lend
themselves to being used by us to analyse two or even a few thick concepts, the spirit of the point in the
main text still holds: there will have to be a very large number of individual feelings in order for us to
analyse concepts in this way.
11 Blackburn (1992), pp. 291ff.
12 Or, given what I said in Chapter Three, ‘a range of speciﬁc, positive and negative evaluations linked to
highly similar concepts’.
13 Blackburn (1992), p. 295.
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Yet, recall that I have characterized Gibbard’s analysis as extreme. What if we had
worked with feelings that were more coarse-grained than L-censoriousness, yet more
ﬁne-grained than some bare pro or con attitude? These feelings are envisaged as
helping to isolate the thick concept we require, but are not themselves doing the
whole job or even just most of it. In effect, such feelings do less than Gibbard
envisages. We then allow the descriptive content to ‘ﬁll in’ and, in effect, be the
thing that helps to individuate every thick concept. This seems a more promising
strategy, at least in so far as it is not obviously subject to the criticism I have been
making of Gibbard’s analysis.
However, this relies on that descriptive conceptual content being sufﬁcient to
cover or mimic the thick concept. In Chapter Five we will examine a powerful
argument that suggests that it cannot do this job. To ﬁnish off this section, I switch
to consider what we can say about cognitivist-separationists and this matter, and also
reﬂect more generally.
What drives a lot of the criticism of this section is the idea that we do not have all
of the ﬁne-grained feelings sufﬁcient to do the job required. But cognitivist-
separationists are not interested in feelings. They prefer to say that we can employ
some evaluative ideas, understood cognitivistically, in our analyses of thick concepts.
However, they also have a tricky path to tread. They clearly do not wish such ideas of
concepts to be themselves thick and components in some analysis, for that would
make these components themselves nonseparable and basic. What if they assume
that we can employ in our analyses some thin concepts (so-called) which are less than
minimally or barely thin? That is, they eschew PRO and CON and work with OUGHT,
DUTY, ACCEPTABLE, and other such ideas.
Certainly doing so avoids a worry that we may not have sufﬁcient feelings to map
onto the concepts we wish; no doubt we have a range of such thinner concepts. But a
different worry arrives, one that lingered in the background of earlier comments.
Why would we feel the need to provide an analysis of (so-called) thick concepts and
regard them as non-primitive, while also thinking that these thicker-than-bare-thin
thin concepts are primitive and in no need of analysis? I may have argued across §4.2
and §4.3 that it would be unwise to jettison the idea of a difference in kind between
the thin and the thick, but clearly my whole discussion raised the possibility of there
being a lot in common between concepts traditionally classed using these two
headings. Indeed, I showed that we could provide ways of distinguishing some of
the thinner concepts from one another. They fall short of ‘analyses’, because detail
was lacking, but we might very well suspect that analyses of the sort favoured by
separationists could be forthcoming. At the very least, cognitivist-separationists who
wish to employ in their analyses thin concepts that are thicker than PRO and CON
owe us a great deal of discussion and defence as to why they use such concepts and
why they are primitive.
It is time to draw some morals and a conclusion in this section. Separationists are
committed to there being at least two elements that are to be included in their
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analyses of thick concepts. These elements cannot be isolated and captured by using
thick terms and concepts, at least before any analysis has been carried out. We can
assume that any thin evaluative element that is employed can, without problem, be
barely thin: noncognitivist analyses can assume that we have some form of pro or con
attitude, while cognitivist analyses can assume a simple PRO or CON concept. This,
however, means that when we analyse and individuate thick concepts, all of the work
is done by the descriptive conceptual content that is included as part of the analysis.
(We will look at this in Chapter Five.)
If separationists do not take this route, then they are subject to worries. Non-
cognitivists make the feeling or attitude associated with a concept more ﬁne-grained
than a simple pro- or con-attitude. The more ﬁne-grained they make it then the more
they run the risk of us querying whether we have a range of such feelings that can
help to individuate our whole range of concepts. And they need to make sure they
stop short of saying something as obviously viciously circular as ‘the feeling that
helps to isolate thick concept X is the X sort of feeling’. As part of this we may worry,
with Blackburn, that there is not a single speciﬁc sort of feeling associated with any
particular concept. There may be many such feelings, some of which may be positive
and some of which may be negative.
Cognitivist-separationists who wish to ‘thicken up’ the thin element in their
analysis are similarly in trouble. We may ask, quite simply, why the thicker-than-
bare-thin thin concepts are treated by them as unanalysable and primitive, while
thick concepts require analysis of a separationist kind. Such separationists owe us
a detailed discussion which, with good reason, shows why it is that GOOD, RIGHT,
and OUGHT, say, are primitive, but DUTY, AESTHETICALLY GOOD, WISE, and GROTESQUE
are not.
The overall conclusion, then, is that separationists are on far safer ground if they
assume that the thin element in their analysis of thick concepts is barely thin, just as
Blackburn, and Elstein and Hurka do. As I have mentioned, this puts stress on the
descriptive part of any analysis, and I discuss that in Chapter Five. Furthermore, our
earlier thoughts in this chapter about the various thicknesses of (supposed) thin
concepts might cause a little disquiet: according to the train of thought thus far,
separationists are better off working with very thin notions of evaluation, but this
may mean that they have to give separationist analyses of so-called thin concepts into
some positive or negative part plus some descriptive part. There is nothing incon-
sistent with this as it stands, but it is an interesting development that I pick up in
Chapter Six.
But we cannot jump to these matters now. It is one thing to assume or claim that
there are barely thin concepts; I have assumed that, after all, with my invocation of
PRO and CON. It is quite another to assume and argue for the idea that such concepts
are conceptually prior to thick concepts. Before we tackle the descriptive, we need to
tackle this idea. After all, this is the reason why I introduced the genus–speciesmodel
in the ﬁrst place.
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4.6 Susan Hurley and Centralism
As well as asking what reason there is to think that thin concepts are conceptually
prior to thick concepts, we also need to ask what is meant by the phrase ‘conceptual
priority’ ﬁrst of all, at least as it pertains to the debate in which we are interested.14
My understanding of ‘conceptual priority’ is fairly simple and plain: if we say that
one concept is prior to another (and assume there to be some link between them) it
means that the former has been involved in the creation of the latter, with the latter
cast as some type of product. This clearly reﬂects my discussion in Chapter Three.
There may, of course, be reasons why we wish to say that one concept is prior to
another. Invoking these may give us only a sense of a particular type or example of
conceptual priority and not give us a better sense of what the whole idea of
conceptual priority means. Remember that when separationists think of thin con-
cepts being prior to thick ones, they appear to be making a general claim. Even if they
favour a particular, speciﬁc understanding of conceptual priority, advanced through
examples, perhaps, they need a further argument that establishes that that is the best
way of understanding the general idea. In my discussion below I consider three
different examples of conceptual priority: ‘social priority’, ‘learning priority’, and
‘justiﬁcatory priority’. These three illustrative examples do not get separationists
close to justifying the priority of the thin over the thick in general, let alone give
them conclusive victories.
Before we get to those examples, it is worth starting to think through these issues
via someone who has already been here. Susan Hurley is to be credited with giving us
some insights in this regard. In her Natural Reasons she identiﬁes a position she calls
‘centralism’, which is the assertion that thin concepts are the central evaluative
concepts, with thick concepts being derivative.15 She opposes this position with
‘non-centralism’. I prefer to say that separationists are committed to ‘thin prioritar-
ianism’. It is an uglier term, certainly, but speaking in this way allows us to introduce
explicitly two opposing positions in a way that Hurley’s terminology does not. She
recognizes the two opposing options, but her terminology blurs this point. ‘Non-
centralism’ covers two ideas. One could be a ‘thick prioritarian’ and claim that thick
concepts are conceptually prior to thin ones. Or one could hold to a ‘no priority’
position and argue that across the whole class of evaluative concepts it is wrong to say
that either type of concept is prior to the other.16 There may be small family
14 So I can talk of ‘conceptual priority’ for simplicity’s sake, I talk of thin concepts being prior in the rest
of this chapter, while acknowledging that noncognitivists may prefer the more neutral ‘thin element’.
15 Hurley (1989), pp. 13ff. See also Tappolet (2004). Tappolet also assumes that centralism about
evaluative concepts fails.
16 This position of ‘no priority’ is different from that labelled in the same way in McDowell (1987),
p. 160 (cf. Wiggins (1998), pp. 195–6), although McDowell’s (and Wiggins’) idea is indicated in a different
part of this study. The idea behind this other ‘no priority’ view is that one could see evaluative concepts as
prior to feelings that one is identifying, or one could see the feelings as prior. This links with the ideas
regarding Gibbard’s analysis earlier in this chapter. Another, very closely related idea often labelled as a ‘no
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groupings that, for whatever reason, exhibit this sort of priority relation. Yet, it is
wrong to generalize across all evaluative concepts. So with my terminology we have a
clear three-way ﬁght.17 Below I discuss possible ways of arguing for thin prioritar-
ianism. In doing so I argue against both this and thick prioritarianism, as I favour the
no priority view.
Before that, a few comments on Hurley’s discussion of the matter. Simply through
her labelling she achieved a lot as she was able to identify a key and pervasive idea.
However, she provides no knock-down argument against centralism, that is thin
prioritarianism. Arguably, much of Natural Reasons is designed to show the attrac-
tions of the alternative view and the paucity of her opponents’. Despite the absence of
a knock-down argument, she does have a promising argumentative strategy. Early on
in her book she considers how centralism can and is applied in areas other than
(explicit) the area of value and reason, and she tries to show the implausibility of
centralism in the value and reason case; those other areas are the use of colour,
mathematical, and legal concepts. Some of what she says amounts to the idea that ‘we
do not think as centralism says we should think in those other cases, so it is likely that
we do not think in this way in the evaluative case either’. Put baldly like that, this
point is unlikely to convince a neutral, let alone a thin prioritarian. This is partly
because centralists may argue that we do think as they say we think, and also because
many centralists try to abstract from practice and argue that we are trying to get some
analysis of what is involved in the concepts themselves. We can talk of a concept
being conceptually prior, in a philosophical analysis, while accepting that in practice
ordinary users rely on both thin and thick concepts all the time. Hurley would
probably have challenged this methodological guiding idea since her opposition to
centralism is heavily informed by work from the later Wittgenstein who, as is well
known, privileged the practice of concept use when understanding matters philo-
sophically. That sort of tension in methodology will crop up in the next section. For
now, as an illustration, let me talk through Hurley’s strategy against colour central-
ism and how it can be continued.
To my mind she begins by attributing a mistaken view to centralists by assuming
that centralism analyses RED in terms of COLOUR plus something that picks out red
things, for example wavelength of a certain sort.18 As mentioned, this is standardly
not thought to be a serious option in discussions of the genus–species and
determinable–determinate models. However, Hurley then usefully comments that
we do not apply and understand COLOUR without applying and understanding RED,
priority’ view is that idea that properties and value judgements are ﬁtted to one another, and that neither
one is prior to the other: properties do not come before judgements (as a mind-independent realist might
think), nor do judgement come before pseudo-properties, as certain noncognitivists are characterized as
thinking. See Wiggins (1998), pp. 196ff.
17 Hurley, when opposing centralism, seems to favour a ‘no priority’ approach, but this is not absolutely
clear.
18 Hurley (1989), p. 15.
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BLUE, and the like. However, she does not consider how centralists might respond,
and I think in doing so we can extend the discussion in an illuminating manner. I do
this now and drop talk of ‘centralism’.
It is key to bear in mind that we are interested in the concepts themselves. Clearly
anyone familiar with what it is to be coloured, and the colours themselves, will realize
that if an object is coloured it is coloured in a certain way, and vice versa. Similarly, if
an action is good it is good in a certain way, and we might also say that if an action
has some thick concept applicable to it, it entails that there will be some applicable
thin concept. But, contra Hurley, thin prioritarians about colour might say that this
is a slightly different point from having decent understanding of the concepts
themselves. They might argue that when we focus just on the concept COLOUR (or
COLOUREDNESS), we have some related ideas of ‘objects being ﬁlled in visually’. We
have enough understanding of what being coloured is apart from any understanding
we have of the various colour concepts. Well, perhaps. But my example phrase of
‘objects being ﬁlled in visually’ seems to be simply a synonym for ‘being coloured’,
and it is hard to come up with something that is not. Furthermore, it might be
suggested that we cannot understand what it is for an object to be coloured unless we
have some idea of exclusion and contrast: if something is coloured it has to be a
particular colour that excludes other particular colours, and this seems to invite the
idea that we can understand COLOUR only if we understand the concept of being a
particular colour, which might then further invite the thought that we have to have
some understanding of the familiar colour concepts RED, BLUE, and the rest.
Thin prioritarians about colour might counter this line of thought with further
ideas. Whatever we say about this local debate, it seems more important that those
who wish to challenge thin prioritarianism about colour focus on thin prioritarians’
commitment to the genus–species model. As should be familiar by now, this model
involves two points of interest: the genus and the differentia. Once we focus on the
fact that some differentia needs to be produced for each of the various speciﬁc colour
concepts, we see that none can be given. (We saw this in the previous chapter.) It is
this, rather than attention to the thin genus, that provides the killer blow to any two-
component analysis of speciﬁc colour concepts such as RED.
Is the evaluative case analogous? No, but to the detriment of those that wish to
oppose thin prioritarianism. Focusing on the differentiamay also damage the genus–
species case, but—again, boringly—this is the topic of Chapter Five. Our focus here is
on the thin genus. Do we have decent understanding of GOOD and PRO prior to any
understanding of speciﬁc thick concepts? Unlike the analogous questions about
colour, where I have indicated that there may be something that thin prioritarians
can say in their defence, our answer here is strongly in the afﬁrmative. I have
already discussed the ideas PRO and CON: we can certainly make sense of the idea of
preferring one thing to another, of thinking of something as being on the positive (or
negative) side of things, or thinking something better than another, and so on.
Clearly such judgements strongly imply that a judge prefers something for some
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reason, whether or not she can articulate it. But any reasons she might offer for
preferring something, say, do not seem intimately bound up with, or are simply not
part of, the idea of preferring something and of thinking of something positively.
These notions certainly do not seem as intimately bound up with the reasons for the
positive view or preference as the speciﬁc colours might be bound up with the general
concept COLOUR.
So I think it fair to say that although an interesting strategy, undermining thin
prioritarianism about value concepts by looking at what happens with colour con-
cepts is not foolproof. I think that we can make sense of the idea of PRO and CON
without reference to thick concepts. But, crucially, even if thin prioritarians can make
out that we have decent enough understanding of thin evaluations aside from other
considerations, it is a further thing to establish that the best analysis of thick concepts
is a reductive, separationist one that has them constructed, in part, from the thin.
That, after all, is the key part of thin concepts being prior. A defence of this idea is
normally missing. What could be the argument for it?
What I now do is examine three illustrative exchanges between thin and thick
prioritarians. Thin prioritarians will try to show how thin concepts are prior. In
contrast, thick prioritarians have to show that thick concepts play certain roles and
fulﬁl certain conceptual needs in their own right, such that we undercut the motiv-
ation for having separationist analyses in the ﬁrst place. In doing so thick prioritar-
ians say, indeed they have to say, that it is the thick that comes ﬁrst. No prioritarians
make an appearance at the end of each exchange, emerging on top. This will take us
back to Hurley’s centralism.
4.7 Are Thin Concepts Conceptually Prior?
Let us imagine how the debate might go between thin and thick prioritarians, by
imagining three brief illustrative exchanges. Although I have focused on thin priori-
tarianism, I begin by thinking about how thick prioritarians might argue.
First, thick prioritarians might challenge thin prioritarians by developing some
of Williams’ thoughts in ELP.19 They might argue that although we use thin and
thick concepts readily, thick concepts are tied more closely to our social and moral
lives. Our justiﬁcations of action are more compelling if we use thick concepts
rather than thin ones since we are better able to capture and describe various
action types, as well as evaluate them, than if we used thin concepts alone.
Our description of our social world is made brighter and clearer if we use thick
19 Williams is not explicitly concerned with the issue of conceptual priority in Williams (1985). I think,
however, that this extension of Williams’ view is in keeping with his view of the thin and the thick. Recall
that he thinks of thin concepts as more abstract concepts, where the suggestion is that they are abstracted
from thick ones. I say more about this in Chapter Eight where I outline Williams’ views about evaluative
knowledge.
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concepts. People get a better sense, a more detailed sense, of what it is to be an
evaluating being if thick concepts are used. Although it is true that we can and do use
thin concepts to justify actions, and to describe our social world and human agents, such
uses are parasitic on our use of thick concepts, simply because of the (stipulated)
merging of evaluatory and descriptive content in thick ones: they are conceptually
closer to the (descriptive) world of which they are used when we evaluate.
Well, possibly. But I can imagine thin prioritarians, and neutrals, remaining
unpersuaded. For a start, we need further justiﬁcation that evaluative concepts are
conceptually ‘closer to’ the nonevaluative world in a way that justiﬁes them as being
conceptually prior. An alternative picture, one amenable to thin prioritarians pre-
sumably, has it that we conceive of the nonevaluative world and our (thin) evalu-
ations as quite separate things, and we then have to derive our thick concepts in order
to bridge the gap. (This recalls the fact–value distinction.) And, further, thin priori-
tarians might put pressure on the more speciﬁc thoughts. Justiﬁcations can often be
powerful if one uses no-nonsense thin concepts. Some actions are downright ‘wrong’
rather than the more vague and ambiguous ‘beastly’ or ‘not on’. Thin concepts play
an important role in working out the contours of our social world by marking
clearly what is and what is not acceptable. They are direct, clear, simple, straightfor-
ward, and unambiguous. They give us a way of thinking that thick concepts do not
offer; while thick concepts can be used of wrong actions, for example, and can imply
the wrongness of those actions, they work in these ways while necessarily picking out
or alighting on other aspects. There is little here to persuade thin prioritarians.
However, a neutral might think differently. In defending their position perhaps
thin prioritarians are merely digging their heels into their entrenched view. Where is
the justiﬁcation to think that thin evaluative content and descriptive content are prior
in the way assumed? Indeed, we can begin to see the attractions of no prioritarianism:
why not think, instead, that our thin and thick evaluative concepts are as useful as
each other, that justiﬁcations of actions, and descriptions of our world and of agents,
are best if we use both sorts of concept? Indeed, perhaps our judgements make sense
only within a network of all sorts of evaluative concept, both thin and thick.20
Consider a second challenge. Imagine we think of conceptual priority in terms of
learned priority. Thick prioritarians might argue that it makes sense to think that we
start with certain ﬁne-grained responses, certain ways in which we like things, or are
disgusted by other things, and from that develop the more general concepts of
preference, avoidance, and the like, which seem then to be translated into our
developed concepts of GOOD and BAD.
But this is a difﬁcult point to accept. For a start, if anything the psychological
evidence points the other way. As babies and toddlers we begin with certain basic
responses—yuks and joys—that seem to be coarse versions of thin concepts, and
20 Ronald Dworkin voices this view, albeit brieﬂy and in the context where he thinks that there is some
continuum between thick and thin. Dworkin (2011), p. 183.
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then, as we move about the world and learn more about it, we reﬁne these concepts
and develop more ﬁne-grained responses, often with the help of others. These ﬁne-
grained responses are our thick concepts. It makes sense to be a thin prioritarian.
If we have to choose one or the other, we can say that the evidence favours thin
prioritarianism on this particular point. However, why think that a story about how
mature users of evaluative concepts learn those concepts when they are immature
should decide which type of concept is conceptually prior? The story might indicate
only what it is set out to show, namely ‘temporal, learnt priority’. It indicates what
sort of concept it is easier for young humans to latch onto and understand, not which
sort of concept, if any, should be assumed to be conceptually prior to the other. And
anyway, the assumption of a two stage process—where we begin with some thin
responses that are already fully formed or become so, and then we develop thicker
ones—seems far too cut-and-dried an account of something as complex as develop-
mental psychology. The ﬁrst thought seems to cast doubt on the general argumen-
tative strategy. The second, while accepting this strategy, suggests that even if there
are local derivative relationships based on how people learn and develop concepts, it
seems better, at least as a safety-ﬁrst option, to adopt a no priority view as correct for
thin and thick concepts generally.
What of our third illustrative debate? Imagine any item deemed good. Presumably
it will be deemed good because of certain features it has: perhaps a person is good
because she has opened the door for another; perhaps the foodstuff is good because it
has a certain texture and taste. Mentioning such descriptive features clearly invites a
marrying of evaluative and descriptive content: the person is kind, the foodstuff
succulent. So, the thought might go, if one can apply thin concepts such as GOOD,
one has to be able to apply thick concepts. Perhaps this suggests, then, that thick
concepts are prior in some fashion.
But this is clearly a poor challenge. For the challenge to be successful we need the
phenomenon to show clearly that thick concepts are prior and thin ones derivative.
Yet the phenomenon shows no such thing. These examples could equally well show
the opposite, that thin ones are prior. After all, we might say that if one can apply a
thick concept to something one has to be able to apply a thin one.21 If something is
deemed to be a certain thick way then it must follow that it has to be judged to be a
certain thin way. If the food is succulent then, prima facie, it is good. If the person is
gracious, she will also typically be good.
So something has gone awry here. What either sort of theorist needs in order to
cement their claim is the idea that a certain sort of evaluative concept applies to an
object and the other sort of evaluative concept does not apply. I ﬁnd it hard to
imagine a case where a thing is deemed bad and where that thing has no features that
could be used to ‘thicken’ the thin categorization. Similarly, I ﬁnd it hard to imagine a
21 I examine this claim in Chapter Six, but only in a way that supports the overall suggestion that no
prioritarianism is attractive.
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case whereby something can be judged in a thick way and a thin concept not apply,
where this case justiﬁes the overall conclusion that the thick is prior to the thin.
Again, the possibility of a no priority view comes into view here. We do not have
much positive reason to prefer it, I think, from this little exchange, aside from the fact
that wherever we can apply one or more thin concepts, we can apply one or more
thick concepts, and vice versa. It seems that when it comes to justiﬁcations, we can
have explanations going in both directions: this is a thin way because it is a thick way,
and this is a thick way because it is a thin way. The two sorts of concept seem to work
together and be as useful as one another.
This is, admittedly, a fairly thin and sketchy reason for preferring the no priority
view, but there is nothing in this exchange to count against it either. Hence, in the
absence of any reasons to the contrary, this at least shows the view as an important
contender.
Where do these three illustrative examples leave us? At each stage in our exchanges
we saw that it might make sense to think of thin and thick concepts being inter-
dependent. Perhaps the idea of conceptual priority does not make sense, either
thinking that the thin is prior to the thick, or that the thick is prior to the thin.
And this is telling. We began on this path because we wanted to undercut the
motivation for thin prioritarianism, that is centralism. Even if one could make a
decent case for having some understanding of thin concepts as thin concepts alone, it
is another thing to say that we then must reductively analyse thick concepts partly in
terms of them. Such an analysis depends on being able to provide a descriptive
differentia for each thick concept, a topic to come. But in association with that, we
can ask why someone would try to analyse thick concepts in a separationist manner
in the ﬁrst place. It seems curious to do so if they are used as much as thin concepts,
grow interdependently with them in some evaluative network, and seem to have their
own point and purpose.
Yet, notice that if we think that this idea has any merit, it is available only to no
prioritarians. In saying that thin concepts are derived from the thick in some way,
thick prioritarians deny the importance of the relations that thin concepts have with
thick ones, that any role they play will be derived and based on thick concepts and so
on. If we are to loosen the hold that thin prioritarianismmight have over us, and if we
do so by emphasizing the interdependence of evaluative concepts and the individual,
genuine roles that they all play, we cannot do so by switching to a counter doctrine
that denies just that for thin concepts. In short, the broad moral from Hurley’s attack
on centralism is that it is wrong to think that either sort of concept is prior to the
other sort simply because such thinking is very curious and strange. The view that is
forming is that thin and thick concepts are as important, useful, and illuminating as
each other. Although it is tempting, trying to analyse (and partly reduce) the one in
terms of the other is a chimerical and misguided aim.
After all of this, do we have a knock-down argument against separationism
here, something that any reasonable thinker could accept as showing the view as
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implausible? I think the answer is negative. I have not exposed any sort of internal
inconsistency, and I can imagine comebacks from separationists and worries about
my sketched view. Some might think that there is no interconnected network of thin
and thick concepts or, if there is, we should plunge deeper and show that there is this
network only because the thin sits at the centre or the base. This is enough to
motivate us to look for other anti-separationist arguments, even if we think that
separationism is on the back foot, with its claims about the priority of the thin being
exposed as weak.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I have focused on the genus side of the genus–species relation. Along
the way I have voiced support for a few views. I think that separationists are on safer
ground if they assume the thin genus element in their analysis to be as thin as is
possible rather than if they thicken this element up somewhat. As part of this
I showed that one can thicken up thin concepts and still talk with some conﬁdence
of these concepts being thin. This itself should make us doubt that we can separate
thick concepts, for then we are left with what to do with those thicker-than-bare-thin
thin concepts. This doubt will be worked out in Chapter Six.
I have also shown that there is an onus on separationists to argue that thin
concepts are conceptually prior to thick ones. My short discussion illustrated how
difﬁcult it will be to convince people that thin concepts are prior in the way needed.
So there is some reason already to be sceptical of separationism, but we need to
think about the other side of the genus–species divide. As I have been promising, we




In the previous chapter I suggested that the ﬁrst anti-separationist strategy fails to
convince. In this chapter we focus on the second anti-separationist strategy.1 I said in
my Introduction that they can be seen as linked since both stem from the genus–
species model. We have focused on the thin. In this chapter we now turn our
attention to the differentia. Recall that the key idea is whether separationists can
develop a differentia unique for each and every thick concept that will create that
concept when combined with some thin conceptual content.2
This issue has been a key point in the debate about thick concepts and metaethics
generally over the past thirty years or so. However, it has not been put in terms of
differentia and genus–species. Instead, people have talked only of the possibility of
evaluative concepts being ‘disentangled’ into component parts, and whether evalu-
ative concepts are ‘shapeless’ with respect to descriptive, nonevaluative concepts.
I slot the debate about shapelessness into my overall discussion of the genus–species
1 This chapter is a shortened version of Kirchin (2010a); that article is around 21,000 words. For those
interested in a comparison, in this presentation the central argument remains at the same length, but I do
not have as much textual exegesis of the papers by Blackburn and McDowell, I have deleted some notes,
and I have deleted material at the end of the article on reductionism. However, this chapter, for obvious
reasons, situates the debate more explicitly in the wider debate about thick concepts; I comment on the
relative importance of the shapelessness debate in that debate. Despite these differences, I have not changed
my philosophical views signiﬁcantly since writing the article, although I do emphasize here that in the ﬁnal
analysis the argument is not wholly convincing. That is because, in this book and unlike in the article, I am
able to contrast it with a different argumentative strategy, namely that which comes in Chapter Six.
McDowell’s main discussions of disentangling and shapelessness are in McDowell (1979), (1981), and
(1987). Blackburn responds to McDowell in Blackburn (1981) and (1998), chapter 4 §§2–5. Wiggins
discusses the hypothesis in Wiggins (1993a) and (1993b), which respond to Railton (1993a) and (1993b).
My original motivation for writing on this topic was to make sense of what is, frankly, a difﬁcult idea that
receives little detailed exposure. For example, the following mention or brieﬂy summarize the shapelessness
hypothesis, and all accept it more or less without question: Dancy (1993), pp. 84–6; Hurley (1989), p. 13;
McNaughton (1988), pp. 60–2; and McNaughton and Rawling (2003), pp. 24–5, to which Lovibond (2003)
is a reply (Lovibond discusses shapelessness at pp. 6–8). Two notable detailed discussions and criticisms of
the shapelessness hypothesis are Lang (2001) and Miller (2013), §10.1.
2 Recall an earlier footnote in Chapter Three, note 2: a differentiamay be united with either PRO or CON,
thus creating two different concepts. Again, although I speak of a unique differentia, I have this corrective
in mind throughout.
model because this wider discussion helps to highlight what is at stake about
disentangling.
The main moral of this chapter is that while separationists are committed to there
being differentia that play the role we have envisaged them playing, the anti-
separationist point concerning shapelessness does not quite work. That is not to
say that separationists come out unscathed, but just that nonseparationists should
look for a further argument, or set of considerations, beyond discussion of shape-
lessness. That is the motivation for my discussion in Chapter Six.
In §5.2 I orientate us, laying out how the terminology of my debate links with the
normal way of talking about shapelessness. In §5.3 I lay out the anti-separationist
argument used by nonseparationists. In §5.4 I list a few notes that need to be made
explicit, and which normally are not, in order to understand better what is going on.
These take up a fair amount of space, but are important for setting up the main
discussion. In §5.5 and §5.6 I get to the heart of matters and show where the
argument falls short, as typically given. In §5.7 I show how the argument may be
revived and what power it retains. I also deal with possible responses. In §5.8
I conclude, arguing that some other sort of strategy is needed for us to adopt
nonseparationism.
5.2 Cognitivism and Noncognitivism
The disentangling debate about evaluative concepts maps onto the debate about
whether the genus–species model accounts for such concepts. Is it possible, for any
and every concept traditionally thought to be thick, to ‘disentangle’ it into different,
component parts? And, normally, these parts are assumed to be some thin evaluative
conceptual content (or similar), and some descriptive conceptual content. I prefer to
talk in terms of the genus–species model because that lays bare the sort of conceptual
priority that separationists assume, and also allows us to introduce and reﬂect on
other traditional conceptual models, such as the determinate-determinable model.
One interesting difference is that the ‘disentangling debate’ was fought most
strongly between cognitivists and noncognitivists. In the former camp were, notably,
McDowell and Wiggins. (Although he disagreed about some things with them, espe-
cially with McDowell, Williams was also sceptical that the disentangling manoeuvre
could be made.) In the latter camp were people such as Blackburn and Gibbard. To my
mind noncognitivists have to be separationists. But, as we have noted in earlier chapters,
separationism can be combined with cognitivism about the thin. In this chapter
I focus mainly on simple separationism, although I indicate towards the end how the
discussion affects complex separationism.
The disentangling argument was not so much an argument for cognitivism, as
an argument against noncognitivism. The explicit claim was that a noncognitivist
account of evaluative concepts could not be made to work. I retain that broad
orientation, although I am more doubtful than, say, McDowell, that the argument
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works. I also change terminology, and label this an ‘anti-separationist’ argument,
for this is not really a positive argument for nonseparationism. That will come in
Chapter Six.
The worry about disentangling focused on the descriptive conceptual content that
was supposed to be part of any thick concept. It was assumed, contrary to the
noncognitivism of the day, that evaluative concepts are shapeless with respect to
nonevaluative recharacterizations of them, and that this called into serious question
the disentangling move. To see why this is so, and to see what is meant by
‘shapelessness’, I now lay out the argument, leaving behind talk of cognitivism and
noncognitivism.
5.3 Shapelessness and Outrunning
The argument starts simply. We divide situations, actions, and other things into
different conceptual categories: these things are kind while those things are selﬁsh.
We should take as bedrock the idea that our normal conceptual divisions are rational.
In other words, there has to be some reason to the divisions we make; they cannot be
made capriciously and on a whim. It is commonsensical that we should be commit-
ted to thinking that there must be something that connects all of the items that are
grouped together using any sort of evaluative concept, such as KIND, and furthermore
something (probably the same something) that distinguishes them from other
things grouped together using different concepts, such as SELFISH.3 To preserve the
idea that our divisions are non-capricious, what links certain items together has to be
more than just the bare fact that they are grouped together by people, since this
criterion is satisﬁed if people decide on only a whim that any randomly selected two
actions are selﬁsh, say. There needs to be something about the grouped items such
that it is justiﬁable to group them.
The next stage is concerned with identifying what the ‘something’ is that connects
all and only all the things deemed kind.4 This move is premised on the fact that both
sides are attempting to make sense of our conceptual practices.5 Nonseparationists
argue that neither of the two elements—the descriptive conceptual content used to
3 As Blackburn (1981), pp. 180–1 agrees. Notice that in order to concentrate on the shapelessness
hypothesis we assume that concept use is consistent across individuals at different times and, if need be,
across communities.
4 Talk of ‘the something’ might suggest a particular, isolatable thing, although we will see that
nonseparationists should not think in this way at all.
5 Despite their claim that ethical judgements are expressive of some noncognitive attitude, most modern
noncognitivists still wish to accommodate ethical value, truth, rationality, and the like. This is motivated
partly by their aversion to ethical relativism. They could conﬁne themselves to claiming that ethical
judgements function as expressions of attitude and not care about ‘consistency’ in any sense. They
would then not face any objection motivated by disentangling and/or shapelessness, but their position
would be suspect precisely because they had not tried to accommodate this notion. This point extends from
ethics and noncognitivism to evaluative elements and separationism.
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pick out stuff seen to fall under the concepts, and thin evaluative elements—taken
separately and, hence, ‘disentangled’ could, on their own, explain such practices.
Hence, it makes sense to think that the ‘something’ that connects all and only all the
kind things must be (something we are justiﬁed in calling) the evaluative feature of
kindness, something that we are picking out using a (genuine, unitary) concept.
Let us take each of these two elements in turn. A thin evaluative element,
interpreted cognitivistically or noncognitivistically, will be insufﬁcient to pick out
all and only all the examples of an evaluative concept. We like or hoorah or think
good many, many things and these thin positive responses are alone insufﬁcient to
distinguish the kind from the just, nor will they distinguish the kind from the sublime
and the humorous. We have already had a taste, in Chapter Four, of how the battle
will then go. Separationists can argue that the evaluative elements can be conceived to
be less than minimal, and that we can thicken them up so as to enable us to
distinguish as required. I have already given pause for thought here, as to whether
really speciﬁc evaluative elements of the sort suggested by Gibbard exist widely, and
can be used as he wishes to use them. Other separationists may wish to employ
evaluative elements that are less than speciﬁc than the ones Gibbard suggests, but
which are more speciﬁc than PRO and CON. Right now we can see that even if this sort
of path is taken, a debate about shapelessness needs to happen. For at this point the
evaluative element is less speciﬁc than the thick concept being analysed. So it stands
to reason that some work will have to be done by some descriptive element, some
differentia. Hence, there is a suspicion that this descriptive element, either in tandem
with some (somewhat speciﬁc) evaluative aspect, or just on its own (with some
minimal PRO or CON), will be insufﬁcient to distinguish all of the evaluative concepts
as required.
Thus, from now on I focus just on that descriptive element. It is at this point that
the shapelessness hypothesis is introduced. We could specify that all kind actions
have the same nonevaluative feature in common, and, hence, we can characterize
kindness as simply being this feature. (And the same for all selﬁsh actions, just
actions, and so on.) But what would that feature or small number of features be?
I suggest that it would very hard to ﬁnd anything. For example, ‘having concern for
others’ is too loose to do the desired work. If it is interpreted in a nonevaluative
manner, then we have concern for others as part of all sorts of actions, not just kind
ones: ones where we act bravely for people, ones where we cruelly torture people, and
so on. Interpreting this idea in an evaluative manner is ruled out, obviously. But even
then it is too loose and vague to do the required work.
And, anyway, if one thinks of the types of kind action there are, then a whole host
of actions suggest themselves: opening doors for people, telling the truth, telling a
‘white’ lie, giving someone some sweets, refraining from giving sweets, and so on. Not
only is there a wide variety of descriptive features that constitute various kind actions,
many kind actions have no, or no evaluatively relevant, descriptive features in
common. It seems that we will move quickly beyond the idea of there being a single
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descriptive thing common to all kind actions. Indeed, based on a quick list of the
various kind actions there are, we might think that there is a fairly long, disjunctive
list of descriptive features that might make an action kind. In short, we might have
something like this: ‘something is kind iff it has features a, b, c; or features b, c, d; or
features e, f, g; or . . . ’, where the letters indicate things or features of things picked out
using descriptive language alone.
And then we have the killer thought. Supposedly, our evaluative concepts are
shapeless with respect to descriptive concepts and ideas. That is, if we were to try to
ﬁnd a pattern between all of the sets of descriptive features that constitute kindness,
without trying to view things from an ethical or an evaluative point of view (or the
correct ethical or evaluative point of view), we would not be able to see it. Why so?
We will investigate that in full detail below, but the idea, brieﬂy, is that the charac-
terization I have just given in the paragraph above can never be completed. Notice
the three dots at the end. An incomplete analysis is no analysis at all.
We can put these ideas slightly differently to develop a thought that will be the
focus of my discussion.6 It is plausible to say that we could imagine a cruel situation
that would turn into a kind situation with the addition of one or more features. To
take a simple example, it might be cruel to refrain from sharing chocolate with a
young child who desperately wants it, but it can be kind if, in addition, we are acting
because there is some risk of her teeth rotting in the future. In more complicated
situations it might be kinder to share, despite the risk of tooth rot, because, say,
someone has hurt her feelings and she needs comforting. Or, it might be kind to offer
some extra chocolate just to this one child, even if justice and fairness demand
otherwise, because nothing else will stop the tears ﬂowing and there is no possibility
of any lessons being learned or of any bad behaviour becoming entrenched from such
a short-lived action. We can easily imagine that situations can become more complex
than this and that it is always possible that the addition of new features, or the
subtraction of existing ones, will affect the situation’s ethical value. Or, in other
words, the chocolate case and others like it motivate us to see that the variation of
features relevant to the ethical value of the situations they constitute can continue
indeﬁnitely. The key thought is that KIND might outrun any descriptive character-
ization we could give of the actions deemed kind. I will refer to this throughout
simply as ‘outrunning’.
Why is this bad for separationists? They wish to identify ‘something’ that connects
all and only all the kind actions. Imagine we try to create and employ a list of
disjunctive clauses of the type I have just given. This list will merely be, by deﬁnition,
a summary of all the descriptive features of the actions judged to be kind up to that
point. The test is whether comparison of the list alone with a new action—an action
with a combination of descriptive features never before encountered—will enable us
6 This is a common strategy. See McDowell (1979), §4 and Wiggins (1993b), §§IV–VII. There is no
concrete example in these passages, but the idea I present is clearly expressed.
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to say correctly whether the new action is or is not kind. If the above train of thought
is correct, then we need not arrive at the correct answer if we employ this method. It
seems there could always be a kind action that escapes being captured by our list, or
there could always be an action that according to the list should be kind but which is
cruel because it has new features, combined in a way that has not yet been encoun-
tered. (That is, perhaps it does have features a, b, and c, but it also has feature x that
renders the action cruel. This extra information is not encoded in the list, and so
we judge incorrectly.) These thoughts are often brought to life by imagining an
‘outsider’—an anthropologist, perhaps—trying to predict correctly the applications
of evaluative concepts within an alien community. All she can see are descriptive
features a, b, and c (and x). She has no appreciation of their evaluative signiﬁcance
and how the ‘sequence’ might continue with new clauses. I illustrate more thoughts
using the outsider later.
Nonseparationists typically put these matters in a positive light and say—or said—
that separationism’s failure is to be expected since our evaluative concepts reﬂect, or
are an expression of, our interests and such things cannot be reduced to descriptive,
nonevaluative terms, or codiﬁed using non-interest-laden terms, or similar.7 This
thought will reappear in §5.6.
There is a lot to sort out here, even from this short introduction. I now turn to a
number of notes we should consider in relation to the argument. In §5.5 I think about
outrunning in detail.
5.4 Seven Notes
(a) Phrases such as ‘mastery of a concept’ are often bandied around in this debate.
A number of ideas might be meant by this. I think we should be clear that, thus far, all
that the debate is concerned with is whether a theorist can map the extension of
evaluative concepts, and use this to guide future use.8 I will offer one reason to
support setting matters up in this way in §5.5.9
(b) Note that I gave no thought as to what ‘levels of description’ are appropriate
when considering the characterization of the descriptive features that are seen to
compose the evaluative features of things, that is the descriptive characterization of
the relevant evaluative concept. Are we supposed to imagine recharacterizations that
include the movements of agents’ limbs? Can one include the agents’ intentions? Can
the whole argument be run in terms of sub-atomic structures? Usually no thought is
given to this question in the context of this argument. The shapelessness hypothesis is
7 For example, see Wiggins (1993b), §§IV–VII, where Wiggins speaks of the ‘interest in the value V’, by
which he means some human interest; and see McDowell (1981), especially §2, where this idea is part of the
whole point of the piece.
8 See McDowell (1981), p. 145; McDowell uses ‘mastery’ in just this way.
9 I discuss the phrase more and defend my whole argumentative set-up in more detail in Kirchin
(2010a), §6.
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presumed to be correct for any level of description we could choose. I will proceed on
this assumption, although a fuller treatment than mine might consider if the level of
description affects the plausibility of either side of this debate and why.
(c) Following on from (a) and (b) a more general point emerges. Earlier on, in
characterizing the debate, I made out that the challenge for separationists is to
provide the descriptive element and do so in a way that summarizes all of the aspects
of all of the examples of the evaluative concept. That is, separationists are typically
asked to provide a summary of the extension of the concept. But, we might ask,
should we not be interested in the intension of the concept and associated term, that
is the concept’s meaning?10 Are we not interested in concepts that are either PRO or
CON and which, in addition, are those concepts that mean such-and-such?11
This is a good question to ask, which is rarely raised. Although it seems as if the
move I have made is odd, if not just plain wrong, it is understandable in the context
of this debate.
Note that separationists, as well as their opponents, often present matters that
suggest ‘extension’ rather than ‘intension’. The wording of Gibbard on LEWD and Elstein
and Hurka on DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE suggest conditions that need to be fulﬁlled in order for
the concept to apply, and these conditions are given in terms of aspects of things that fall
under the concept. So it seems that in order to break down the meaning of a term or the
content of a concept into more understandable parts, we can get a lower level of
description and in doing that we are providing more speciﬁc descriptions of parts of
the things that fall under the concept. This leads us from intension to extension
generally and, in any instance, by concentrating on how the concept is ‘extended’ or
applied to various things we can be led back to the meaning of the term: ‘it is these types
of thing that fall under the concept, because they have these aspects, and so we can list
those aspects in order to get at the meaning of the term, and associated concept’.
We can challenge this move in a number of ways. I choose not to in this study, but
instead make the following point. Separationists typically think that they will be able
to provide short analyses of evaluative concepts, with few clauses; just think of the
amount of text that the analyses of both Gibbard, and Elstein and Hurka take up. But
the key anti-separationist idea, which we have yet to evaluate, is that any analysis, for
any level of description, will not be that short. Gibbard’s analysis of LEWD will not
10 Some may shy away from speaking of a concept’s meaning, preferring to say that terms alone can
have meaning. I hope my slide here does not offend too greatly. The overall point is unaffected by it.
11 For those who do not quite get the importance of this, we can distinguish, it seems, quite sharply
between a term’s (or associated concept’s) meaning, and the things to which it applies. We can know the
one, or believe we know the one, without knowing or articulating the other. So, for example, I can identify
and apply FURNITURE to various items of furniture, possibly without being able to supply a clear and exact
deﬁnition of ‘furniture’. Similarly, I can have a clear and conﬁdent idea of how to apply SCOUT without
knowing, or being aware of, all of the scouts and being able to list all of their various features. But, beyond
that sharpness, which surely can be and is exempliﬁed by a number of examples, we may get some grey
area. In some cases we may be able to get at the intension only by reﬂecting on the extension.
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cover all of the examples we want it to cover, perhaps. (Blackburn agrees on that.)
Elstein and Hurka sneakily only put in three letters! And both analyses seem guilty
of employing terms in their respective analyses that are not obviously descriptive.
(Gibbard’s WARRANTED comes to mind, here, which has to function as more than a
simple PRO.) Once we look at some illustrative analyses, we will see that short versions
will be suspicious. Just think of my ‘having a concern for others’ example from
earlier. Similarly, to give one more example, saying that ‘someone is wise if and
only if they employ sufﬁcient understanding and relevant knowledge’ is nowhere
near up to the task. For a start, being the sort of person who employs UNDERSTANDING
or who is KNOWLEDGEABLE seems to bring in evaluative content, if not employ
straightforward synonyms. Also, this analysis, in pointing to the balance and inter-
play between two items, gives us only vague suggestions: what exactly is ‘sufﬁcient’
and ‘relevant’ in this context anyway? Indeed, it is not obvious that these ideas
are wholly descriptive.12 I think we can imagine with conﬁdence that the analyses
given will rely on the extension of the concept, and that these extensions may well
be quite long affairs.
Having justiﬁed that this is the battleground, nonseparationists argue that when
we try to create extensions in descriptive terms we encounter the phenomenon of
outrunning, thus showing separationism to be wrong.
(d) We should sort out the exact relationship between the disentangling argument
and the shapelessness hypothesis. What I have said reﬂects, fairly I think, normal
introductions of the debate. Yet, there is a large hole.13 The traditional way of
construing things makes it seem obvious that the shapelessness hypothesis can be
run for any evaluative concept, including thin ones. After all, just think of the many
sorts of good or right action there can be. But if that is the case, then the connection
12 This point relies on my view about the evaluative, on which I elaborate in Chapter Six.
13 An exception, which explains things neatly, is Roberts (2011). (Roberts also cites Dancy (2006),
p. 128. Dancy points out that McDowell’s shapelessness point may apply beyond evaluative and
normative concepts to any ‘resultant’ concept which applies in virtue of the application of other
concepts.) Roberts focuses on McDowell. She agrees that he was not writing about the thick speciﬁcally,
but argues that there is a way of developing his thoughts so that there is a second sense of shapelessness
that may (initially) apply only to thick concepts. (The ﬁrst sense is that which I develop in the main text.)
In short, she imagines us sharply distinguishing the content of a concept from the things in virtue of
which it applies, in the manner I suggested earlier. There may be many types of thing that are kind, but
what KIND is may not encapsulate all (descriptive) aspects of all those things, or even those aspects in
virtue of which the term ‘kind’ applies. Indeed, continues Roberts, KIND may be such that it does not
encapsulate any non-evaluative descriptive content. So, even when we apply it in one case, there may be
no way to disentangle the evaluative from the descriptive: all the ‘descriptive’ content is infused with the
evaluative, if one continues to talk in this faux language of two distinct contents. But, as she admits,
crucially this sense of shapelessness applies also to thin concepts, for the content of GOOD, say, seems
likely to differ from the descriptive aspects of the good things in virtue of which the label applies. We are,
therefore, back to trying to ﬁnd some difference such that the hypothesis applies only to thick concepts—
which does not seem to be achievable—and back to separating the disentangling argument from the
shapelessness hypothesis as I do in the main text.
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between it and the disentangling argument requires clariﬁcation. If thin concepts
involve evaluative content alone, then there are no supposed parts to disentangle.14
Below I develop the discussion as traditionally implied, as I take it to be, and think
of the shapelessness phenomenon as applying equally and strongly to thin and thick
concepts. So to underline the point, I reckon that the chocolate example could be run
for GOOD and there be the same philosophical outcome. But we need to adjust the
traditional set up. If shapelessness is proved in the case of thick concepts, then we
cannot disentangle any supposed evaluative and descriptive content. If it is proved in
the case of thin concepts, then we can say that there is no disentangling argument to
then be given, although we can talk of the shapelessness hypothesis leading to an
argument (perhaps the shapelessness argument) and a conclusion that are both
similar to that reached in the case of thick concepts, namely that thin concepts
should be thought of along nonseparationist lines.
Going down this route adds an extra argumentative aspect. It might be that thick
concepts are shapeless only because they have an element—a separable element—of
them that is agreed on all sides to be shapeless, namely thin evaluative content or
some thin element. That is, even if the shapelessness of thick concepts is shown, it
is still an open question as to whether they can be disentangled. I will comment
on this in §5.7. What should be emphasized, however, is that my prime interest
here is whether the shapelessness hypothesis is correct in the ﬁrst place. We need
to keep an eye on how it relates to the disentangling argument, but that should
not dominate.
If I had decided not to go down this route and argued instead that thick concepts
are shapeless in a way different from their thin cousins, then in addition to having
to argue for there being a distinction between the types of concept, I would have
had to have found something in that distinction or elsewhere that supported the
anti-separationist conclusion. I do not rule out such a strategy, despite the route
I take, although I think that ﬁnding such a reason to identify thick concepts as
different or unique with regards to the supposed phenomenon of shapelessness will
be very hard.15
(e) At certain points I have shifted between concepts and features. I have occasion-
ally talked of evaluative features that concepts pick out, for example. We are certainly
interested in concepts, but are we interested in features?
Let me put the worry more plainly. The argument seemingly has the following
broad structure. We note something about how humans use certain concepts. We
argue that these concepts cannot be replaced by other concepts and there be the same
extension. We then conclude that there must really exist corresponding features that
14 I have suggested that some thin concepts are less thin than others. But (i) separationists may disagree
and, anyway (ii) the point in the main text at least applies to PRO and CON.
15 See again note 13. Even Roberts admits that her second sense of shapelessness applies equally to thin
and thick concepts.
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the original concepts pick out.16 This last move seems a little wild. Why think that
anything about human concept use implies, let alone entails, anything ontological?
Are nonseparationists, through employment of the disentangling argument, com-
mitted to a type of evaluative realism?
I agree that this move seems less than innocent. Indeed, it is clear that people
who have argued for the hypothesis, and those who have referenced it, have
been opaque in their language. There are two things we could do. First, having
noted the worry we could be strict with ourselves and previous writers. Perhaps all
that we have is an argument for a nonseparationist cognitivism and we should
ignore any reference to features and properties. We should sharply distinguish
cognitivism—concerned with whether concepts have the possibility of referring
(successfully) beyond themselves and ‘encoding’ knowledge—from realism, and
acknowledge that even if we have established that our evaluative concepts are
unitary, we leave it open as to whether they refer to anything, thus making an
evaluative error theory an obvious and live possibility. This option certainly has its
attractions, not least because cognitivism and realism are different. But why would
writers have slipped into talking about features and properties every so often?
Perhaps because there is a tendency to think that evaluative concepts’ legitimacy as
referring concepts makes sense only if one thinks that they can be and generally are
used successfully. This is not to say that an evaluative error theory is not still a serious
contender. But it is true that many feel awkward about it, not least because it aims to
show as false such a widespread and seemingly essential way of thinking and
speaking. Indeed, one might say that evaluative thinking has so many important
aspects to it that it seems implausible to think that all of them are dodgy such that the
whole is bogus.17
This leads, then, to a second way of viewing what we have. Perhaps we are being
too harsh here. The conclusion of the overall argument might be better expressed as
saying that our use of evaluative concepts strongly implies that we must take
seriously the idea that corresponding evaluative features are, in some sense of the
term, real. This need not commit us to the claim that evaluative features are as
ontologically serious and proper (whatever this means) as, say, the features and
properties of a supposed ﬁnal scientiﬁc theory. Rather, it invites us to explore further
the question of what ‘real’means in this sense, and how we can make sense of the idea
of real evaluative features that are real from a perspective of human evaluators; of
how we can explain that there is something about the world to which we are
responding rather than our evaluative categorizations being something that are
16 McDowell frequently moves between concepts and features in McDowell (1981) for instance,
although the features in question are often ‘theoretically massaged’ with the thought that they are, broadly,
response-dependent in some fashion. Wiggins, although more careful in his writings, also moves between
‘subjective responses’ and associated properties in Wiggins (1998), essay V.
17 See Kirchin (2010b) for an argument along these lines.
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wholly a product of our ‘gilding and staining’.18 Obviously, even if the shapelessness
hypothesis works, there is still much work to do in this vein, and important work at
that as failure on this point will probably undermine the whole hypothesis. I will
expand on these comments in my ﬁnal chapter. All I wish to state is that we should not
reject the argument out of hand simply because it seems to magic, by mere sophistry,
some ontological rabbit out of a conceptual hat. What we can reject out of hand are
those that talk exclusively of ‘features’ and ‘properties’ and who think the argument is
clearly and uncontroversially an argument that establishes a metaphysical conclusion.
(f) What is the precise aim when using the shapelessness hypothesis? Here is a
distinction between two readings of it. Should nonseparationists be trying to prove,
from their philosophical armchairs, that outrunning does and will occur and, hence,
that separationism is false? Call this the strong version of the shapelessness hypoth-
esis. Or should nonseparationists claim merely that there is a reason or some reasons
to think that when we carry out the necessary empirical investigation of our concepts,
we will ﬁnd the shapelessness hypothesis to be correct and, hence, we have reason to
doubt the truth of separationism? Call this the moderate version. In other words, our
distinction is this: when we empirically investigate how evaluative concepts work,
either we will conﬁrm what we have already shown to be true, or we will conﬁrm
what we suspected to be true.
I think neither version is correct, but later I argue, more positively, that a third
option has a chance of working. In brief, the ﬁrst two readings of the hypothesis
assume that empirical work will deﬁnitely show that evaluative concepts are shape-
less with respect to descriptive concepts. The third reading denies this: we will
probably never show anything deﬁnitive in this regard. A better characterization of
the hypothesis states that we are justiﬁed in supposing, in any case and after some
empirical work, that the evaluative could be shapeless with respect to the descriptive.
I argue that this gives some support to nonseparationism, although probably not
deﬁnitive, knock-down support. I provide more detail later.
Whether or not one thinks these two readings are defensible, it is worth noting
that both the strong and the moderate versions can be found in the core writings
on this topic. For example, in McDowell (1979), §4 McDowell seems to imply
that the argument shows conclusively that noncognitivism, that is separationism,
cannot be correct.19 His supporters are similarly bold.20 On the other hand, in
18 See McDowell (1983) for a discussion of this topic. McDowell is responding to Williams’ thoughts,
located in Williams (1978) for example, about the ‘absolute conception of reality’.
19 One referee for OUP suggested that my third option is expressed by McDowell, perhaps with this
phrase in mind. I disagree, although in the broad narrative of this book this exegetical disagreement is
secondary. The phrase I quote comes from the following context: we have not yet conducted any empirical
work and so we can be sceptical now, but we assume that such work can be done and that the truth will out
when we do this. As we will see, my third option is different from this.
20 Sometimes it is hard to discern to what a writer is committed if they have not made explicit the
distinction that taxes us, in this case that between the moderate and strong versions. However, despite their
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McDowell (1981), p. 144, he thinks that the argument makes it only “reasonable to be
sceptical about” separationism (that is, noncognitivism). I think this phrase, and
other such phrases in the rest of the section, are meant as they stand and are not
academic ‘hedges’. Similarly, Wiggins, in Wiggins (1993b), §§IV–VII, thinks that he
has not shown conclusively that Peter Railton’s naturalistic, reductionist realism is
impossible, but only that we should be sceptical about its chances.
For completeness’s sake, let me state that I have not found my third option in
the literature.
One last point. In introducing the argument we might wish to say things such as
‘according to nonseparationists, there will be no descriptive match to the evaluative
concept’ or ‘any such recharacterization will fail’. But, after reﬂection on these two
readings, we might say that before we do any empirical work we should state that
‘there will almost certainly be no descriptive match . . . ’ and ‘any such recharacteriza-
tion will almost certainly fail’. Or, once we have considered my third reading, we
might say something else.
This links to my last point in this section, which provides us with one reason for
initially preferring the moderate version.
(g) Should we construe the shapelessness hypothesis as an a priori claim or an a
posteriori claim?21 This can be a misleading question. Clearly the claim cannot be a
wholly a priori one. We cannot plausibly claim what the relationship between
evaluative concepts and supposed descriptive counterparts is likely to be, let alone
show what it is, through theoretical reﬂection alone on the nature of evaluative
concepts. We have to draw on our experience of how evaluative concepts are used
in order to support the hypothesis, no matter whether it is construed moderately or
strongly. But saying that the claim is an a posteriori one might mislead. We might
think that we can prove the claim to be true simply by going through all of the
evaluative concepts that are used, or at least a central stock of them, and showing that
the phenomenon of outrunning is common. Clearly this would be difﬁcult to do to
qualiﬁcations (such as “it may be the case that”), I reckon that Dancy (1993), p. 76 and McNaughton
(1988), p. 61 can be read as siding with the strong claim. McNaughton and Rawling (2003), pp. 24–5 are
bolder. They assume, for argument’s sake, that noncognitivism is defeated by the ‘pattern problem’ and
that there exist normative facts.
21 This sub-section is directed against Miller (2013), §10.1, esp. pp. 245–9. Miller goes wrong in failing
to distinguish between moderate and strong versions, although it is clear that he thinks that nonsepara-
tionists (that is, cognitivists) put forward a strong version. He dismisses the shapelessness hypothesis
because he thinks that McDowell—in advocating the strong version—has wrong targets. On Miller’s
construal those that argue using the shapelessness hypothesis will be successful only if we assume that
separationists (that is, noncognitivists) claim that by conceptual a priori reﬂection alone one can prove that
descriptive recharacterizations of evaluative concepts are possible. But, as he points out, separationists do
not claim that. They claim that empirical work and substantive evaluative theorizing will reveal that
evaluative concepts can be recharacterized in this way. And no a priori argument will work against that: we
need empirical research to counter it. But if we introduce the moderate version, we can see that
nonseparationists’ aims can be different and their position less easy to dismiss. Thus, I go into more detail
than Miller does about the ensuing debate between the two sides.
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say the least: there are a lot of such concepts and outrunning seems to be something
that will involve an awful lot of investigation.22
What seems to be misleading here is the assumption that we have only empirical
types of justiﬁcation matched with a desire to prove the strong version to be true. But
nonseparationists have not gone in for such methods and, given the difﬁculty of
proving the strong claim, even by empirical methods, this seems right. What they
typically do instead is offer some examples drawn from real-life experience, such as
my chocolate example, and from that reﬂect on the nature of evaluative concepts
generally. Clearly this sort of method will not provide enough evidence for the strong
version, and if we did think that this is what nonseparationists are trying to do it
would be easy to dismiss their argument.
Assuming that they are not wholly misguided in what they are attempting to do,
perhaps we should construe matters along the following lines: from description of
limited experience, and reﬂection drawn from such experience about the nature of
evaluative concepts, nonseparationists are aiming to show that it is likely that, if
thorough empirical work were done, we would ﬁnd that no, or no central, evaluative
concept could be recharacterized in the manner suggested. This is clearly an expres-
sion of the moderate version.
These seven notes touch on some deep issues—levels of description, ontology, the
distinction between a priori and a posteriori investigation—and, while making some
positive points, for other points I have done no more than advertise them as worries
and bracket them to the side. With such a subtle, sometimes obscure, wide-ranging
argument this is inevitable. I hope that the reader forgives what bracketing there has
been; this is necessary so that I can set up the discussion and assess the hypothesis
directly. (I also hope the reader forgives the length of these notes.) With that said,
then, let us now return to the main ﬂow of my discussion. Howmight a more detailed
exposition of outrunning proceed?
5.5 Outrunning
One idea to bear in mind as we consider outrunning is that proponents of the
shapelessness hypothesis have never based their claim on any supposed epistemic
inadequacy of humans. The focus is on the nature of evaluative concepts. Something
about them, no matter how intelligent and imaginative humans are, is such that they
cannot be captured correctly in descriptive ways by us, or are unlikely to be so.
The (supposed) phenomenon of outrunning is something that occurs because
there is a gap between the extension of an evaluative concept and the extension
entailed, or encoded by, some descriptive recharacterization of that concept
22 I draw out exactly how much in the following section.
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given in some list. What is required is some consideration of how large those
extensions will be.
Imagine, for argument’s sake, that there is only a ﬁnite number of ways, be it ﬁve or
20,005, in which actions get to be kind. Could outrunning then occur? Assuming that
we do not have recourse to the epistemic inadequacy of humans, and assuming that
we are dealing with humans who have a fair amount of time and are diligent, there
seems no reason in principle to imagine that we could not produce a list that
captured the ﬁnite number of ways in which actions get to be kind, even if that
was a very large number. Thus, in order for the claim of outrunning to be an
interesting challenge we have to assume that there is an inﬁnite number of ways in
which actions get to be kind. We can assume, for now, that evaluative concepts are
inﬁnitely complex in this way. I will examine this claim later.
Let us think instead about the list of descriptive clauses. Of course, it is highly
plausible to claim that the lists that everyday humans can produce will have only a
ﬁnite number of clauses, and we cannot ignore this. If KIND, say, is inﬁnitely
complex, we will not be able to capture it. But, again, this might well indicate only
humans’ epistemic limitations. Is there anything else to say here?
Imagine, again for argument’s sake, that by some cosmic ﬂuke humans as they are
could produce lists with an inﬁnite number of clauses. How they do so is crucial. We
should recall that we are not interested solely in the descriptive capturing of evalu-
ative concepts, but in whether this can be done ‘from a nonevaluative point of view’.
To illustrate, let us return to our outsider and introduce another ﬁgure, the insider.
The insider is, by deﬁnition, a typical and mature user of some evaluative concept
and so, in our imagined scenario, she would have the ability to convert her under-
standing of some evaluative concept into a complete capturing of descriptively
characterized clauses. This should not unduly trouble nonseparationists. For a
start, separation of thin evaluative element from descriptive feature in individual
cases may be common.23 When I judge something to be kind, I can nearly always
focus on a feature or features that make it so. For example, I can say why someone’s
action was kind by pointing out that she gave up her seat on the bus for someone else
who needed it, and approve of her action because it contains—or simply is—this.
Separation in individual instances is no worry here; the whole debate is about
whether we can make such a theoretical separation for the whole of the concept.
Clearly the insider is converting her already existing evaluative understanding into
descriptive terms, just as I can do in the bus case. The only difference between the
insider as I have just imagined her and myself is that she has the ﬂuky ability to
produce lists with an inﬁnite number of clauses. She can make the individual
separations for the whole of the concept and offer a complete translation of the
concept into descriptive language, something that is certainly beyond me.
23 However, my line of argument in Chapter Six casts doubt on what we can class as a descriptive feature
and a descriptive concept.
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We now need to ask whether an outsider—who can produce lists with an inﬁnite
number of clauses—can do the same as the insider. We should tread carefully. In
order for the issue to remain clear we need an outsider to remain an outsider. We
cannot have an outsider doing what anthropologists typically do in real life. She
cannot try to imagine what it is like for an insider, to pretend to be her, to draw on
her own stock of evaluative concepts to understand the concepts of the insider’s
community, and so on. If we do not keep to that then we lose the point of the debate.
A nonseparationist could rightly protest that our scenario does not show that the
evaluative is shapeless with respect to the descriptive. What it is far more likely to
show, it seems, is that if the ‘outsider’ (as we might now label her) has seemingly
been successful in understanding the insider, then her evaluative concepts were
probably not so different from the insider’s in the ﬁrst place and she is turning
herself into an insider.24
We can keep to this injunction, then, but this need not mean that the outsider is at
a complete loss. Perhaps she meets a friendly insider, follows her round for a while
and observes how she uses a certain concept. The outsider notes down the various
descriptive features of actions that the insider categorizes using the concept under
investigation. Presumably, however, this will happen only for a while, and the
outsider will have a list with only a ﬁnite number of clauses. The question is, given
that she has the ability to produce an inﬁnite number of clauses if needs be, will she
be able to extend this list and capture the rest of the concept descriptively?
With the ground prepared we can now see that there is some chink left for the
separationist to exploit that normally goes unnoticed, although I think that, in the
end, it offers little support. It seems that our outsider could produce a full and correct
descriptively characterized list, but only through pure chance. That is, we put our
outsider on the spot and she magically produces the correct inﬁnite list by some stab
in the dark.
However, this logical possibility provides only limited support. It seems highly
unlikely that such a list could be produced with no prior evaluative understanding,
even ignoring the fact that we are asking for the production of an inﬁnite list. I worry
what the status of this unlikelihood is given that we are dealing with an inﬁnite
number of kind actions. (My intuitions go fuzzy here regarding probabilities and
inﬁnitude, as I imagine other people’s do.) But I am content to leave this response
aside. At the least, separationism’s truth looks debatable if it has only this possibility
on which to fall back.
A nonseparationist might object. Why allow separationists this chink to exploit?
After all, it seems crazy to imagine that such a list could be produced. But I think that
after a moment’s reﬂection our nonseparationist would realize that the outsider could
strike lucky. However, she might continue and wonder, more generally, whether this
24 As advertised, I investigate the possibility of anthropology in Chapter Eight.
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present discussion has been set up correctly. This lucky outsider would not under-
stand kindness, so why think that she could produce such a list? She has not
‘mastered the concept’ after all. Considering this worry gives me a chance to return
to §5.4(a). It is unfair for nonseparationists to state that when such a list has been
produced by an outsider, separationism will be vindicated only if she is able to
explain why the various clauses appear on the list rather than merely report that
the presence of such features justiﬁes a certain judgement; that she is able to say why
the presence of features a, b, and cmake an action kind, while the addition of feature
x renders the action cruel; that she is able to explain why the action with features a, b,
and c is a canonical example of its type; and so on. Being able to comment in such a
way seems to be part of what it is to have evaluative understanding of the concept at
issue. But there is no reason to expect that the outsider will be able to comment in this
way, since the outsider is being challenged to do something without evaluative
understanding. Why think that she can produce the list with no understanding and
expect that, from such a position, evaluative understanding over and above the ability
to capture the concept’s extension will then follow? How is full evaluative under-
standing to be magicked from none? This sets the bar too high for separationists,
surely. This is why the debate should be restricted to discussion of the extension of
concepts. That is enough of a challenge anyway.
Something deeper might motivate separationists. So far we have been discussing
disjunctive lists. Some nonseparationists might question whether we can seriously
think that such things legitimately represent KIND. I have little sympathy with this
move.25 As we have just seen, even if we do not normally think of evaluative concepts
in these terms, it seems possible for an insider to produce such a disjunctive list, be it
ﬁnitely or inﬁnitely long. That is as legitimate as it needs to be for our purposes.
I am being hard on nonseparationists here. Even if we acknowledge that our
outsider can have and produce a correct list, if she does produce a correct list she
does so only by good fortune. The worries that I imagine some nonseparationists
airing show us starkly how lucky the outsider has to be. After her travels with the
friendly insider have ﬁnished, the remaining number of ways in which actions get to
be kind have to be made up by the outsider, or they have to pop into her head, or
similar. It is, I hope, clear both that this is possible, but also how extremely unlikely it
is. Indeed, additionally, it seems that the real worry is with descriptions popping into
the outsider’s head, and it is not so important whether the list that has to be produced
is inﬁnite or just a very, very long ﬁnite one.
The debate could proceed from this point with us discussing other things about the
points of view of the insider and the outsider, and whether this can be used to
nonseparationism’s advantage. I will do this later. For now, let me recap this section.
We have shown that in order for the claim of outrunning to convince, we need to
25 At least in the context of this debate. In Chapter Six I think about what it is to characterize using only
descriptive, nonevaluative language.
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imagine that kindness comes in an inﬁnite variety of forms. If we do that, we need
to ask whether someone could capture it nonevaluatively. Even if someone has the
ability to produce inﬁnitely long lists, she can do so ‘normally’ only if she is an
insider. If she is an outsider, she can do so only by pure chance, and this gives
little support to those that oppose the shapelessness hypothesis. We now have to
ask whether we have reason for thinking that supposed evaluative concepts are
inﬁnitely complex.
5.6 A Prejudice
Let me comment brieﬂy on my phrasing, for clariﬁcation. I have talked of evaluative
concepts being ‘inﬁnitely complex’ and, more strictly, of there being an ‘inﬁnite
number of ways in which actions get to be of a certain evaluative sort’. This is in
contrast to there being an ‘inﬁnite number of actions of a certain evaluative sort’.
There might be an inﬁnite number of kind actions, but the nonevaluative feature or
features that are crucial to their being kind might come in only a limited number of
forms. In which case, there might be no reason in principle why humans could not
capture what it is for something to be kind in nonevaluative ways. What needs to be
established is not just that there are, or are likely to be, an inﬁnite number of kind
tokens, but that there are, or are likely to be, an inﬁnite number of kind types.
What reason have we for believing that outrunning will occur? Let us start with the
strong version of the shapelessness hypothesis. Recall that, in this case, the conclu-
sion nonseparationists are aiming to show is:
(A) Evaluative concepts cannot be recharacterized in descriptive terms unless
one has full evaluative understanding of them.
Recall that (A) was earlier supported, in §5.3, by the positive light in which non-
separationists saw things:
(B) Evaluative concepts are essentially ‘human-laden’ (in a special way): they
reﬂect our interests which receive expression in ways that can be codiﬁed only in
evaluative ways.26
But what reason have we for believing (B), and (A) for that matter? At this point in
our discussion all we have is (C):
(C) There is an inﬁnite number of ways in which actions get to be a certain
evaluative way. For example, there is an inﬁnite number of ways in which actions
get to be kind.
26 I include the caveat in parentheses since arguably all concepts are ‘human-laden’ in the sense of
reﬂecting our interests. The claim relevant here is that the human-laden nature of evaluative concepts
results in uncodiﬁability with respect to the descriptive.
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But to what can we point to support this claim? I can think of nothing except the
chocolate example and similar cases. Recall that we supposedly conclude that the
value of the action could always alter following the addition of new features.27 But
this assumption seems motivated only because we assume that the evaluative cannot
be recharacterized in wholly descriptive terms, or that ethical concepts are essentially
human-laden and reﬂect our interests that are expressed in uncodiﬁable ways.
Indeed, we are assuming that evaluative concepts are special concepts where out-
running occurs, as opposed to other concepts—such as ‘is a line’—where we assume
this does not happen, since we assume that there are only a ﬁnite number of types of
way to exemplify the concept, even if there are inﬁnite tokens.28 All that we have
standing against our accepting that there is only a ﬁnite number of ways in which
actions get to be kind is some pessimism about strategies involving descriptive
recharacterizations. If this is true, then nonseparationists who employ the shapeless-
ness hypothesis are guilty of begging the question.
That is one way of expressing that there is an unjust prejudice at work. A different
way is this. Instead of accusing nonseparationists of smuggling their conclusion into
the premises, we might worry that (A), (B), and (C) are merely different ways of
phrasing the same idea and, hence, none can be used in support of the other two. In
the terms of the present debate, what it is for something to be noncharacterizable in
wholly descriptive terms is just for it to be essentially human-laden. Similarly,
‘nonrecharacterizability’ is just an easier way of saying ‘there is an inﬁnite number
of ways that an action can get to be kind, say, and hence it cannot be represented in
descriptive terms’.
So the strong version of the shapelessness hypothesis is really only an expression of
the (controversial) initial anti-separationist hunch. We certainly do not have an
argument here. Talk of outsiders trying to understand the value of various actions
involving the giving or withholding of chocolate might make the anti-separationist
hunch more vivid, but does nothing to strengthen it or add to it.
Well, that is the strong version of the hypothesis. What of the moderate version?
We might think it is in better condition. Claiming only that evaluative concepts are
likely to resist recharacterization in descriptive terms commits us to less than the
strong version; we could be wrong about the deﬁnite claim, but the balance of reasons
still favours us being right in advance of doing some investigation. If the moderate
version seems good, then the onus shifts to separationists, which is no mean feat.
However, this is not quite right. Our rejection of the strong version exposed the
fact that our evidence for believing it was only the initial anti-separationist hunch.
27 Which, of course, would result in slightly different actions each time. We are concerned with the
value of the general action type of giving chocolate.
28 This comparative judgement is here for illumination of the evaluative case. We could challenge the
claim about ‘is a line’ and worry about rule-following generally. That does not strictly affect the claims
about evaluative case: is there or is there not uncodiﬁability here?
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It is not as if we have acquired only a little evidence aside from belief in nonsepar-
ationism, and concluded that it is too little to base so strong a claim on. It is that we
have no evidence beyond the anti-separationist hunch. With that in mind, the
moderate version is in no better condition. Of course, the weaker claim allows for
the possibility that evaluative concepts might be captured from a wholly descriptive
perspective. But we are still, then, saying that the phenomenon of shapelessness is
more likely than not. However, what justiﬁes this? Only again some thumbnail
sketches of various evaluative concepts whose characterization is infected with
anti-separationist bias.
Some might think I am being harsh on the employment of the shapelessness
hypothesis here, and speciﬁcally the moderate version. After all, many might feel the
force of the anti-separationist hunch and they might think the thumbnail sketches
fairly true to life. (I do, as it happens.) But some have intuitions that go the other way.
Opponents might instead feel the force of the thought that scientiﬁc work over the
past centuries has explained various phenomena in all manner of ways. Parts of
scientiﬁc investigation embody the hope that one can explain phenomena that seem
united as a type only at some higher level of description and which are disparate and
seemingly unfathomably complex at some lower level of description. And, relatedly,
science has explained the uniﬁed nature of phenomena at lower levels that at higher
levels seemed disparate, and will continue to do so. Even if nonseparationists cannot
convince their opponents, they might need to offer more to convince neutrals who, as
yet, might be caught between both intuitions.
As I have said, the hypothesis can be rehabilitated a little. I am being hard here
since I want a defence of the anti-separationist view to have a better chance of
standing up to critical scrutiny. Shifting simply to the moderate claim invites the
worries that (i) we still have only prejudiced reasons for believing the supposed
likelihood; and (ii) one could easily reject the claim based on opposing prejudices.
Nonseparationists who wish to use the shapelessness hypothesis against separation-
ism need to think a little harder.
5.7 A Third Option
There is a third way we can understand the aims that lie behind the shapelessness
hypothesis.
What the strong and moderate versions of the shapelessness hypothesis share is
that both make claims about what we will discover when we investigate how
evaluative concepts work. We can claim from our limited experience either that
something is or is likely to be the case. What they both leave unquestioned is the
epistemic position of the people doing the investigative work and what they will and
should think when a lot of that work is done.
So what if we consider that? Consider the outsider again. After she has ﬁnished
following the insider around she has a ﬁnite list of clauses. We then challenge her to
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predict how an insider will view a sample of new actions that we will present. We can
imagine that the sample will be a mix of actions that have many of the same features
of previously judged examples, as well as those that have very few. Based on previous
thoughts we can accept that there is a possibility that the outsider will get every
case correct. But how conﬁdent will she be of doing so and how conﬁdent will we
be in her abilities?
The answer depends in large part on how bright she is. If she is dim and slow-
witted, then she might stumble along attempting to make her judgements, and
sometimes get it right and sometimes get it wrong. She might not reﬂect on this
and simply shrug her shoulders when she goes wrong. If she is brighter, then her
experience might teach her that she is not doing as well as the insider and that this
change of scenario has exposed her as being less than competent with the concepts
under investigation. If she is brighter still she might reﬂect on her experiences and
imagine cases such as the chocolate example. (Or perhaps she is simply knowledge-
able and has read about shapelessness.) We might imagine that seeds of doubt are
sown in her mind. She might, ﬁrst, doubt that she will ever be able to capture the
concept under investigation descriptively. But, second, on reﬂection she might revise
that for the (better) doubt that she could capture the concept in this way, but that she
will never be able to tell if she has done so. She will always wonder if a conﬁguration
of nonevaluative features is possible that does not appear on her list but which is such
as to be deemed kind, say. I think it plausible to say that our outsider’s conﬁdence in
her ability with the evaluative concepts under investigation will diminish, possibly
signiﬁcantly. And I take it that this will reﬂect our conﬁdence in her abilities, given
our previous thought about how likely it is for her to get things right every time.
What position are we in when we judge? If we follow through this train of thought
we can imagine that seeds of doubt are sown in our minds also. We have been
introduced to the shapelessness hypothesis, made vivid by some examples. We might
think, ‘Well, that could happen to me and the concepts that I use, and any new ones
that I try to understand. Perhaps I won’t be able to latch onto an exhaustive
descriptive pattern. Or [the better doubt] even if I can, perhaps I won’t know that
I have.’ It seems that if this train of thought is correct, we should start to be unsure
about our concept use and lose conﬁdence in our abilities. A different way of putting
the idea is this. Before we started to doubt we might have considered ourselves to be
insiders rather than outsiders, that is if we could have accepted this distinction
without buying into all of the doubts. But now, after reﬂection, we might not be so
sure whether we are insiders or outsiders. Insiders are people that pretty much
understand their concepts.29 They can be conﬁdent that their extensions are pretty
much consistent. Even if they get some individual examples wrong, they can be
29 Even if we cannot articulate the necessary and sufﬁcient criteria of application of a concept, or even
get close, we might be able to apply the concept well enough, and manipulate it and reason about it in
individual cases.
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conﬁdent that they will understand why that is, after time and reﬂection anyway.
They might question their use of a concept on an occasion; they might debate with
others and change their mind. But this is from a base of being conﬁdent with the
concept and related evaluative concepts overall. Yet perhaps we are not like this.
Perhaps we are more like outsiders. Perhaps we might come across some new cases
and fail by some margin to get things right and, further, be ignorant of our failings
and fail to realize that someone could challenge what we think.
But this train of thought seems pessimistic. An interesting contrast is provided by
the fact that many of us are conﬁdent in how we use our evaluative concepts.
Certainly we might get things wrong every so often but, as I remarked just now,
that is consistent with being an insider. We do not normally think of ourselves as dim
or reckless when it comes to our use of evaluative concepts. We can participate in
everyday evaluative discourse and can argue and reveal ideas in ways that people
ﬁnd agreeable and unsurprising. Indeed, furthermore, we normally think that we
are able to understand other people and their initially alien concepts. Anthropo-
logical research is based on such conﬁdence.
It could be that we are being dim or reckless. Perhaps we adopt an air of conﬁdence
because we prefer to be optimistic, even if this has no basis in reality. But that seems a
little implausible. At the very least, I could imagine a neutral agreeing with what has
been said so far.
Why is this bad for separationists? If we have conﬁdence in our concept use, then it
shows that we have found some pattern of items in the world that we categorize in the
same way, and it shows that we are happy that we have, pretty much, immediate
access to the (rough and ready) contours of the pattern, such that we could consist-
ently extend it to new cases. If the shapelessness hypothesis has any power, then the
thought will be that for evaluative concepts this pattern will ﬁgure in our deliber-
ations strangely if we think of it, on reﬂection, as a descriptive, nonevaluative pattern,
as separationists suppose. We may not have latched onto it, and even if we do, we will
not know that we know it; we cannot conceptualize it as ‘the pattern of kindness’ if
separationism is correct. So how can our everyday conﬁdence in our concept use
persist? Why is our conﬁdence justiﬁed? This looks like a curious state of affairs, and
suggests a strange state of mind.
This contrasts with the nonseparationist thought that the pattern is evaluative. We
might not be able to articulate the whole pattern in nonevaluative ways, but we seem
to be fairly conﬁdent in our application and understanding of kindness, say, as the
pattern of kindness. Or, in other words, the ‘something’ that links all and only all the
kind things is the feature of kindness, or the fact that they are kind, or some other,
similar phrasing. We are able to latch onto this pattern with none of the bother that
separationism seems to entail.
Hence, we can provide a mirror claim to that given for the strong and moderate
versions. The precise aim of the shapelessness hypothesis is to claim that the
evaluative could be shapeless with respect to the descriptive. The difference between
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this and the moderate claim, with its ‘likely’ or ‘strongly likely’, is that we will never
be able to know whether shapelessness is a real phenomenon, whereas the moderate
version says that it is likely that empirical work will show the hypothesis to be correct.
This epistemic point should make us question whether our natural, everyday conﬁ-
dence in our concepts is undermined by the separationist account of evaluative
concept use. Cases such as the chocolate example are not designed to justify some-
thing being the case, either to us now or once we have done the necessary empirical
work. Rather, they get us to think about whether we could ever know that the
necessary empirical work was complete and whether we could show conclusively
that appropriate descriptive characterizations were forthcoming.
How might separationists challenge this? They could argue, ﬁrst, that we are
deceiving ourselves and that our conﬁdence is misplaced. This is a possibility,
although condemning most people like this does not seem an attractive strategy.
Besides, there are other more interesting responses, (a)–(d).
(a) One obvious response—perhaps the obvious response—is to agree that we are
conﬁdent in our use of evaluative concepts and, hence, agree that this is probably
because we are picking out some pattern. However, separationists can challenge and
ask why this cannot be a descriptive pattern. The idea from above is that we cannot
capture and articulate such things. But, goes the response, the existence of descriptive
patterns and the articulation of them are separate issues; it might be that we can
articulate such patterns only feebly at most.30 So it might be that separationists
cannot prove that there are suitable descriptive charaterizations available, but it
might also be that nonseparationists cannot prove that there are not.
Can nonseparationists respond? It is true that they cannot conclusively prove
that such descriptive characterizations are not forthcoming. But nonseparation-
ists could adopt a piecemeal strategy and attempt to convince neutrals. They
could give a battery of examples such as the chocolate case. Then they could alter
the descriptive features of each a few times to show how the applicable evaluative
concepts might change. By going through this process they cannot show that it
will happen every time, mainly because of the nature of the debate: ‘inﬁnite or
ﬁnite?’ But they can show that it can happen a fair amount, in each family of
cases. They could then move the discussion on. It is certainly true that they
cannot prove that this process will not stop. Yet, given that examples have been
continued some way, then perhaps the onus is on separationists to show why we
should continue to believe what they say. If we have an awful lot of continuation,
why not think that the default is to imagine it will continue unless proved
otherwise? In effect, what nonseparationists do is shift our argument so that
they are not trying to show that separationism is wrong, but to argue that the onus is
on separationists to prove otherwise. Thismight be enough to convince a neutral to back
30 See Blackburn (1981), p. 167. I comment on this in Kirchin (2010a), pp. 11–12.
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nonseparationism, at least as a ‘safety-ﬁrst’ option. Perhaps this onus-shifting move is
the best way of articulating the force of examples such as the chocolate case.
But it must be said that this is no knock-out argument, even if separationism does
not emerge victorious either. (If nothing else, my discussion shows this contra all
commentators on the debate.) This line of thought may do little to persuade separa-
tionists; I am not sure how neutrals will respond. That alone should incline us to look
elsewhere for a way to defend nonseparationism and query separationism, although
there are a few other thoughts I have let slip in this chapter that require questioning
anyway. And, of course, it affects what we say in the overall discussion of how
important this strategy is in showing separationism to be incorrect.
Before we get ahead of ourselves, though, what other separationist responses
might there be?
(b) A separationist might wonder about the chocolate case and other examples.31
I have provided only a snapshot of how this case might go. We could argue about
how long that case could continue, but let us imagine it could continue a lot. More
interestingly, a separationist might ask whether the new examples would be that
surprising, or rare, or cause us to rethink what we have been doing previously with
the concept. After all, that seems to be where these examples bite. In short, the
challenge is to think whether we could summarize an everyday evaluative concept
descriptively based on some examples, and from that be conﬁdent that nothing too
surprising will then emerge. If so, our conﬁdence will be enhanced.
The response to this is to recall some previous thoughts. Think back to the
outsider. She merely notes down the descriptive information that has gone before.
Her future judgements are a function of this. It is no part of this noting down that she
is able to discern which features of a case justify the application of the relevant
concept, unless the insider tells her. Similarly, given my set up, she will be at a loss to
notice that a feature pops up more times than others or, at least, she will be at a loss
to explain what, if any, evaluative signiﬁcance is carried by this statistical fact. With
that in mind we can say that she will be surprised by a lot of things that to us, as
everyday users, would be unsurprising. For example, some insiders start to talk about
kindness with reference to chocolate being shared between children. But then they
start talking about teeth and pain. And then they start to talk about tears and upset
children. And then the insiders are not so bothered that the children are upset
because the thing that is causing the upset is trivial (which is then further speciﬁed).
But now the insiders become more curious because they learn that the thing causing
the upset is not so trivial because of some further thing (again, to be speciﬁed). And
so on. It could be that at no stage are we, as everyday users, surprised. But the
outsider might well be. And, I think, this reveals a theme of my discussion.
31 Here I respond to a nice point from Daniel Elstein.
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I have tried to be fair-minded when dealing with separationism, particularly on the
issue of ‘mastery of a concept’. The bar cannot be set too high. But here we reveal the
limits of the separationist interpretation. Simply because separationists’ ambitions
for the outsider are just for her to follow and articulate the extensions of concepts, it
seems unlikely that such an outsider will be conﬁdent that she can continue on her
own, since the features themselves will not reveal any pattern. This could be what the
whole debate turns on: the rival conceptions of what an evaluative concept is; when
push comes to shove: something sui generis or something that can be characterized in
other terms. According to the former conception of evaluative concepts, many new
features and situations will not be surprising. But, in accordance with the latter, every
new situation, no matter how trivially different it seems to us as readers of this book,
has the potential to be surprising to users. Or, in other words, the challenge to
separationists is that separationism characterizes us all as being outsiders.
Of course, we start as philosophers by thinking about what our everyday use is like.
Perhaps the idea of shapelessness might not get off the ground unless we found that
new situations came along that surprised us with unexpected features. But I reckon
that is fairly common. It is certainly common when we are ﬁrst learning to use a
concept: one’s ﬁrst case of a cruel action that is also kind can be a revelation.
Similarly, working out exactly what sorts and mixtures of furniture, clothing, and
musical style are kitsch or classy can be surprising. But this phenomenon applies even
to mature users. Such changes in concepts (or, rather, conceptions) do not, I think,
mean that we should be low in conﬁdence in our use of evaluative concepts. Indeed, an
awareness that youmight not have got all of it right and have room to grow can add to
your conﬁdence. The key is that one is recognizing patterns in the instances that one is
picking out using an evaluative concept, one canmanipulate it and can connect it with
other concepts, and so on. None of this is going on in the mind of an outsider.
(c) Recall that I said, in Chapter Two, that it was never part of the classic presenta-
tion of the disentangling argument that separationism should reﬂect our phenom-
enology. Separationists might argue that our rejection of their position is driven by
worries about their theory not reﬂecting everyday phenomenology. After all, we have
a case where we supposedly feel conﬁdent in our everyday evaluative concepts that
their theory says we should not have. But, separationists might claim, we should not
dismiss a theoretical treatment of a phenomenon if that treatment does not accur-
ately reﬂect the phenomenology of it.
I think that that ﬁnal claim is right. A mismatch between theory and phenomen-
ology does not and should not spell the end of a theory straightaway.32 However,
what sort of mismatch do we have here? It is not just that the phenomenology is not
accurately reﬂected in the theory. We have the theory and phenomenology standing
32 See Kirchin (2003a) where I argue that ‘phenomenological arguments’ alone in metaethics cut no ice.
Moral phenomenology is useful only when allied to certain metaphysical, epistemological (etc.) arguments.
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opposed: the theory says that we are picking up on a descriptive pattern when we
categorize evaluatively, while the phenomenology not only is, supposedly, free of
such patterns, but one could never be sure that one had captured such a pattern even
if one had. Even then we might say that in some cases this does not dissuade some
philosophers from adopting certain theoretical positions. (Certain approaches to
inductive knowledge come to my mind here.) But we might want to say that if a
separationist raises the issue of phenomenology, she should be prepared to argue that
there are clear beneﬁts, and even clear beneﬁts overall, for adopting her position
despite the drastic mismatch between theory and phenomenology. Yet, although it
may have some prima facie merits, we have already seen, in the previous chapter,
reasons to worry about separationism, and in the next chapter we will encounter
some more. So, a defence based on short-circuiting the supposed phenomenological
motivation for our worry is suspect. And this is so particularly because the opposing
position, nonseparationism reﬂects the phenomenology pretty well and continues to
do so after theoretical reﬂection on the precise matters discussed in this chapter.
(d) One last discussion in this section introduces a more complicated response.
I promised earlier I would address how this argument worked against complex
separationism. The choice of label reﬂects something that seems to be an advantage
here. We have a more complex analysis of evaluative concepts, with some evaluative
element being used within some general descriptive element. This is advantageous
because we are supposing that evaluative concepts are complex and so we may be able
to capture them better. But this is a false hope. The supposition on the third reading
of the shapelessness hypothesis (and similarly with the other two come to that) is that
there is some reason to think that the evaluative is so complex that it cannot be
separated into component parts. Any attempt to make a separationist analysis more
complex will do nothing to stop the scepticism that we have now, ﬁnally, captured the
concept. And note that when it comes to details, Elstein and Hurka’s analysis of
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE included just one role for some evaluative element to affect the
concepts’ extensions, and INTEGRITY included just two. This is hardly ramping up the
complexity of the analysis very much.
In a similar vein we can close off an earlier avenue. I do not see how making the thin
evaluative element thicker than a PRO or a CON will help fend off this challenge. We are
thinking about nonseparable or ‘uncapturable’ complexity. Even if we make the evalu-
ative element more speciﬁc (yet not so speciﬁc as to make us worry that we have a thick
concept introduced on the sly), I am unconvinced that this will do the required work.
There will still be an assumed gap between the materials and the extension of the
evaluative concept, and that is all that is needed to generate the worry I have voiced.
But in returning to this position we can see a different challenge emerge. Recall
that in §5.4(d) we reﬂected on the relationship between shapelessness and disentan-
gling. Perhaps thick concepts are shapeless, but what drives the shapelessness of the
thick is only the shapelessness of the thin and, so, thick concepts can still be
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disentangled.33 This seems to be an option only for cognitivist-separationists: their
noncognitivist cousins will not want to say that thin concepts, such as PRO or GOOD are
shapeless. I take it, crucially and to repeat, that what has been said about kindness
goes for goodness: the chocolate case and many others will work in the same way for
the thin and the thick.
So what of cognitivist-separationists? They might be happy with PRO and GOOD
being shapeless (or, rather, ‘appearing to us to be shapeless because we can never be
sure that we have captured their shape nonethically’), and happy for (disentangled)
thick concepts to be shapeless but only in virtue of their thin, evaluative element. This
might be a victory of sorts for the McDowell–Wiggins nonseparationists, but at most
a half-victory, and almost certainly a moral defeat.
A response to this brings us back to earlier ideas. We need some reason to think
that thin concepts should be conceived as being conceptually prior at this point, and
we saw that even if separationists were not deﬁnitely wrong about this matter, there is
a large question mark hanging over their position. We can extend things a little here
also. The speciﬁc position under consideration right now is the idea that thick
concepts are shapeless only because thin elements within them are shapeless. What
is the motivation for that view? If we think that the chocolate case will carry on
changing such that we will carry on switching our judgements about its variations
from good to bad and back again, then why not think that the cause of the changing
in the case of the thick is the same as with the thin, rather than the cause being only
the thin itself? All of the features mentioned in relation to the chocolate case—dental
health, learned behaviour, being upset, features that are trivial (perhaps the upset is
because the chocolate bar is the child’s favourite), features that are not (it is the
child’s birthday; the bar reminds them of a relative they hardly see)—seem to be
intimately connected with kindness in this example in a way that is the same as in the
case of goodness. Although not a cast-iron, unquestionable point, it seems telling that
when we justify something as kind or cruel or brave or mean we look and consider
the features themselves in a way that is unmediated by whether these features are
good- or bad-making. Is it so obvious that the thin should be assumed to be
conceptually prior? There may be no further way of expressing this point. But
maintaining the opposite view—that only the thin is shapeless—seems to me to
maintain a theory for its own sake, despite the evidence to the contrary.
I think there are too many question marks hanging over this envisaged retreat. If
we were to accept that the thin is shapeless, it seems justiﬁable to accept that the thick
is too. Of course, we could deny that the thin is shapeless. Or, as a reminder, we could
deny that we will ever be certain that the thin was not shapeless. But the chocolate
case and others like it, married with the argument earlier in this section, seem to
favour our holding out against this, at least as a safety-ﬁrst option. The onus is on
33 Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to comment on this idea.
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those that oppose the nonseparationism of evaluative and descriptive content to
provide clear and unambiguous arguments that either show that evaluative concepts,
thin and thick, are shapely with respect to the descriptive, and that we can know when
we have a correct analysis; or show that the thin is shapeless, while the thick is not.
There are worries with this proposed retreat, then, such that we can conﬁdently
dismiss this avenue.34 But we should not forget my earlier cautiousness. The disen-
tangling argument, with its employment of the shapelessness hypothesis, does not
deliver a knock-out blow to separationism. This position might still be correct.
The most we can say, even if we accept that no separationist counter that I have
considered works, is that we can never know if separationism is correct and that this
scepticism does not chime with the state of mind that separationism suggests.
I am inclined to think that there is a tension between our normal state of mind
and that suggested by separationism. Yet, I am prepared to think that others will
disagree. Furthermore, there is lack of directness about this argument: it is a
suspicion, but separationists might push the point that I earlier sidelined and
argue that we should not be as conﬁdent as we are. Or, if we insist on such a
conﬁdence, then that simply shows that there is some nonevaluative pattern to our
evaluative categorizations.
Aside from these points, we can now see that the two strategies we have thought
about—the one that concentrates on the genus and conceptual priority, and the one
that concentrates on the shapelessness of the differentia—work together, and not just
because we have two parts of the genus–speciesmodel in play. They work also because
at various points, as we have just seen, we are left questioning whether, for example,
the thin genus really is prior. Furthermore, then, separationism is left with question
marks hanging over it, even if there is no decisive victory against it.
5.8 Conclusion and a Pause
In this chapter we have dissected in lengthy detail one of the key arguments, if not the
key argument, that has been raised by nonseparationists against separationists over
the past thirty or so years. The claim is that the evaluative is shapeless with respect to
the descriptive; no descriptive-only analysis of evaluative terms and concepts will
work. Putting it in the terms I have favoured in this book, there is a grave suspicion
that the differentia cannot be speciﬁed such that we can conclude that thick concepts
are species concepts.
I have raised doubts about the shapelessness hypothesis and disentangling argu-
ment. I do not think it works as it has normally been given. A third way of
understanding it has merit but, as an overall move against separationism, both this
strategy and the ﬁrst may leave us wanting more. There is no point in my discussion
34 In Kirchin (2010a), p. 23 I discuss this avenue in a little more detail.
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where we can say with conﬁdence that separationists should be worried and that
nonseparationists can claim victory. We have not really got to the heart of some of
the debate against separationism. It feels as if there is more to uncover about thick
concepts.
The argument of this chapter revolves around the idea that we cannot reduce the
evaluative to the descriptive. The strategy employed takes these two types of thing
and shows they are different. But that sort of strategy assumes that we have two
distinct types of thing in the ﬁrst place. As I expressed in Chapter One, one of the
reasons thick concepts were originally a focus of such interest was that they held out a
hope for some thinkers that it was not so clear that the evaluative and the descriptive
were different, or if there were clear examples in each camp, it was not so clear where
the one domain stopped and the other started. In the next chapter we think about
that idea.
Before that, a pause. I have said that I wanted to understand the terrain and get
under the skin of separationism in the ﬁrst few chapters. Much of my tone may have
been negative. However, we have uncovered a number of positive ideas. Here I list the
major ones as they will help ease us into Chapter Six.
(i) In Chapter Three I started to make the case for evaluative ﬂexibility. We saw
that it may seem odd to postulate a large number of separate concepts, such as
ELEGANT-PRO and ELEGANT-CON, when we can just have one concept, ELEGANT,
that holdswithin itselfmore than one ‘pointed evaluation’. InChapter Six I return
to this idea and show how it connects with nonseparationism.
(ii) In Chapter Four I argued for the idea that concepts that are typically labelled
as thin can come in a range of thicknesses, or at least can be more or less
speciﬁc than one another. PRO is different from GOOD and RIGHT. GOOD is
different from ETHICALLY GOOD and AESTHETICALLY GOOD, not just in content but
in speciﬁcity. Yet it is not unreasonable to think of all of these examples as
thin or as ‘simply’ evaluative. If so, then it seems as if it is reasonable also to
think that we should investigate more the notion of what it is for something
to be evaluative, given that all of these examples are treated as evaluative
concepts.
(iii) Although suggestive only, in Chapter Four we saw that ‘no prioritarianism’
might be at least as viable and plausible a position as both thin and thick
prioritarianism.
(iv) Finally, we have just seen that nonseparationists may make no convincing
headway, ultimately, if they argue only that evaluative and descriptive con-
ceptual content are intertwined in some way that suggest they cannot then be
separated. The emphasis here is wrong. Nonseparationists need to focus on
questioning the assumption of there being a split or separation in the ﬁrst
place. If they do this they open up a different way of defending their view and
of characterizing the evaluative.





In this chapter I get to the heart of the debate about thin and thick concepts and, in so
doing, reveal two very different pictures about them. The positive nonseparationist
picture I draw understands evaluation in a way different from how evaluation is
understood by separationists. My overall argumentative stance against separationism
and for nonseparationism should therefore be understood in this light. Recall from
Chapter One my argumentative aim. I do not show to devastating effect some fatal
incoherence in separationism, or similar. Indeed, I believe that there is no such ﬂaw.
Instead, I aim to show that nonseparationism understands and casts thin and thick
evaluative concepts in a better light than separationism and, further, that in the end
separationism emerges as strange and curious. Recall also my hope that neutrals will
be persuaded to side with me; it may be that some separationists will question their
allegiance also, but I do not expect many to do so.
There a number of ideas at work in this chapter and I now list them. Most are
repeated from earlier adverts in the book.
(a) In this chapter one aim is at the forefront: to persuade people that there is a
notion of the evaluative at work in everyday thought and language that goes beyond
notions of positive and negative stance (pro and con, and even pro-in-a-way and
con-in-a-way), even if it also encompasses them. Further, such thick concepts cannot
be separated into component parts. We may cast this position in various ways, using
terms such as ‘entangled’, or describing thick concepts as ‘unitary’ and perhaps as
‘basic’, ‘non-derivative’ and the like. Whichever terms we use to ﬂag up particular
ideas, the central notion I expressed in the ﬁrst sentence of this paragraph is clear.
And it can be ampliﬁed by another central idea mentioned in Chapter One also: thick
evaluative concepts are as wholly or purely evaluative as thin concepts are, even if
some evaluative concepts are more speciﬁc than others. This claim then invites us to
reﬂect in detail on what our conception of the evaluative is.
(b) Following on, then, and to hark back to labels introduced in Chapter One, in this
chapter I am motivating the liberal view of evaluation, and showing the conservative
view to be unattractive. Liberals think that some concepts can be categorized as
evaluative even if some instances of their use have no positive or negative view
conveyed, no pro or con stance to them. Conservatives think that there must be such
a stance in each and every instance for a concept to be an evaluative concept.
(I provide more detail of each position later.) So according to liberals we can apply
a concept such as MACABRE legitimately on some occasion where its use does not
convey any positive or negative stance or view (the judge may not intend any, the
audience does not infer any), and yet the concept overall can still be called an evaluative
concept and it can be taken to be used evaluatively in this instance. I aim to defend the
possibility of this position through reﬂection on many examples of how we use
concepts, and make it obvious that we assume such a position in the ﬁrst place.
A quick note. How does the liberal–conservative disagreement intersect with the
separationist–nonseparationist disagreement? They are different, after all. Clearly
I am a liberal-nonseparationist: I believe that our everyday notion of evaluation is not
exhausted by notions of pro and con, and I believe that thick concepts cannot be
separated into component parts. The special nature of my position, I suppose, is that
I think the best version of nonseparationism has the liberal notion of evaluation at its
heart. As I have said before, to say that thick concepts unite (thin) evaluation and
descriptive content is to give away too much to separationists already. We need a
notion of evaluation that they simply do not typically presume is on the table. This
then takes me to the next possible position. All of the separationists we have met are
conservatives, since they implicitly assume all the time that evaluation just is positive
or negative, pro or con, although they typically use the language of good and bad.
What about other possibilities? A conservative-nonseparationism is certainly coher-
ent, but I believe it is vulnerable to attack by separationists. One thinks of thick
concepts as unitary concepts, yet what is united is evaluation and descriptive content
as separationists conceive them. (This was my worry expressed at the end of
Chapter Five, and noting the vulnerability of this position leads to the liberal outlook
I defend.) Liberal-separationism appears to be a very strange position, verging on the
incoherent. A person occupying this position assumes that we should characterize
evaluation as being something that is not exhausted by pro and con stances, some-
thing that appears to be (as I take it to be) neither descriptive nor pro-or-con-only,
yet is also something that can be separated into component parts. Perhaps someone
could make this work, but I would want to know what one would be separating
this evaluation into: what are the component parts? For reasons of brevity, in
what is going to be a lengthy chapter anyway, I will ignore this fourth position
from now on.
(c) Having sorted out some positions in logical space, I should make clear a different
aspect of my view that will occupy much of my time in this chapter, and again I have
raised it before. I argue that although there may be clear examples of descriptive,
nonevaluative concepts, and also clear examples of evaluative concepts—that is, evalu-
ative concepts as separationists understand them—I also argue that there are many
examples of concepts that do not ﬁt neatly into these two camps. Furthermore,
I argue that such concepts deserve to be thought of as evaluative concepts by theorists
and, from what I can tell, are routinely thought of in this way in everyday thought and
activity.
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Let me pause so that we can take this in, for it may seem confusing. The phrase in
italics in the previous paragraph is key. I think that there are many examples of
evaluative concepts, and that many concepts can be classed as evaluative, probably
more than separationists think. That is because I have a more liberal view of
evaluation, something that is not exhausted by the conveyance of either pro or
con stance on any and every instance of the concept’s use. So, I do not think there
will be much dispute between myself and most or all separationists that KIND is an
evaluative concept. (The analysis of it will be different, but that is another matter.)
However, there is very likely to be different reasons for our view that it is
evaluative. Whereas separationists will think it evaluative only because it is nor-
mally used to convey pro views, I think that while such a concept can and is used in
this way, it is used to do other things as well. That extra thought leads me to think
about many other concepts also, and mount the case for them being classiﬁed
as evaluative.
There is a further part to my view that may well muddy the waters even more. In
this chapter and book I do not provide conditions, let alone necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions, at some exacting level of detail that any and every concept has to satisfy in
order to be evaluative.1 This is because I think there is strong reason to believe there is
a grey area between those concepts that are obviously evaluative and those concepts
that are obviously nonevaluative. Or, in other words, I think that there is strong
reason to think that there is no hard and fast dividing line between the evaluative and
the nonevaluative. I believe this is shown by many examples. This view may seem
counterintuitive and indeed downright gnomic, if only for reasons of logic and
English: we have two clear categories—evaluation and nonevaluation/descriptive—
that are clear negations of each other, so surely any concept must be one or the
other. We cannot have any third category, grey area, or anything else. I aim to show,
instead, that when we reﬂect on a range of examples, we can see the possibility of this
grey area and, therefore, what we might well wish to give up is an adherence to the
strict, unbending idea that we have two mutually exclusive categories which exhaust
the ﬁeld.2
So my focus on various examples will attempt to press two main, interrelated ideas.
First, that an evaluative concept can be evaluative (overall, and in any particular
instance) and not convey a positive or negative view in every instance of its use.
Second, even if there are clear examples of descriptive concepts and clear examples of
evaluative concepts by separationists’ lights (perhaps concepts that are exclusively
used to convey positive or negative view)—and, to stress, I do believe there are clear
1 There is another reason related to that in the main text. Recall also the cute but important thought
expressed in note 1 in Chapter Two. It may be difﬁcult, to say the very least, to try to describe necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for a concept being descriptive or nonevaluative in language that does not beg the
question as to what it is for concepts and terms to be evaluative and nonevaluative.
2 To avoid confusion, some clariﬁcation. I phrase the last idea as ‘I believe there is strong reason to
believe that . . . ’. I do not think I have any clear-cut, knockdown argument for my view. But I believe the
examples and reﬂections I offer make the view highly attractive and there are strong reasons to believe my
suggestion.
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examples of each type—there are many concepts ‘in between’. Their character is such
that we at the very least may wish to extend the notion of what an evaluative concept
is, simply because we are stretching our notion of the evaluative (in effect, the ﬁrst
point just mentioned). We may also wish to call into doubt whether there is a clear
and fast dividing line between the evaluative and the nonevaluative in the ﬁrst place,
strange as that may initially sound.
(d) Recall another important part of my view, namely that I think of thick concepts
as being essentially evaluative. By this phrase I mean that a thick concept has the
ability to convey evaluation because such evaluation is a central, necessary—that is,
essential—part of its nature. Indeed, talk only of conveyance of evaluation misses
something. These concepts just are evaluative, and this is partly expressed because
they can convey evaluation, such as pro and con views. The opposing view says that
such concepts, while they may be able to convey evaluation at times, do so only
accidentally or contingently, because of one’s tone of voice, linguistic context, or
other matters external to the nature of the concept itself.
In this chapter I am motivating the liberal view. So much of that view, in fact,
relies on the notion of evaluation I am suggesting being an essential part of the
concept. It is not just that pro and con views are conveyed, but that the concept’s
very nature is to have a variety of functions and to be a certain way. (Hence my ‘just
are’ qualiﬁer in the previous paragraph.) These various functions and aspects may be
inﬂuenced by situation and tone of voice, certainly. But all of this malleability is
something that is also part of what the concept is; anything that changes should not
automatically be thought to be only accidental to the concept and a contingent
feature of context.
So, although this chapter motivates the liberal view, my defence of my position
continues into Chapter Seven where I consider an important, recent challenge due to
Pekka Väyrynen. Recall my brief summary from Chapter One. In essence Väyrynen
questions whethermany of our concepts that are seen as evaluative and used in evaluative
ways are essentially evaluative, rather than having evaluative uses that are only accidental.
(He phrases the question by asking whether concepts classed as thick are ‘inherently
evaluative’; I comment on this terminological difference inChapter Seven.)MACABRE is one
of many examples that Väyrynen will have in mind, but he also worries about pretty
much all the concepts routinely accepted as thick and evaluative. He holds a
conservative view of what it is to be an evaluative concept. Considering his position
is important. If we assume that this present chapter is successful and that I can persuade
people that what evaluative concepts have is not exhausted by pro and con stances, then
thismay still leave a doubt in people’s minds that evaluation could be different fromhow
conservatives think, and yet still be accidental to thick concepts. Reﬂecting onVäyrynen’s
arguments and attempting to rebut them reveals more of what my view entails.
(e) Here are a couple more ideas, and the chapter structure, before we begin.
First, I have used a number of examples in this book thus far. I have used KIND,
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ELEGANT, and JUST plenty of times, along with infrequent uses of other concepts such
as INTEGRITY and WISE. I have used other concepts as well, but perhaps there have been
too few exciting examples. Concepts I have in mind include MACABRE, as well as
MUNDANE, JEALOUS, DULL-WITTED, HUMANE, JEJUNE, DEFIANT, TANTALIZING, STIMULATING,
KITSCH, CONTORTED, DISARMING, SCINTILLATING, SINISTER, HONOURABLE, RIDICULOUS, GENTLE,
PICARESQUE, SLOB, ANTAGONISTIC, TANGLED, TRANSCENDENT, STRAIGHTFORWARD, BOLD, MARVEL-
LOUS, TASTY, DIABOLICAL, and many more examples that this list suggests.3Asmentioned,
by working through examples such as these, I am to show the plausibility of my
views. I am aware that someone could easily question whether some of the concepts
above are evaluative or thick. They might accept GOOD and RIGHT as evaluative, and
perhaps JUST and BEAUTIFUL, but draw the line at STIMULATING and TANGLED. They might
certainly baulk if we focus on the qualiﬁers in phrases such as essentially or inherently
evaluative: ‘Is TANGLED really essentially evaluative?’ Such a worry is understandable,
but I think it is wrong, and that is the point of this chapter.
Second, this chapter is somewhat complex. In service of the main themes men-
tioned above, it gathers together a number of ideas, some of which have been
mentioned before and some of which are new. I hope that the structure I have chosen
helps to relate those points to each other and builds a clean narrative rather than adds
to the confusion.
In §6.2 I carry on from the last chapter by diagnosing why the disentangling
argument fails to convince. I then begin the main story. I do not dive straight into
discussion of the liberal view but instead build to it slowly. I think it important to put
the reader in a mood to be receptive to it. First of all, then, in §§6.3–6.5 I encourage us
to see how thick concepts have a number of different functions. I focus on Williams’
characterization of thick and thin concepts in order to do this, and go quite deeply
into it. I think Williams goes wrong in an interesting way in his account of thick and
thin concepts or, as I think it more accurate to say, a slogan associated with his view
misguides us. I illuminate why this is by thinking about Ryle’s account of thick
description.4 In discussing Ryle I outline his view of concepts generally. All of this
will be important background and motivation for my view.
Having discussed Williams and Ryle, I put forward my view across various sub-
sections of §6.6 by thinking about a number of examples and drawing morals from
them. I round off the discussion with thoughts from Foot. In §6.7 I return to
separationism and compare its picture of thick and thin concepts with mine.
In §6.8 I lay out some possible challenges to my view which set the agenda for the
ﬁnal chapters. In §6.9 I conclude.
3 And why stop at adjectives? We can also talk of nouns such as PEST, WIT, POSEUR, ADVOCATE, PRAT,
CURMUDGEON, and ZEALOT. Later on in the main text I discuss the verbs CAJOLE and GOSSIP.
4 The sections on Williams and Ryle are a rewritten version of Kirchin (2013). I also compare and
contrast ethical, aesthetic and epistemic concepts more in Kirchin (ms).
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6.2 Previous Arguments
The disentangling argument and the employment of the shapelessness hypothesis are
not downright hopeless. Any nonseparationists should agree with the spirit of the
overall claim: the evaluative is shapeless with respect to the descriptive, and one
cannot disentangle thick concepts into component parts. But writers seem to ﬁxate
on the idea of shapelessness and they typically give scant regard to asking in a deep
way why it is true, assuming it is. This is wrong, to my mind: it is absolutely
imperative that we ask why shapelessness is true and use this result as the oppor-
tunity to think about the nature of the evaluative. In the absence of the sort of
questioning that I think is necessary we end up by saying—or at least I did—that the
best version of the argument is an ‘epistemic’ version. This can cause discomfort for
separationists but it does not seem fatal.
There is therefore important motivation to consider the ideas of this chapter.
Furthermore, if nonseparationists are not careful, they will be open to a fatal attack.
The point is to argue that evaluative concepts cannot be separated into component
parts, and that they are essentially evaluative. In arguing for this claim, supposedly,
anti-separationists will point to the shapeless nature of evaluative concepts. But what
happens if the supposed shapelessness nature of evaluative concepts does not show
them to be essentially evaluative and, by implication, distinctly different from other
concepts? Indeed, the reasons why they are shapeless may have nothing to do with
the fact that they are evaluative, essential or otherwise. Väyrynen puts forward this
challenge and articulates it nicely.5 He argues that the shapelessness hypothesis cuts
no ice against his view that thick concepts are not essentially or inherently evaluative.
Consider OLD. This is a context-sensitive concept: an object can be considered to be
old in one context (or in comparison with a range of other objects) and yet
considered young in a different context. There is both a strong suspicion that there
is no way of capturing OLD in ‘non-OLD terms’, and that the context-sensitivity of OLD
is what explains its shapelessness with respect to the non-OLD.6 (A listing of examples
in non-OLD terms of the object-groups to which items considered OLD are compared
may very well fail to capture OLDNESS fully and deﬁnitively.) In addition, it seems
plausible to think of OLD as a descriptive concept. We can use it to convey pro or con
evaluations, such as when we insult someone by calling them old with a certain tone of
voice. But mature users of English know this evaluation is not core to the concept.
(Think of FAT and CHAIR from Chapter Two.) We can use OLD and many other examples
to then cast doubt on thick concepts. Many thick concepts seem to be context-sensitive,
and perhaps it is this that explains their shapelessness. Or perhaps there is some
5 Väyrynen (2013), pp. 186–202.
6 Presumably we can capture OLD using synonyms and other related concepts, such as AGED, NOT YOUNG,
and LONG-LIVED. What precisely is meant by ‘non-OLD terms’ need not hold us up; I take it that we have
enough sense of this in order for the point to go through.
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other reason than context-sensitivity that explains the shapelessness. What does not
explain it is something special about the evaluative, that these concepts are essentially
evaluative in a way that other concepts, such as OLD, are not.
Here is a quick link back. In §5.6 of Chapter Five we encountered claim (B) which
talked of evaluative concepts being essentially ‘human-laden’ (in a special way) since
they reﬂect our interests. But this is bluster, for many concepts, not just thick ones,
can be described in these terms. Väyrynen thinks that nonseparationists who use the
shapelessness hypothesis have to articulate the crucial difference between the evalu-
ative and the descriptive, so as to show why the evaluative—or the shapelessness of
the thickly evaluative—is different such that it justiﬁes the evaluative and thick
concepts as being treated as fundamental to our thought. He is sceptical that this
can be done.
I return to address this in Chapter Seven. For now we can agree that Väyrynen’s is
a good worry. In addition we can contrast his challenge with the challenge I set
myself. Instead of assuming that there is some dividing line between the evaluative
and the descriptive, and then being caught trying to articulate what that difference is,
I prefer to cast doubt on there being a dividing line in the ﬁrst place.
What of the ﬁrst argumentative strategy I built to in Chapter Four? The quick
debates at the end of that chapter were concerned with whether thin or thick
concepts were conceptually prior to the other. These may be instructive, although
we saw through my illustrative exchanges that pretty soon the debate may run out of
steam. I bring out a different point now in relation to this present chapter with a
simple question: why think that the thin is conceptually prior when you have not
given thought at the start to what the evaluative is? The assumption running though
the ﬁrst few chapters is that the thin just is the evaluative, and the thick is evalua-
tive-plus-something-else, with the debate about priority being presumed (either
implicitly or explicitly) on those terms: do we add something to evaluation that
exists prior, or do we take something away from the more complicated concept to
reach simple evaluation for all thin and thick concepts? What I am doing now is
explicitly thinking about the terms upon which this debate is built.
I pursue that task now and start by thinking about the work of Williams and Ryle.
6.3 Williams’ Distinction
The aim in this section and the next is to introduce the idea that standard thick
concepts have a number of functions and roles, and that we should not narrowly
pigeon-hole such concepts in the way that people sometimes do. As mentioned, this
will, I hope, warm us up for later thoughts to come later on.
Recall that Williams, in ELP, draws the distinction between thin and thick
concepts differently from how I and others draw it. He thinks of thin concepts as
being wholly action-guiding, and thick concepts as being both action-guiding and
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world-guided. This summarizing slogan, as I refer to it, is used by both Williams and
others to capture his views.7 Yet, his views are more subtle than this as I show.
However, even accepting that there is more detail to his view than the slogan
captures, I believe both that the slogan is a good way of capturing the foundational
point of ethical concepts, but also that this slogan is a bad way of capturing thin and
thick concepts in general, across many domains, and that even in the case of ethics it
hides important points.8 Williams may have been led to say what he says because of
his focus on ethical concepts, but even with that acknowledged we need to correct the
view that the slogan strongly implies. In doing so we begin to see what is going on
with the evaluative generally.
Let us consider the three main passages in ELP where Williams deﬁnes what he
means by a thick concept. In a ﬁrst passage he discusses the fact–value distinction,
where he is arguing against Hare and other prescriptivists.
What has happened is that the theorists [i.e. prescriptivists] have brought the fact–value
distinction to language rather than ﬁnding it revealed there. What they have found are a lot
of those ‘thicker’ or more speciﬁc ethical notions I have already referred to, such as treachery
and promise and brutality and courage, which seem to express a union of fact and value. The
way these notions are applied is determined by what the world is like (for instance, by how
someone has behaved), and yet, at the same time, their application usually involves a certain
valuation of the situation, of persons or actions. Moreover, they usually (though not necessarily
directly) provide reasons for action.9
Later he says:
Many exotic examples of these [thick concepts] can be drawn from other cultures, but there are
enough left in our own: coward, lie, brutality, gratitude, and so forth. They are characteristically
related to reasons for action. If a concept of this kind applies, this often provides someone with
a reason for action, though that reason need not be a decisive one and may be outweighed by
other reasons . . . Of course, exactly what reason for action is provided, and to whom, depends
on the situation, in ways that may well be governed by this and by other ethical concepts, but
some general connection with action is clear enough. We may say, summarily, that such
concepts are ‘action-guiding’.
At the same time, their application is guided by the world.10
Lastly he contrasts thick with thin concepts.
This brings us back to the question whether the reﬂective level might generate its own ethical
knowledge. . . . [I see] no hope of extending to this level the kind of world-guidedness we have
been considering in the case of the thick ethical concepts. Discussions at the reﬂective level, if
7 For example, see also Tappolet (2004) which casts Williams’ work in this way. Williams himself
indicates this slogan in the second quotation we are about to consider in the main text.
8 I admire Williams’ work a lot. Even if I differ in some respects, I agree with much of the spirit of his
writing. I leave to others to decide whether he would have agreed with some of the points I make here.
9 Williams (1985), pp. 129–30. 10 Williams (1985), pp. 140–1.
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they have the ambition of considering all ethical experience and arriving at the truth about the
ethical, will necessarily use the most general and abstract ethical concepts, such as ‘right’, and
those concepts do not display world-guidedness (which is why they were selected by prescrip-
tivism in its attempt to ﬁnd a pure evaluative element from which it could detach world-
guidedness).11
Certainly the summarizing slogan is not a wholly incorrect way of characterizing
Williams’ view. He considers thick and thin concepts to be different, and the latter
to be wholly action-guiding and to display no world-guidedness. Yet, there is more
to say.
Here are three brief points that indicate the detail. First, we might have to think
hard, in a way that Williams’ writing often invites us to, about how and when
concept-application will provide us with reasons to act. Williams seems to accept,
in the second passage, that because concepts ‘often’ provide people with reasons to
act, then they sometimes do not despite his insistence on the characteristic point of
them. Following on from this we can, second, think about Williams’ ﬁrst passage.
How is it that concepts offer or embody reasons ‘directly’, there and then in a
situation, and how and when do they guide action only indirectly? Perhaps indirect
guidance is provided when a type of action is described in a steady drip-drip sort of a
way, and action occurs only when the context is right. Third, and relatedly, we will
also have to think hard about the nature and character of the reasons that the
application of ethical concepts creates or embodies. This links in an obvious way to
Williams’ much-discussed distinction between internal and external reasons.12
Even if the summarizing slogan is a decent summary of Williams’ views, we can see
already that, as is often the case with summaries, it leaves much that is interesting
unsaid. That takes me to the next section.
6.4 Where the Slogan Goes Wrong
Williams clearly thinks of ‘action-guidingness’ as the central and foundational
characteristic or point of both thin and thick concepts. But his summarizing slogan
is misleading because it hides one qualiﬁer he explicitly makes: thick concepts often
provide reasons for action, not that they always do so. The slogan would lead
someone to think that Williams thinks the latter, but clearly it is the former he
advocates, and he is surely sensible to do so.
Indeed, we can see that as regards other sorts of evaluative concept, not only do
they sometimes not provide reasons for action, Williams thinks it is unwise to see
11 Williams (1985), pp. 151–2.
12 Williams (1981). For commentary on the tension between his work on thick concepts and his work
on internal reasons see Heuer (2013) and Wiland (2013).
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them as being characteristically related to action. Elsewhere in ELP, earlier than
the passages quoted above, he criticizes Hare for characterizing all evaluative con-
cepts along prescriptivist lines.
In saying that anything is good or bad, admirable or low, outstanding or inferior of its kind, we
are in effect telling others or ourselves to do something—as the explanation typically goes, to
choose something. All evaluation has to be linked to action.
This result is not easy to believe. It seems false to the spirit of many aesthetic evaluations, for
instance: it seems to require our basic perspective on the worth of pictures to be roughly that
of potential collectors. Even within the realm of the ethical, it is surely taking too narrow a
view of human merits to suppose that people recognized as good are people that we are being
told to imitate.13
The worry Williams has is that if all evaluation is linked to action then it reduces
the idea of evaluation to choosing, or promoting, or recommending, or doing
something beyond (or as part of) the act of categorization.14 When it comes to
aesthetic concepts, are we to assume that if we praise an outﬁt as glamorous, say, we
are expressing our desire and intention to wear it, or telling people to wear it, or
anything else similar? Clearly we do use aesthetic concepts in this way, but we do not
always do so.
Let me continue in this vein by detailing my previous sentence. First, no one
should doubt that we do use aesthetic concepts to guide action. It is not as if aesthetic
concepts exist in some ‘pure realm’ devoid of any connection to what we do. We
make choices and act on the basis of aesthetic categorization all the time. I choose to
wear an outﬁt because it is eye-catchingly beautiful, while you decline because you
think it is garish. We can also disagree about which people are attractive and swop
various evaluative concepts in our discussion. (Recall Betty and Frank from
Chapter Two.) Despite our disagreements about clothes and people, we may both
decide not to buy a certain novel because we have read a review of it that describes it
as naive and clunky. And so on.
These are contexts where a direct, unmediated choice is forced upon us, but
action-guidance can occur indirectly as well, even in the aesthetic realm. There
may be no intention in my mind at the time I categorize something using an aesthetic
concept, but there is no reason to think that a reason to act may not come later. My
evaluation of a book can lead you in future, when a direct choice faces you, to spend
your money in one direction and not another.
Yet, Williams is right in the passage to draw attention to the fact that we often do
not use aesthetic concepts in this way. We can pass judgement on outﬁts, novels, and
many other things with no intention at all to express our desires about them, or get
13 Williams (1985), p. 124.
14 The types of action I give are all positive. I could easily have listed refraining and dismissing as well,
for example.
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people to do things in relation to them.We simply wish to categorize them in a certain
way. Further, we use certain aesthetic concepts to explore what we think about them
and, indeed, to reveal their nature better. ‘Well, why is it naive? Mainly because the set-
pieces, though probably decent in the abstract, were too clunky and came too thick and
fast to allow the characters room to breathe.’We also use aesthetic concepts to contrast
one thing with another. Action-guidance might come, but it might not. The link
between concept-application and reason-giving might be so weak and tenuous that it
is misguided to speak of there being any link at all, even something indirect.
An advocate for the literal application of Williams’ slogan for all evaluative
concepts could counter by claiming that action-guidance will come at some point,
no matter how indirect. I am not so sure that it will. But even if it does, this objection
takes us down the wrong argumentative track. The present discussion is not con-
cerned with whether we can ﬁnd counter-examples to show that an evaluative
concept can be applied with no consequence at all for the guidance of action. The
debate is whether talk of ‘action-guidingness’ should be seen as the best way of
characterizing the fundamental nature of aesthetic concepts and, more broadly, all
evaluative concepts. On that point, just imagine that when reading ELP you had
come across this summarizing slogan: ‘thin aesthetic concepts are action-guiding,
while thick aesthetic concepts are both action-guiding and world-guided’. I suspect
any reader would have been a little unnerved. This surprise would have remained
even after digging beyond the slogan and acknowledging the qualiﬁers about the
frequency and directness of the action-guidance provided. It just seems wrong to
think that aesthetic concepts are primarily concerned with the guidance of action and
that casting them in this way reveals something fundamental about their nature.
Williams himself saw this.
That is enough for us to stop and say that Williams, or at least his slogan, was
wrong to characterize all thin and thick concepts in terms of the guidance of action.
As I have already said, perhaps his focus on ethical concepts led Williams to say what
he says about all evaluative concepts. But, beyond this, might we worry also about
ethical concepts? Notice that in the fourth passage quoted, although the focus is on
aesthetic concepts, Williams mentions ethical concepts at the end in the same regard.
I think there is a difference of degree between typical ethical and aesthetic
concepts. (The qualiﬁer ‘typical’ indicates the fact that I do not think we can be too
precise here.) Ethical concepts are more frequently and pointedly related to action
than aesthetic concepts are. Ethics seems to have at its core how we interact with
other people: how we treat them and how we respond to what they do. It seems to
involve the giving of guidance, the organization of our lives, and decisions about what
to do. It also covers the area of our lives where we categorize and decide what we do
for ourselves. (The overlap here with prudential concepts is obvious.) This is why
Williams’ summarizing slogan in a book about ethics does not surprise in the way
I imagined an ‘aesthetic version’ surprising us. There is nothing bad about saying that
ethical concepts are characteristically related to action, assuming that in doing this
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we are drawing a contrast with those evaluative concepts that are not characteristic-
ally like this.
Yet, I stress that even in the case of ethics we should not think that any sort of
problem is solved and that we can carry on blithely using the summarizing slogan.
The slogan hides Williams’ qualiﬁer about reasons for action only often being
provided. If there are cases where no reasons are provided, then those concepts
must have some other function or functions, at least on those occasions. And,
probably, they have this other function or functions on occasions where reasons
for action are provided. Indeed, it is obvious that ethical concepts can be used to
categorize and shape our view of things in a way that is unrelated to any attempt to
inﬂuence action. We just want to understand better in an ethical way what the thing
is like, and what our view of the thing is like. How does it compare with those other
things and how complex is it? Evaluative concepts allow us to do all of this, and
ethical concepts are no exception.
To drive the point home we can think about evaluative epistemic concepts such
as WISE, KNOWLEDGEABLE, DULL-WITTED, IGNORANT, GULLIBLE, CLEVER, SHREWD, and NAIVE.
Just as in the case of ethics we can describe these concepts as related to the guidance
of action. We choose one dictionary rather than another because we believe it is
more comprehensive, and we listen to the views of one person rather than another
because she understands better what is going on. But talking of action-guidance is
too broadbrush here, for it is obvious that there is a certain class of actions—if we
call them that—that epistemic concepts typically apply to. These concepts are
characteristically related to the formation of beliefs and the development of under-
standing. So if we were to form a summarizing slogan for epistemic concepts, we
might talk of ‘belief-formation’ or (the ugly) ‘understanding-enabling’, say, rather
than ‘action-guidance’.
However, as should be clear, I think we should try to resist the temptation to form
any such summarizing slogans. As in the case of ethics and aesthetics, epistemic
concepts do more than merely give guidance as to what beliefs we should form. We
also use them to categorize things in ways related to this aspect of our lives. Someone
may be described as knowledgeable without there being any intention that we should
go to her when we want to ask a question. And a scientiﬁc method may be described
as reliable merely so that we can distinguish it from its rivals. The moral here is that it
is a mistake to think that all evaluative concepts should be thought to be wholly about
the guidance of action or wholly about something else. Evaluative concepts have a
number of different roles, even those from within areas such as ethics or aesthetics. If
we are tempted to use summarizing slogans, we need to make clear that they are just
starting ideas from which we can extend our knowledge and which need to be
rethought in the light of further reﬂection.
Having said all of this, a reader might worry about my tendency throughout this
book to speak of thick concepts as being both evaluative and descriptive. I happen to
think these two labels are broader than Williams’. But the spirit of the charge may
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still stick: being wedded to these two labels rules out certain sorts of function that are
important when it comes to thick concepts. Indeed that is true. Ironically, the idea of
action-guidance is not obvious from talking of ‘the evaluative’. But to deﬂect this
charge the reader should realize that this whole book is an extended reﬂection on
what is meant by ‘the evaluative’ and ‘the descriptive’ in this context, and as I hope is
clear, I am happy to be generous and open-minded about what sorts of action or
function are encompassed by ‘the evaluative’.15
What of the other part of Williams’ slogan? Thick concepts are world-guided,
while thin concepts are not. This seems odd, at face value. Imagine the everyday
application of concepts and terms to the world. (Even separationists will be able to
entertain the idea that, at ﬁrst glance, evaluative concepts can be and are legitimately
applied to things.) At this level it seems obvious that people can be honest and
horrible, and that actions can be good and bad. The use of these concepts and terms
seems guided by how things are in the world, for there are many things in the world
to which these concepts and terms apply.
So the slogan has to be implying more than what it says simply on the surface, that
thick concepts are world-guided while thin concepts are not. As mentioned in
Chapter One, Williams thinks of thick concepts being more important than thin
ones. (He is the best example of a thick prioritarian.) The clue is in the fact,
mentioned in Chapter One, note 11, that Williams does not refer to ‘thin concepts’
by this label in ELP, but instead talks of the “most general and abstract concepts”, as
in the third passage above. Extrapolating, but only a little, we can form Williams’
view. Thick concepts give us a way of categorizing things. (Indeed, we might say that
the stuff of the world becomes isolatable and understandable as separate things partly
in virtue of our categorizations.) They are speciﬁc and relate to, and help to pick out,
aspects of individual things to which our attention is drawn. We note that some
things bear great similarities to each other, and when we apply a concept to one thing
we apply that same concept to another thing. And, in fact, concepts develop partly on
the basis that similarities are noticed by us. Crucially, for Williams’ view, some
evaluative concepts are very speciﬁc. Some less so. The really speciﬁc ones relate,
we can imagine, to only a few examples. The less speciﬁc the concept, the more likely
it is that it will apply to more things.16 We form less speciﬁc concepts often by
abstracting from the really speciﬁc concepts and the things to which they apply.
15 A small note about my argumentative strategy. Someone might be suspicious that in pushing this
generous account of what evaluative concepts are, I am simply helping myself to the liberal notion. Clearly
if this is what I was doing, then it would be suspect. However, what I take myself to be doing is to show that
it is good to be generous and open-minded about what thick evaluative concepts are since, later on, we will
see that it helps us make better sense of what they are like.
16 Note the qualiﬁers. There are possible worlds where there are few good things but many wicked
things, but that need not mean that GOOD is more speciﬁc than WICKED. Despite such examples, I think the
general identiﬁcation I make in the main text holds in this world, by and large.
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So, to take a family of examples I have already used, we can distinguish actions by
marking them with concepts such as SYMPATHETIC, EMPATHETIC, COMPASSIONATE, and
THOUGHTFUL. Despite the differences between these concepts and the examples they
apply to, most or all actions categorized with these concepts can be categorized using
KIND. Williams’ guiding thought is that thin concepts, such as GOOD and RIGHT, sit
at the top of our ‘abstraction tree’.17 They are the end point of many abstractions and,
as such, have little or no important connection with any of the things they are used to
categorize. They do not generate or ground the sort of evaluative knowledge that can
be used by a community to ward off any threat of relativism. They provide little
understanding of the world because they are so abstract and removed from what the
world is like. In short, they are not world-guided, but are merely thin content formed
from other, more speciﬁc concepts.
In conclusion, Williams’ detailed prose is, as one might well imagine, nuanced and
reﬂective. His slogan does not do his thoughts justice. I have no criticism to offer of
the slogan’s use of ‘world-guided’ in the way in which I criticized ‘action-guidance’.
I say more in Chapter Eight about evaluative knowledge picking up on my comments
just now about the ‘abstraction tree’. I think that Williams is too pessimistic about
thin concepts and sees them only through the prism of thick concepts. The reason for
me talking about world-guidance now is so that I can introduce Ryle’s work on the
idea of thick description. This allows me to reinforce my criticism of the slogan:
concepts, both individual concepts and concepts of a certain particular type, have a
variety of functions. Conveying this idea has been the main task of this section and
the one previous. Looking at Ryle will help us to broaden our understanding of what
is going on. This is all with a view to understanding the evaluative better.
6.5 Ryle on Thick Descriptions
I have three aims in this section. First, to understand Williams in the light of Ryle.
Second, to introduce the suggestion that thick concepts are a type of thick descrip-
tion, that is that they are a simple subset of the larger group. While this idea is partly
correct, matters are not as straightforward as they seem. Third, to set out Ryle’s
view of concepts. This takes us to §6.6 where I lay out my view of the evaluative
and defend it.
We can think about the idea of a thick description by starting with one of Ryle’s
examples from Ryle (1968). He thinks about how we distinguish different sorts
of wink. He imagines a succession of boys who wink in different ways and for
17 I would go further if I were Williams and say ‘PRO and CON’, but that is a small point. Aside from
which concepts sit at the top of the tree, Williams was also interested in criticizing fellow philosophers’
obsession with thin concepts, mainly GOOD, RIGHT, DUTY and the like. More in this day than in the mid-
1980s, PRO and CON seem appropriate focuses of this criticism, at least of some parts of our philosophical
community.
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different reasons.18 The ﬁrst boy has an involuntary twitch. The second winks
conspiratorially to an accomplice. Yet he does so in a slow, contorted, and conspicu-
ous manner. The third boy parodies the second in order to give malicious amusement
to his cronies. He acts clumsily, just as the second did, but he is not himself clumsy.
This third boy is later imagined in a different setting, and so becomes a fourth
example: he practises his parody and so rehearses for a (hoped-for) public perform-
ance. This boy is later imagined in another setting, thereby creating a ﬁfth example.
When winking he had not been trying to parody the second boy, but had been “trying
to gull the grown-ups into the false belief that he was trying to do so”.19
Ryle asks what is common to these examples. The obvious answer is the thinnest
description, such as ‘the boy contracted his eyelids’. Ryle thinks this applies to every
case, and we can say of each that there is a physical movement. However, he presses
two points. First, in order to distinguish the boys’ actions—note, not just their
physical movements—we need to employ thick descriptions. This need (which is
my word) is not just a matter of ease of language, that thick descriptions act merely as
summations of various (separable) elements that could be expressed without them if
only we had the time and patience. We need particular descriptions rather than
others because some actions are so complex that they cannot be separated into parts
that can be described separately. We can see this through a second point. Ryle argues
that the boy who winks conspiratorially does not do, say, ﬁve things that should be
treated as separate from one another: (i) winks deliberately, (ii) to someone in
particular, (ii) in order to impart a certain message, (iv) according to an understood
code, (v) without the cognizance of the rest of the company. For Ryle it is better to
describe the boy as doing one complex thing, something with a number of aspects,
rather than saying that the boy is doing ﬁve separate things at one and the same time.
In some cases of a particular action described in a particular way one can be
successful (or fail) in one aspect only if one is successful (or fail) in other aspects.
Ryle refers to clauses such as those just expressed as embodying ‘success-and-failure’
conditions, and this is a key point for him. Actions such as winks and conspiratorial
winks are to be distinguished from physical movements, such as involuntary
twitches, because the former have success-and-failure conditions, which in turn
guide us in our descriptions or, better, are embodied in our descriptions.
We can elaborate. Imagine an example one step on from Ryle’s list. A boy is both
parodying a fellow pupil, with the complexity familiar from above, and is trying to
win a girl’s heart. On some understandings of this description we can have a case
where not all aspects of the action stand or fall together: the success-and-failure
conditions are separate. The boy can parody the other pupil without trying to
impress the girl and he can impress the girl in all manner of ways. In the sort of
understanding I have in mind of this case it seems right to say that our winker is
18 The examples are introduced in various ways across pp. 494–6 of Ryle (1968).
19 Ryle (1968), p. 496.
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trying to do two things. In this case one part—‘trying to win a girl’s heart’—can be
dropped. That would change the action as described previously, but it seems as if we
have two actions that were conjoined anyway, all along, and dropping the one aspect
will leave the other intact and unchanged.
We could have had a different description—one that some readers may have in
mind—where aspects of the action might well stand or fall together: the boy is trying
to win the girls’ heart by parodying his fellow pupil. Perhaps someone corrects the
previous description: ‘No, Eric isn’t parodying Ernie and trying to win Vanessa’s
heart. He’s trying to impress her by impersonating his friend.’ Here I think it
plausible to say that the winker is doing only one complex thing.20
This shows how and why the description is paramount for Ryle. As we might term
it, there is the physical movement, which in this case is the contraction of the eyelids,
and there are the various actions. Each individual physical movement can be picked
out with the same thin description: ‘the boy’s eyelid contracted’. But for Ryle there
seems to be no one core thing that is the action in his examples which then gets added
to separable aspects, or to which separable aspects are added in order to create more
complex actions. So, to ﬁnish with my two cases just given, while in the ﬁrst case (the
one that employs ‘and’) dropping the part whereby Eric is imagined to be winning
the girl’s heart will not change the part or action where Eric is imagined to be
parodying Ernie, in the second case (‘by’) it is not obvious at all that a subtraction
of the former aspect will leave the latter aspect intact and unchanged.
We can generalize. If there is a range of similar actions such as Ryle’s range of
winks, described using related but different thick descriptions, then for Ryle there
need be no core that all has in exactly the same way. This is true even if we imagine
that the core is ‘the boy winked’. For a start, it will not cover our ﬁrst case, of the
involuntary twitcher. But also the ways in which people wink are different and
embody different success-and-failure conditions. There is no reason to think that
we have one thing, winking, which is exactly the same thing at the core of each action
to which we simply add separable aspects that do not change it in any way as we
move from case to case. This is why I talk of Ryle in this book. It is clear to me that
this idea of his is nonseparationist in outlook, even though we must grant that it is
not developed using or applied to evaluative concepts.
These points can be hard to see when it comes to winking simply because ‘wink’ is
often used colloquially to describe the physical act of contracting the eyelid. It is
easier to see the thought with the activity that is Ryle’s prime focus in his (1968),
namely thinking, for thinking is not colloquially thought of as a physical activity.
There are many types of thinking: pondering, meditating, coming to understand,
20 The ﬁnal remark of Ryle (1968) shows this perfectly. “A statesman signing his surname to a peace-
treaty is doing much more than inscribe the seven letters of his surname, but he is not doing many or any
more things. He is bringing the war to a close by inscribing the seven letters of his surname.” The word
‘things’ at the end of the ﬁrst sentence is key to understanding Ryle’s point.
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and so on. These examples are exempliﬁed in many ways: mental arithmetic, writing
on a piece of paper, chatting with others, arguing with others, manipulating some
wood, playing notes on a piano, picking food from a shelf, and so on.21 Are we
conﬁdent that there is one separable core activity called ‘thinking’ common to all
these examples that we could isolate and that stands revealed as the very same thing
in each instance? Can we also, therefore, imagine that we would then be left with one
or more separable element for each action that would be our remainder? The answer
is surely not an obvious yes, and, I think, we would and should be inclined to say no.
For Ryle, when we describe an action with a thick description, we are labelling
something that is a unitary thing.
Of course, in one sense all the examples of winking and thinking have something
in common, namely the former are all cases of winking and the latter are all cases of
thinking. But this simple, innocent point can lead us astray. It would be wrong to
move from this thought to think that there was a core, narrowly construed action of
winking or thinking that was divorced from all its instances and which was conjoined
with all the various aspects to create those individual instances. Instead, those aspects
of acts of winking and thinking help to us appreciate what winking and thinking are,
in a fuller way. This is why there is no simple subtraction from actions of certain
aspects that leaves the act of winking or thinking intact as before. From this we can
generalize, again.
In short Ryle thinks that we understand a concept only through its applications
and uses.22 Furthermore, we can make a point not just about us understanding
concepts, but a point about what concepts are. A concept is the abstraction from
words and phrases used in all manner of ways in various contexts.23 The various
inﬂections of meaning and the (sometimes) subtle differences in meaning across
context are such as to affect our appreciation of what a concept is and what an
associated term means, and all of this appreciation reveals to us what the concept is.
Think again about THINKING. For Ryle we appreciate what it is to think only if we
understand the various exempliﬁcations of the concept, which things count as
thinking and which do not. Someone playing on a piano ﬁddling around to ﬁnd a
tune can very well be thinking, and this sort of thinking differs from the thinking we
21 Some of these examples are from Tanney (2009), p. xviii. I categorically do not wish to suggest that
every instance of, say, playing notes on a piano is a type of thinking, just that some are. To elaborate these
examples: the physical activity is not something separate from the thinking. It is how the thinking is
exempliﬁed and how an idea, some inspiration or frustration, say, is worked through.
22 The resemblance to the later Wittgenstein on this point is striking, but I do not detail it here.
23 This applies also to technical words for Ryle. To take a much-used example, we might say that it is
discovered and stipulated that water is H2O. Fine. But non-scientists rarely encounter H2O. What most
people typically encounter is H2O with impurities of various sorts. Does that mean we should not call the
stuff in the bottles on our desks ‘water’? Do we have to say that it is just a shorthand? Do we have to say that
we have one word ‘water’ that, strictly, stands for two related concepts: the technical one and the everyday
one? These are options. Another option is to say that, despite ﬁrst appearances, WATER can legitimately be
applied to more than just pure H2O.
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typically experience in a philosophy seminar between two disputants trying out an
idea on one another or arguing with all guns blazing. It will also differ from idle
ﬁddling around on a piano when someone is not thinking about anything even a
tune, but is just, well, ﬁddling. Appreciating the similarities and differences of these
and other examples is simply to appreciate the contours of THINKING and how it can
be applied and withheld correctly and incorrectly, creatively and foolishly. Of course,
once we do that we will appreciate what THINKING stands for. So just on this basis it
would be wrong to say that there is no ﬁxed meaning for THINKING. THINKING means
whatever our investigation of its uses reveals. However, once we accept that there can
be all manner of different things that can be categorized as THINKING, with no core
element that THINKING stands for, we should appreciate that new uses will appear,
present uses will disappear and, therefore, that the concept itself, and not just
applications of it, can change.
Of course, one could say that thinking just means any sort of general mental
activity. But that seems only to give a deﬁnition by (trivial) synonymy. What we are
after is something deeper than that, something that allows us to apply and withhold
properly, something that allows us to connect it in meaningful, plausible ways to
other concepts. In order to do so, we have to get a handle of some of the uses familiar
to us and understand all aspects of acts of thinking.
Despite the claim that we can understand concepts only if we understand the many
and various contexts in which the concept is used, this is not to say that we have wild
and frequent changes in concepts’ meanings across such uses, at least for every
concept. (In the case of a supposed single concept, that might well point to us having
different concepts to cope with.) Instead, we can talk of there being a common root,
and rock-solid commonality, and other such things. Philosophers are important
because they can point out this fact and map the ways in which different concepts
work and their implications, as well as pointing out mistakes that fellow philosophers
have made.
All of the foregoing is no straightforward argument for Ryle’s view. But it is central
in the picture I am building for thick concepts. In brief, I think Ryle’s view about how
concepts and language work is right, and it will be key as we go through other ideas.
In short, I think that thick concepts are such that (i) we understand them only
through understanding how they are used, and (ii) the content of thick concepts, and
the meaning of thick terms, is given by how they are used. For now, two topics are left
for this section.
First, what of Williams in relation to Ryle? Quite simply, despite the suggestive and
interesting nature of his qualiﬁers, in my view Williams does not pay enough
attention to the ways in which various evaluative concepts are used, and from that
the various trends that become apparent. While many ethical concepts have success-
and-failure conditions that guide action, they often have conditions that do not
provide reasons to act at all. Williams I think is guilty of paying too much attention
to how some ethical concepts work on some occasions and not enough to the
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success-and-failure conditions that they and other evaluative concepts have. (This is
ironic given how much Williams bemoans modern philosophers’ ﬁxation on the
narrowly moral concepts associated with duty and obligation.)
So, for example, a concept such as HONEST can be used to guide action directly.24
But it can also be used to guide actions indirectly, and it can be used to evaluate
with no thought of the inﬂuence of action, and action to be guided in the future. It
can be used to compare. It can be used to voice hope, express relief and joy, and
many more things. It can be used of people, of actions, of institutions. It can
indicate a narrow judgement about a particular piece of language. It can be used
of a document and what is said between the lines. It can also be used of the
intentions of speakers and writers, and of their wider spirit of personality. Despite
all of these various uses, we typically are able to get a handle on the concept
through some process of abstraction, even if people will have different conceptions
of that concept.
Discussion of Williams and Ryle is therefore instructive. We have talked through
the idea that evaluative concepts can have a variety of functions and roles. We have
also seen suggested that many concepts, not just those regarded as straightforwardly
evaluative, can be understood through their uses. Such uses reveal that there is no
narrowly construed idea of a concept that, when it is applied, is applied in separation
from other aspects of the action that it is describing. Those other aspects enable us to
capture a mature understanding of the concept in question.
A second thought ends this section and sets up the next. A tempting idea moves
into view. Are thick concepts a type of thick description? It seems straightforward to
answer in the afﬁrmative. Thick descriptions are speciﬁc descriptions or, as we can
say with a little licence, speciﬁc concepts. Thick concepts are a type of speciﬁc
concept, namely speciﬁc evaluative concepts. Therefore thick concepts are a type of
thick description.
Now, it is not as if this is a terrible idea. But as with Williams’ summarizing slogan,
it requires pause for thought since it may hide important points. Talk of thick
evaluative concepts that are a type of thick description implies, strongly or weakly,
that there is a type (or there are types) of thick description that is (or are) not
evaluative. This talk of types may imply, strongly or weakly, that we can easily
divide the evaluative from the descriptive or nonevaluative along a neat line. It is
this implication that worries me and which we need to uncover and reﬂect
upon. How conﬁdent are we that we can divide in this way? In the next section
I suggest that we should be highly wary of being able to do so. We may not wish to
commit to any division at all or, if we do, we should be wary of thinking that it
lies where some writers think it does and wary that we can pinpoint its location
with conﬁdence.
24 I owe this example to Sophie-Grace Chappell.
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6.6 Evaluative Concepts
We now examine some ideas that move beyond the appreciation that concepts can
have a variety of functions. In the discussion of ethical, aesthetic, and epistemic
concepts we assumed that some function or functions other than the guidance of
action would still involve some explicit pro or con stance within the evaluation, be it
implied or just inferred. Yet, if we can now see that evaluative concepts can do a few
things, why think that the giving of, and the embodiment of, pro and con stances and
views is exhaustive of their nature?
I begin this section with some examples and then draw some morals.
(a) Some examples. Chapter Four saw us run through various concepts accepted as
thin which we saw come in a range of thicknesses. Even if we might accept that all of
these concepts are always used in pro or con ways—although I will come to that in a
little while—it is clear that the labels of the ‘simply’ or the ‘purely’ evaluative cover
more complexity than is acknowledged by separationists. And if we are comfortable
with that idea, we should consider if other concepts can be called evaluative, even if
they differ from each other and differ from the traditional diet of thin concepts. So we
need to motivate the idea that various concepts (not just thick ones) function in the
ways that those concepts routinely labelled as thick function. We then need to think
about the character of these concepts.
No one doubts that JUST and KIND, BEAUTIFUL, and WISE are thick concepts. Separa-
tionists may offer an analysis of them that I think is wrong, but that is a different
matter. They are not treated as descriptive concepts ﬁrst of all.25 We can move on a
little. Many theorists also routinely accept that KNOWLEDGEABLE and ELEGANT are thick
evaluative concepts. They clearly pick our speciﬁc features of people and objects in
the way that thick concepts routinely do. They are also often used in straightforward
pro (and con) ways.
Is a concept such as ELEGANT so different from concepts such as GROTESQUE and
MACABRE? We can certainly apply MACABRE in a way that indicates positive or negative
appraisals. We can praise a story for the macabre atmosphere that it creates,
given that we want something to spook us; Hallowe’en is no time for sugary fairy
tales. But we can also damn by calling something macabre: its sinister nature chills us
when we require something to soothe and comfort. We can also apply this concept
and be offering no obvious pro or con evaluation. We may call a thing macabre and
be trying to articulate its nature, either to others or to ourselves. We may also be
using this word to compare and contrast it with other things: ‘No, that is not fun, it is
macabre’ or ‘What fun! How macabre!’ Furthermore, we might be explaining
things: ‘It is terrifying because it is macabre.’ Calling something macabre seems to
25 At the very least, they are treated as descriptive concepts that often or always carry some pro or con
element with them.
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pinpoint the nature of something in a way that is more speciﬁc than calling it
terrifying, for example. This is also what we do with ELEGANT, I suggest. Although
we can praise the elegant, and often damn because something is elegant, we can apply
this concept simply to categorize, to compare, and to give conceptual shape to the
thing we are trying to understand.
Although I am often wary of looking at dictionary deﬁnitions in philosophical
contexts, the OED entry for ‘macabre’ mainly lists synonyms such as grim, horriﬁc,
and repulsive, all of which are suggestive of something negative. But, as we know
from LEWD and from human psychology, sometimes we can revel in the grim and
some people are drawn to things they conceive of as being repulsive.26
Similarly, consider GOSSIP. We can talk in a variety of ways and gossiping is one of
them. It is certainly more speciﬁc than COMMUNICATION, say, and something more than
and different from the idea of ‘sharing information’. Furthermore, we can damn a piece
of information as gossip, or revel in the loveliness of gossip, as well as enjoying the piece
of gossip we have just heard. The OED has: “ . . . idle talk; triﬂing or groundless rumour;
tittle-tattle. Also, in a more favourable sense: Easy, unrestrained talk or writing, esp.
about persons or social incidents.” We see here, as with MACABRE, the reliance on
synonyms, and also the switch from negative to positive. There is no clear ‘good’ or
‘bad’, let alone ‘pro’ or ‘con’mentioned, but no competent speaker of English could fail to
latch on to the positive and negative associations that occur in general with the concept
when it is used. And, similarly, we can classify and categorize some conversation as
GOSSIP, with no explicit pro or con point, in order to categorize it in a particular way.
The same is true of CAJOLE: it is a way of asking someone to do something and is,
to my ear, a little more speciﬁc than persuasion. We can persuade in many ways: with
threats, with explicit incentives. And cajoling, while it may use implied threats and
incentives, is something different. Importantly, we can praise a piece of persuasion by
calling it an instance of cajoling, and damn it as well. We can also, plainly, use it as a
way of indicating what the action was.
The OED has this, as a verb, “To prevail upon or get one’s way with (a person) by
delusive ﬂattery, specious promises, or any false means of persuasion.” Later, how-
ever, it also deﬁnes it in a more neutral way: one can persuade by ﬂattery, with the
‘delusive’ dropped.
I am building up the case that the difference in function and nature between the
routine diet of thick concepts name-checked by writers and these others concepts is
slight; indeed it might be non-existent. It is so slight, if it exists at all, that it does not
offend to call MACABRE, GOSSIP, and CAJOLE thick. Indeed, I reckon that before my
discussion we would have called them thick anyway.
26 That last comment takes us into deep waters, where we have to think about people being attracted to the
bad. I do not wish to wade too far in. I do not know about being attracted to the bad (rather than attracted to
things that one thinks others think are bad), but I do think that people can be (counterintuitively) attracted
to the repulsive and not just attracted to that which they acknowledge repulses others.
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Consider two more examples mentioned above. If we work only with concepts
such as JUST and KIND then it would be understandable to class an adjective such as
CONTORTED and a noun such as MEDITATION as nonevaluative, descriptive concepts.
However, we do use such concepts with explicit pro and con views in mind, even if
we do so in fewer cases than we do with JUST and KIND. Poems and dancers can be
damned for being contorted, but they can also be admired for the same reason. Some
academic can praise another for work that has come out of some serious meditation
on a problem, and praise the activity of this special sort of thought itself. We can
also bemoan the meditation and endless thinking going on when what we really
want is action.
Again, the OED’s deﬁnitions are interesting here. For ‘meditation’ we ﬁrst of
all have “to consider thoughtfully”, and “to consider deeply”, and later on “serious
continuous contemplation”. It is not obvious to me that these ideas are wholly
nonevaluative. We can say similar things about CONTORTION: the idea here is of
something that is uncomfortable, strenuous, and unusual. These words are not
neutral: they have strong negative associations. But they have positive ones also:
sometimes it is good to make ourselves uncomfortable, both physically and mentally.
Yet more concepts are worth mentioning. Gibbard’s analysis of LEWD employs what,
to my mind, is an example ripe for the same treatment, namely WARRANTED.
(I mentioned this niggle in passing in Chapter Five, §5.4(c).) When we categorize a
piece of behaviour or a belief as warranted we are saying that it is the sort of thing
that is allowed and authorized. By implication we are saying that the thing is good in
a certain sort of way. So it is not just good simpliciter.27 Similarly, when we say that
something, for example a belief, is justiﬁed, we say that there is some special
link between it and some piece of evidence that shows the belief to be a good one
to hold in some way.
Yet more. Earlier in this study I said that someone who was wise had sufﬁcient
understanding and relevant knowledge. Words such as ‘sufﬁcient’ and ‘relevant’ are
in the same boat as ‘warranted’. We are marking out a certain sort of understanding
as sufﬁcient, just the right amount (of understanding) to allow us to categorize
something in a certain way (a person as wise, say). When we call something relevant
we are saying that it is linked to the thing in which we are interested in the right sort
of way. And, we can further specify ‘right way’ depending on the things in question:
something can be linked to something else such that it is relevant because it
illuminates the thing, or is useful for the thing, or something else. Importantly, it is
not just right simpliciter, but is right in a particular way, for a particular reason, a
reason that may be explained only using other concepts that (I suspect) are evalu-
ative. Knowing when something is relevant will involve the exercise of judgement.
27 Dancy (1995), §VIII mentions this point and discusses and extends it in a way similar to how I do:
introducing the notion of the good or right sort of way immediately takes us back to the evaluative and the
thick.
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It seems we can talk in this way at will. We can say that if something is relevant to
something else we think it is good in a way, a way that may be illuminating and
useful. Similarly, if something is useful, it allows us to do something that we want to
do. Also, if something allows something else, it permits or eases the path of that
something where before there may have been barriers of a kind. And so on.
In all of these cases, and many more, we have concepts and ideas that are
sometimes used in overtly pro and con ways and sometimes not. There may be
some variation between these concepts as to how frequently they are used in pro and
con ways, or the signiﬁcance of those occasions when they do so, and what types of
instance of concept application are considered canonical and exemplary.
One last line of examples. Let us go back to those concepts thought to be thin or
fairly thin: DUTY (or DUTIFUL), OUGHT, ACCEPTABLE, APPROPRIATE, and the like, concepts
that easily shade into JUST and FAIR. We will often use such words to praise and to
indicate something positive, and their antonyms are used negatively. But often we
just report that something is someone’s duty or that someone is being dutiful, or that
something because it is appropriate ﬁts well in the situation or with other things.
Such uses have the potential to lead to praise or to negative judgement, but they need
not be used in this manner directly and immediately. They operate in similar ways to
the other examples of this section.
(b) Some morals. There was a lot going on with these examples. Let us draw matters
out slowly over the next few sub-sections. I start with our big themes.
(i) The liberal view of evaluation. One more reminder. The conservative view of
evaluation categorizes concepts as evaluative concepts only if those concepts are
used routinely in an obviously pro or con way. The liberal view of evaluation views
evaluation as encompassing pro and con, but it does not conﬁne the nature of
evaluation to such matters. It allows that a concept can be an evaluative concept
and yet, on certain instances when it is used (sincerely and straightforwardly), there
be no positive or negative stance as part of its use and this not threaten the fact that it
is an evaluative concept, either overall or in that particular instance of its use.
In cases where we have a term being used with no obvious positive or negative view
at all, conservatives are likely to say one of two things: either that we have the same
word, but a different concept in play; or that we have a single concept across these
different uses, but that the concept is not evaluative, and when it is used evaluatively
such pro and con evaluations are accidental to the concept, contingent add-ons
conveyed through tone of voice for example, and implied and inferred through
conventional means.
Note that I am not arguing that any concept used in an evaluative way in an
instance can be, or even that it has to be, an evaluative concept. I am interested
only in negating the conservative view. I think that concepts can be evaluative even
if at times they do not convey some pro or con view at all. Note also two more
extreme views that I do not favour. The radical view says that a concept can be an
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evaluative concept and there be no instance of its use that has a simple, obvious, pro
or con stance to it. The crazy view says that an evaluative concept must not have any
instances that have any pro or con stances to them. I use these as contrasts to
underline the fact that I think that there must be some clear instances of pro
and/or con use for a concept to count as an evaluative concept. I explain why later.
So why hold the liberal view? To motivate it, consider those two options conser-
vatives have to take when it comes to our examples above. The ﬁrst says that all of
these examples are not evaluative. This does not hold water. Not only can we see that
these examples are routinely used to indicate pro and con views (even if they are not
used in this way every single time), we can also see that those fairly thin concepts such
as DUTY and OUGHT are used in this way too. Does it seem useful or plausible to restrict
our notion of what an evaluative concept is simply to GOOD and RIGHT, or just PRO and
CON?28 I suggest that it is not, and that we do not treat examples from above in this way.
Second, conservatives could say that words can cover a range of concepts, given
with different tones of voice or similar—our familiar MACABRE-PRO, MACABRE-CON, and
MACABRE-NEUTRAL—and that only some of these concepts are evaluative, those with
the –PRO and –CON sufﬁxes. (The same can be said for DUTY-PRO and DUTY-CON, of
course.) Does this stance hold water?
We saw when discussing Williams and Ryle that concepts may do many things:
predominantly guide action and judgement, categorize objects, and express positive
and negative stances. Further, I outlined Ryle’s view that the nature or content of
concepts is constructed from the ways in which we use and apply them. We get a
sense of what the limits of acceptability are and what things are relevant to what other
things only through understanding the types of example which fall under the concept
and the ways in which the concept and associated term are employed across many
instances. The mastery of a concept comes when we appreciate the point of the
concept, how it can be used and what various parts of the concept really stand for.
I agree that we should take a holistic approach to such understanding. When I say of
a novel that it was macabre, and do not intend praise or blame or anything else
positive or negative, I am still offering evaluation of it (that is, there is still evaluative
content), because my categorization of it in this instance relies on, or is an expression
of, an understanding that encompasses times and instances when there are explicit
types of praise and blame or other positive and negative reactions. The content of
macabre—what this means and how it applies—relies on all sorts of instances. If
I cannot understand when to offer and withhold the concept, when it can be used
creatively and foolishly, when it can be used positively or negatively, and why, then
I do not understand what it is for something to be macabre. Aside from this instance,
I might be asked to explain what MACABRE is and doing so will require my drawing on
an appreciation from a number of different examples.
28 It is at this point in the argument that my consideration of Vayrynen’s argument in Chapter Seven is
relevant.
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I think that all of this tells strongly against the conservative option that we should
restrict ‘the evaluative’ to a very small number of concepts such as GOOD and BAD, and
for all the rest multiply concepts in the manner indicated. It seems far better to start
with the view that some or many concepts will have a variety of functions, even if not
every single use is exempliﬁed in every instance. Given how important it often is for
some concepts, such as MACABRE or SHREWD, to convey pro and con stances, then this is
enough to call them evaluative overall.
Furthermore, this idea leads to the following crucial point. All the foregoing tells in
favour of there being some special evaluative content that is not exhausted by pro and
con views. One’s understanding of what it is for anything to be MACABRE, and the
meaning of ‘macabre’ and what ‘macabre-ness’ is, seem to be based on a variety of
uses, and one’s understanding synthesizes and encapsulates them (or at least those
uses we think of as signiﬁcant, core, and exemplary). When nonseparationists talk,
perhaps too loosely, of there being intermingling that offers us nonreductive, non-
separable conceptual content, perhaps it is this idea to which they point. Partly
through those uses of MACABRE that convey pro and con stances, the whole of the
concept exempliﬁes or is something evaluative. Likewise, partly through the particu-
lar uses that have no obvious pro or con stances we can appreciate the special nature
of why and how something MACABRE can be thought of in a positive or negative way.
Sure, this concept is more speciﬁc than GOOD, but it is evaluative all the same.
One further note. This explains why I do not favour the crazy and radical views,
mentioned earlier. I think that one has to have some instances of clear positive and
negative usage for a concept to count as evaluative because of my reliance on one’s
use of the concept across many instances.29
29 This is probably the best place for me to discuss Debbie Roberts’ view. In Roberts (2013) she outlines
a very similar view to mine, where she makes the case for the ‘Inclusive View’. The Inclusive View is the
view that thick concepts have or just embody completely (in my terms), nonseparable evaluative content.
Roberts and I are in broad and deep agreement. However, there are some details that may indicate
disagreement, although in the end they do not. Two notable ones are worth drawing attention to. (Note
that Väyrynen (2013), p. 210, note 51, highlights the ﬁrst point as a potential difference, although this is
because he does not go into detail and sharply distinguish the views I have called ‘conservative’, ‘liberal’,
‘radical’, and ‘crazy’.) (a) I am happy to say that on some if not many occasions thick concepts can be used
to convey some pro or con stance. Furthermore, I think that the possibility of them being used in this way
is something essential to how it is that they are evaluative concepts. And, relatedly, I use this idea to
motivate why they can be thought to be evaluative concepts and why this content is special. This is all
consistent with thinking that thick concepts’ evaluative content is not to be exhausted by PRO and CON. But
I do wish to turn my back on the crazy and radical views, as indicated in the main text. What of Roberts?
In Roberts (2013) she sets out a view that thick concepts have content that one can call evaluative and
where “a plausible case can be made that they do not encode particular thin evaluations in their content”
(p. 79). Is this a clear difference between us, particularly with her talk of ‘encoding’ and my extended
discussion that stresses the appreciation of concepts across many instances? On paper this difference may
be only a matter of emphasis rather than clear opposition anyway, but in personal correspondence Roberts
said that she found my position attractive and hoped that what she said in Roberts (2013) did not count
against my position. (b) She focuses on the question of what it takes for a concept to be evaluative. For
example, she considers essential contestability. This could be, and has been, misinterpreted. For a start,
many of the conditions she picks out may not work. (Väyrynen, (2014) is a pretty good examination and
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Of course, one obvious challenge leaps out from this. How can we tell when a
concept is evaluative and when it is not? Is it because of the number of times in which
it is used with pro and con point? Perhaps. Is it because of the signiﬁcance of those
uses to how we understand the concept? Probably. Despite my comments, can we
really think of CONTORTED or SIMILAR as evaluative? I think we should. But my point
here is that such classiﬁcations will be matters of judgement, debate, and reasoning
across a community of mature concept users.
All of this discussion—in this sub-section and perhaps the whole book—may be
frustrating for some readers. They may acknowledge that I am arguing against a
particular view of evaluation that is characterized in terms of pro and con stances,
and they may understand my claim that the evaluative is more than that. They may
even agree to a greater or lesser extent. However, the frustrated cry may still go up,
‘But what is your view of evaluation? If it isn’t pro or con, of exhausted by these
stances, then what is it?’ I can appreciate that there may be some frustration, but such
a worry starts from a wrong assumption. The worry is predicated on the idea that in
articulating a different view of evaluation, my task is (and has to be) to replace one
deﬁnition—‘to be evaluative a concept must express a pro or con stance’—with
another, where that replacement gives a deﬁnition in terms of a similarly grained
term or set of terms. Or in other words, one may think that the task of this whole
study is (and has to be) to ﬁll in the schema ‘evaluation is or equals x’ where x is at the
same conceptual or terminological level as ‘pro or con stance’. However, this is not
the task in this study at all. I do not believe that this is the only way to articulate a
positive view in general, nor is it what I do here. Positive accounts of ideas can be cast
in these ways. But sometimes—and certainly here—a view can make a positive
advance both by showing that a way of casting some central term or idea is not the
full picture, and by showing people what else is part of that picture, even if what is
then put forward as the replacement is not a deﬁnite thing or term. Furthermore,
I strongly believe that evaluation cannot be articulated as a speciﬁc thing or things
(such as pro and con stance) that can be treated as different from itself such that a
meaningful characterization is produced. My whole, positive view of what it is for a
concept to be evaluative is that such concepts have multi-various functions: they
attack on the condition of essential contestability being a necessary condition of the evaluative, and there
is a general discussion of such marks in Väyrynen (2013), pp. 208–13.) But, more importantly, use of
‘marks’may suggest that Roberts is interested in providing necessary and sufﬁcient conditions that help to
ﬁx what it is for a concept to be evaluative. I have explicitly set my face against this strategy, and in
personal correspondence Roberts has said that she is also not interested in doing this. That is why she
chose the term ‘marks’. Unfortunately, Väyrynen clearly thinks of these ‘marks’ as necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions. Terminology is always difﬁcult here. If I had to pick any one term to try to summarize some of
the aspects that evaluative concepts typically have and which nonevaluative concepts may not have,
I would use the word ‘trend’, or even the phrase ‘broad trend’. Whatever term we pick, Roberts and I agree
that it is essential for the sort of position we defend that it is stated explicitly that one should be wary of
being sucked into a philosophical game of trying to deﬁne that which cannot be deﬁned at a particular
level of detail in an exact and speciﬁc manner.
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encompass the ability to praise and blame, and express positive and negative stances,
certainly (and with that they can motivate and provide reasons for action), but they
can also simply offer speciﬁc understandings of how the world is that do not have to
cast the world in obviously positive and negative ways. When we call a concept
‘evaluative’ we have in mind a looser sense than separationists, say, typically give.
Separationists, among others, are guilty of fastening onto one aspect, albeit an
important one, which evaluative concepts have. Evaluation and evaluative concepts
are fundamental sorts of understandings or characterizations of the world and its
parts, characterizations which I do not believe it is helpful to pin down exclusively to
an expression of clear positive or negative stance. So, if put on the spot and asked
what I think evaluative concepts are, I would say that they are fundamentally
evaluative concepts. What links all of the examples I have been discussing in this
chapter and elsewhere is the fact that we treat and use them as evaluative because
they help to articulate particular ways of viewing the world. To get a better sense of
what ‘evaluative’ means here one has to see how the terms and concepts typically
treated as evaluative are used in many different situations, rather than trying to offer
a deﬁnite term with deﬁnes evaluation. There is no magic x here with which I wish to
replace ‘pro and con stance’.
It is time to move to a different related discussion. Much of the above leads us to
think about whether there is a supposed dividing line between the evaluative and the
rest. After all, there are many ways of speciﬁcally understanding the world. Surely not
all of them can be evaluative?
(ii) The evaluative and the descriptive. I repeat again that I think there are some
concepts that are clearly and essentially evaluative by separationist lights; presumably
this camp includes GOOD and BAD. Some separationists may now wonder if DUTY and
OUGHT and APPROPRIATE should be included. Imagine they do. They may also think of
JUST and FAIR as being initially evaluative concepts, but they will not treat such
concepts as essentially evaluative since they can be separated into component
parts. And on the other side of matters, there are many, many concepts that seem
ripe to be classed as descriptive, nonevaluative concepts. CHAIR has been my favourite
example in this study, and such an example suggests many, many more. Nouns such as
AEROPLANE, PEN, COMMITTEE, BOOK, HEAD, ENTROPY, and ELEPHANT; verbs such as CHARGE,
SHAKE, JUMP, EAT, and SPEND; and adjectives such as BROWN, METALLIC, and LARGE. I just
want to make the case that there are some concepts that can be seen as evaluative, and
by their nature call into question the idea that we have a sharp dividing line between
evaluative concepts and others.
This raises a few questions. First of all, we can call into question a (deliberate)
identiﬁcation I have made through this study. I think that when focusing on other
matters it is perfectly ﬁne and philosophically innocent to treat as synonymous ‘the
descriptive’ and ‘the nonevaluative’. But right now we are considering the categories
as a whole and thinking what, if anything, stands opposed to, or at least is different
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from, ‘the evaluative’. To treat as central the label of ‘the nonevaluative’ in this regard
invites the accusation that my thinking is muddled, for I am labelling the different
camp of ‘the evaluative’ with a label that indicates a polar opposite and which
assumes a difference in kind. I have turned my back on this type of clear division.
Let me make something clear. I do think it is philosophically ﬁne and innocent to
begin by treating as synonymous ‘the nonevaluative’ and ‘the descriptive’, if only to
get us into the right frame of mind to realize that there is an interesting question to be
considered about how these categories relate to the evaluative and what the character
of thick concepts is. But an innocent labelling should not be enough to stop the
position I articulate here. The real action concerns what lies behind the labels, namely
the character of the examples we consider. We should not confuse labelling for
argument, either an argument against my view or an argument for views I oppose.
Indeed, it is clear that one should use these labels only after one has thought about the
character of the concepts that one is putting into each camp, and thought through
whether one wants to support or oppose a clear and exact division between the camps.
And this brings me to the examples I laid out above. Moving from RIGHT to JUST to
ELEGANT to MACABRE to TWISTED to SIMILAR to ALLOW should invite us to question
whether we have such a clear and exact division between the camps of the evaluative
and the descriptive, even if, as I keep on repeating, we think there are obvious
examples of both sorts. I want to call into question, through my reﬂection on the
examples above and many other points made in this study, whether the difference
between them is so clear and exacting. I doubt that it is. The only sound basis for
there being such a clear and exact division, it seems to me, is to take some very
conservative line that only a concept that is used in a clear pro or con way in every
instance deserves the label of being an evaluative concept. That has the philosophical
virtue of being simple and clear. Yet, I think my examples throw doubt on this view
for we simply do not treat concepts in this way.
This idea that we have some difference but no clear and exact difference or division
(or whatever it is one calls it) may seem strange. But I am not the only one to think it
to be perfectly acceptable. Hilary Putnam casts doubt on what he calls the fact–value
‘dichotomy’ (which is what I am doing, in effect) in part by drawing the historical
threads that led to its adoption, from classical empiricism, through Kant’s discussion
of the analytic and the synthetic, and to logical positivism.30 For Putnam, to adopt a
dichotomy is to do something far from philosophically innocent. It is to make a
metaphysical and/or conceptual decision that the two items that one marks as
different are polar opposites and that they, therefore, exclude one another, with no
relevant example being able to occupy both camps. His recurring phrase is that the
fact–value dichotomy assumes an “omnipresent and all-important gulf ”, and he
reaches the same conclusions as I do, that there is no real argument for this gulf,
30 Putnam (2002), especially chapters 1 and 2. I also referred to this in Chapter One.
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and that our practices do not bear it out anyway. At one stage he concludes, when
thinking about how we should classify the principles of mathematics and how they
seem unlike both paradigm examples of analytic truths and descriptive truths, “This
illustrates one difference between an ordinary distinction and a metaphysical dichot-
omy: ordinary distinctions have ranges of application, and we are not surprised if
they do not always apply.”31 We might distinguish the evaluative from the descrip-
tive, but there will be many examples where a (sharp) distinction does not apply and
where our categories may fail us, if we assume that they have to be sharp.
To make clear, in the above discussion I have assumed not just that there is a grey
area, but that there is enough in our examples to justify us calling many examples
evaluative. If arguments from authority hold any weight, then it worth noting that
although he does not go into detail about many examples, when thinking about
scientiﬁc practices and concepts Putnam does assume that COHERENCE and SIMPLICITY
are evaluative concepts.32
This takes me to some more examples. Think about the examples named as
obvious cases of descriptive concepts at the start of this sub-section. Now recall
OLD. At the start of this chapter I used as OLD as an example of a descriptive concept in
order to make a point about context-sensitivity. But we might ask whether it is so
different from RELEVANT. Both seem to be applicable because of the context in which
they are used, both enable us to compare one item with another or more. Both can be
used to convey pro and con points. So are these descriptive, evaluative, or what?
Perhaps annoyingly I am not going to be drawn into making a deﬁnitive pronounce-
ment, although my hunch is that RELEVANT sits more towards standard evaluative
concepts than OLD does. I think we need to look at how people use these concepts,
how often and how signiﬁcant clear pro and con points are conveyed, how often they
are used alongside evaluative concepts to help reinforce a judgement overall, and so
on. In short, whether something is an evaluative concept is a matter of communal
judgement. There are no necessary conditions that can be articulated to decide
deﬁnitively that something is evaluative.
(iii) Evaluation all the way down. Notice that when giving those OED deﬁnitions we
saw other thick terms making appearances. That has happened every so often
through this study. This takes us to an important idea. Some people think that
evaluative concepts go ‘all the way down’.33
A standard model of thought might be that we have thin evaluative concepts at the
top, with thick concepts coming next. Perhaps the former, plus some descriptive
content, help to form the latter. Perhaps thin concepts are simply abstracted from the
latter. Whatever story we adopt, it is tempting to think that there is a level below the
31 Putnam (2002), p. 11. 32 Putnam (2002), p. 31.
33 Jonathan Dancy has shared this view with me in conversation. See also Grifﬁn (1996), chapter III,
although he focuses on properties and supervenience.
THICK EVALUATION 
thick. In this level are wholly descriptive, nonevaluative concepts. This account can
be challenged, however. Is it so obvious that we can eventually get to some rock-
bottom regarding our concepts, where this ﬁnal level is understood as a place where
there are no evaluative concepts whatsoever? It may be possible to exorcise all
reference to PRO and CON, but that may be a different matter.
Consider yet another example. In Chapter Five §5.5 I gave the example of a kind
action in which someone gave up a seat on the bus because an old lady needed it.
What is it to need something? In the example it does not stretch a point to imagine
that in everyday speech we would say that an old lady might need a seat on a bus,
particularly if we give more detail to picture her as somewhat frail and carrying heavy
shopping bags. But it is not as if she will die if she does not sit down, in my example at
least. She would just have to endure some discomfort for a ﬁfteen-minute bus
ride. Clearly NEED is a context-sensitive concept: while it may be true in one context,
or compared to one standard, that the old lady needs to sit down, when compared
to another standard and set of concerns, she does not need to sit down even though
it may be nice if she does so. Despite our recognition that the concept works
contextually, that does not stop us from thinking that NEED here is in an evaluative
fashion. The general meaning is clear and unambiguous, no matter what the stand-
ard: if we need something then that something has to happen otherwise something
serious (or relatively serious) will occur, and that serious thing is typically unwanted.
But SERIOUS looks as if it is a qualiﬁer that works in a way similar to RELEVANT
and SUFFICIENT.
To take us back to the main track, in our explicit deﬁnition of NEED we are highly
likely to have to refer to other concepts that can be considered to be evaluative in the
same sort of way and for the reasons outlined previously. If we try to redeﬁne SERIOUS,
say, thenwewill encounter exactly the same situation, andwewillﬁnd that the evaluative
goes all the way down or, what amounts to the same thing, that it is inescapable.
When I previously discussed this example in the context of the shapelessness
hypothesis, I said that we can easily separate a one-off instance into evaluative and
descriptive elements; the debate is whether we can do so for the concept as a whole.
But that assumption is now being questioned. When we take away the bare approval
of the individual action, we are left with elements of a situation that themselves, or
the concepts use to categorize them, seem evaluative.
We can refer back to make an important point. I ﬁnd Elstein and Hurka’s take on
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE from Chapter Two to be a bit of a cheat. They have ‘blank’
placeholders for the supposed descriptive conceptual content that Rawls or Nozick
(and their supporters) will use to ﬁll out their deﬁnitions. But what would Rawls and
Nozick plug in for X, Y, and Z? Rawls might have: is a distribution ‘chosen under
conditions of fairness’. Yet, that introduces an obviously thick term. What about
‘chosen under conditions of ignorance of one’s place after the resources are distrib-
uted’? Well, that is better, but it is not as if a person has to be ignorant of everything
about themselves according to Rawls, nor would that be a good idea, I think. It is only
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relevant and signiﬁcant pieces of information that someone has to be ignorant of.
And that introduces two concepts that I am suggesting can be conceived to be
evaluative. Also, for that matter, what sorts of resource are going to count? The
relevance of the knowledge is intimately related to the resources to be distributed in
Rawls’ system, and perhaps any liberal system such as his. Similar thoughts affect the
choice facing Nozick and his supporters. What counts as an acquisition? As Nozick’s
comments about labour-mixing show, for him it has to be something obtained by
someone in the right sort of way for the correct reason in the appropriate circum-
stances.34 Specifying the right sort of way and the appropriate circumstances can be
done only with reference to other suspiciously evaluative concepts such as RELEVANT,
IMPROVEMENT, and ENOUGH.
All of this highlights a contrast. I have been talking of the right sort of way, or good
for a particular reason. The contention behind this is that there is no way of
characterizing what is going on unless we employ a thick concept: the rightness of
the way and the reason for it are united and, in fact, a single unitary item with two
aspects. In Chapter Two Elstein and Hurka’s proposals were characterized as indi-
cating that we could pick out some (separable) descriptive content to include in our
analysis of a concept if we approved of it, that is if there was approval simpliciter. But
talk of approval simpliciter is a ﬁction in this debate. We need to be able to specify the
reason why, and we either think we can (be certain that we can) specify this
completely in descriptive terms—which I have argued is not straightforward by
any means—or do so in obvious thick terms.
We need to pause here to highlight the point of all this discussion. My overall aim
in this book is to argue that thick concepts are unitary concepts, and that we can
speak justiﬁably of there being nonseparable thick evaluative conceptual content.
I have suggested that the domain of the evaluative seems to stretch further than one
might initially think and, moreover, that the evaluative-descriptive boundary is a grey
one. In order to undercut all of this, my separationist opponents need to be able to
analyse concepts as products of distinct elements. But at each turn we have seen
doubt cast on the idea that we can analyse thick concepts in terms of some thin or
(supposedly) pure evaluation plus some nonevaluative conceptual content. It is not clear
at all, and indeed very doubtful, whether we have the sorts of nonevaluative conceptual
content to do the job, content that allows one to map fully the large variety of evaluative
concepts that we use. CHAIR and the like will not be sufﬁcient in the slightest. We need
concepts such as ALLOW, SUFFICIENT, NEED, and TWISTED. If they operate, as they seem to,
like ELEGANT, MACABRE, BENEVOLENT, and SHREWD then it is highly unlikely that we can
separate thick concepts in the manner envisaged by my opponents.
Alongside this it seems right, to my mind, to make the extra leap of categorization
and classify thick concepts, and their content, as evaluative, that is as purely, wholly
34 Nozick (1974), pp. 174–8.
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evaluative. We saw an inkling of this in Chapter Four. The range of thin concepts—
which may differ slightly in their thick–thin speciﬁcity—are all routinely thought of
by philosophers as purely and wholly evaluative. Why not say the same about the
thick concepts in this chapter? The fact that these concepts also alight on and help to
pick out features of the world should not blind us. We should move away from the
thought that to be purely evaluative is something that is exhausted by an expression
of positive and negative view. An appreciation of such views and when and why to
express them is something that is core to what it is to appreciate and use an evaluative
concept. (This was part of the moral from Ryle.) Furthermore, collecting together
certain features and viewing them as a collection is part of what it is to express an
evaluative view of the world. It is not just any set of concepts that can be joined
together, and joined together with a certain positive or negative view. (We saw this
just now when discussing Elstein and Hurka.35) There is, of course, the extra point
that at some level of description we may be alighting on features that themselves may
well be evaluative, features such as the fact that someone needs something, or that if
I do something it will allow someone to do something else.
In short, when one scratches the phenomena surrounding thick concepts and their
use, there is little to persuade one to adopt a separationist stance. In contrast, there is
much to persuade one of the merits of nonseparationism, and a particular version at
that, one that takes seriously the idea that it is worth calling such concepts purely and
wholly evaluative. It is just that this occasions serious thought about what ‘the
evaluative’ is or could be.
(iv) Evaluative ﬂexibility. In Chapter Three I indicated some initial reason for
adopting evaluative ﬂexibility. Now I indicate ﬁnal support for this view by showing
how it knits with other ideas I have put forward.
The link is a clear one. I believe that the best strategy that nonseparationists can
adopt is one that questions what the evaluative and the descriptive are in the ﬁrst
place, rather than simply agreeing with the separationist terms of the debate that
these two sorts of content intermingle in some way. If they do that, then we have to
think about what the evaluative is and they have to motivate the case that thick
evaluative content is nonseparable. I think that the best way to do that is to think
hard about the various uses that concepts can occupy and to show that there are
various uses. In which case, embracing evaluative ﬂexibility helps and strengthens the
overall case, for all that this view says is that a single concept can have pro, con, and
neutral uses across a range of instances, just the sort of thing that nonseparationists
need to employ to motivate the best version of their view.
This view is to be found in Dancy (1995). In this Dancy considers Blackburn’s
claim (from Blackburn (1992)), that separationists (that is, noncognitivists) have an
advantage: they can accommodate the idea that a concept can be employed in
35 Below I underline this point with thoughts from Foot.
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different situations with different evaluative points—variations on PRO and CON—
whereas nonseparationists cannot do this because they are stuck with the idea that
each concept has an evaluative point, which has to be an essential part of the concept
and so must remain ﬁxed. We have already seen, earlier in this book, that strictly
separationists cannot deal with the evaluative ﬂexibility of a single concept, for the
evaluative element ﬂoats free of the descriptive.
In brief Dancy’s reply is that it has never been part of nonseparationism (for
Dancy, cognitivism) that there be a narrowly deﬁned and conceived evaluation. All
that matters to the nonseparationist is that, in some way, evaluation is mixed with
description. (And, Dancy further hammers home the idea I have expressed that we
can question if we have separate evaluative and descriptive elements to mix in the
ﬁrst place.) There is no reason to suppose that the evaluative part of a thick concept
has to be conceived to be a single attitude. Instead, Dancy thinks, competence with
a thick concept can involve competence with a range of attitudes associated with a
concept, in a way I have also discussed.36
(v) Conceptual change. Although not central to my case, I think it worth considering
the phenomenon of conceptual change, in part because I mentioned that Ryle thinks
concepts, or the terms that express them, can change their meaning and in part
because it links to other points I have made.
Thick concepts can clearly change. Blackburn approvingly quotes a nice example
due to Quentin Skinner. At the end of the sixteenth century in England, words such
as ‘vocation’ and ‘calling’, which had previously been applied only to religious
positions, began to be applied to other jobs and roles partly to justify certain
economic activities.37 A number of other ethico-religious concepts suggest them-
selves as good examples: SANCTUARY, CHASTE, SINFUL, and NAUGHTY.38
Why does this happen? Let us think about some examples. Gibbard’s account of
LEWD employs two things that catch the eye. First, there is the vague idea of an activity
‘passing beyond certain limits’. Exactly what the limits are and what it takes to pass
beyond them is open to dispute. The number and type of cases that might be
categorized by such a concept will differ from person to person and across time
36 Dancy (1995), p. 270. 37 Blackburn (2013), pp. 124–5, quoting Skinner (2002), chapter 8.
38 In Williams (1996), pp. 29–30, Williams thinks about CHASTE (strictly, CHASTITY) and makes a related
but different point, namely that a concept can be lost as time moves on, even if the word remains. In
addition, concepts change as well as being lost. ‘Sanctuary’ as both noun and verb now straightforwardly
means a safe refuge and to take safe refuge (as well as being part of a church), but in early times it referred
speciﬁcally to taking refuge in a holy place and, even more speciﬁcally, doing so if one was a debtor or a
fugitive from justice. Shakespeare straightforwardly uses ‘naughty’ to mean ‘wicked’ in Macbeth, Act III
scene ii. Many religious and ethico-religious concepts have changed since medieval times in the West, for
obvious reasons. In order to deal with other issues, I leave in the background the question ‘At what point
does the change of a concept introduce a brand new concept, rather than a new version of the same
concept?’ I am assuming that we are dealing here with the case of the same concept changing, and we need
to understand why this happens. It is clearly relevant to my discussion to decide when a new concept
emerges, but I put it aside here. That issue is a whole other book.
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periods. The vagueness involved in the concept invites a range of cases; the ‘elasticity’
of the concept is set up for this. Over time the range and numbers of case to which the
term is applied might change so much that the concept itself changes. (Or, in other
words, the extension of the concept might change over time so much that this leads to
a change in the associated term’s intension.) People see this case as falling under the
concept description, and that case as being similar to the ﬁrst case, and this third case
as being similar to the second and . . . And, before you know it, you have an nth case
that bears similarities to the cases that have gone before and is not wholly miscat-
egorized, but which also is not quite in tune with the ﬁrst case or the original idea of
the overall concept.39 The vagueness that is built into the concept is not enough to
allow for the range of cases that people end up grouping under the same banner. So,
for example, what once would have been categorized as naughty, because it is truly
terrible, heinous behaviour going beyond certain acceptable limits, is now thought
not to be naughty, simply because this categorization is now typically reserved for a
lower-level type of bad behaviour. NAUGHTY occupies some of the same conceptual
region as CHEEKY, MISCHIEVOUS, and DISOBEDIENT, and is now not as associated as it once
was with WICKED and EVIL.
We can underline this ﬁrst point by returning to THINKING. Eschewing simple
synonyms, such as ‘mental life’, we can imagine change happening. Earlier eras
may have deﬁned THINKING by relying on what went on in the (literal) head and
that which controlled action and emotion. But given what beliefs, moods, calcula-
tions, and other things might be prompted by and exempliﬁed in thought, we may see
a change in such a deﬁnition. Earlier in this chapter I talked of people thinking while
ﬁddling on pianos or when choosing ingredients for a meal. Similarly, the ‘extended
mind’ hypothesis, whereby the mind is seen to extend beyond the physical brain and
be inhabited in all sorts of tools that we use to store information and knowledge, gives
credence to the idea that THINKING is open for revision.40 What counts as thought can
change, and this might cause change in the concept itself.
(c) Foot. Consideration of Foot’s work helps to summarizing many of the previous
ideas as well as helping me to underline others.
In Foot (1958) and (1958–9) she, like Williams, takes Hare’s prescriptivism, and
noncognitivist theories of the day generally, as her targets. In both papers she is
worried that there is a lack of appreciation by noncognitivists about how arguments
work and what reasoning looks like. (I believe her arguments apply to separationism
generally.) Foot accuses noncognitivists of assuming that moral argument works
thus: a person accepts certain premises and from them reaches a conclusion. There is
a noncognitivist assumption that there is a strict and unbridgeable divide between
39 That was brief, but I hope the idea is clear enough. Other things can pull at the contours of a concept,
such as one-off momentous events.
40 See Chalmers and Clark (1998).
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facts and values. So some of the premises will be factual, while some will be
evaluations of the facts. At the end of the argument, in which a moral conclusion
is reached, an opponent to our original protagonist can simply reject some or all of
the various evaluations given and so the argument—if that is what we call it—
between them breaks down.
Foot complains that this is too coarse a way of understanding argument and is
based on faulty theory. How is the opponent imagined to be rejecting the idea? What
reasons have they themselves given? She worries, in Foot (1958), about a situation she
takes to be analogous. Imagine a man being shown all that could be shown about the
roundness of the Earth, and then asking (simply) why he should believe it was round.
“We should want, in such a case, to know how he met the case put to him; and it is
remarkable that in ethics this question is thought not to be in place.”41
This sets the scene for her article. Foot wishes to understand how it is that people
understand others and the shape of how they reason in ethics: what do they count as
evidence for their beliefs and why? Foot worries that in the noncognitivist account of
reasoning there is no link between statements of fact and statements of value. Because
of this, each disputant makes his own decision as to which things count as evidence
and which do not, and nothing can be said by others against him if they disagree.
Foot seeks to undermine noncognitivism and uses RUDE to do so. Calling some
behaviour rude can be a way of condemning it and trying to stop it happening. It is
clearly an evaluative word. But she notes it can be used only when certain types of
features are in place. It cannot be used of just any action, or used on just any occasion.
Foot says that it can be used only when a certain kind of behaviour “causes offence by
indicating a lack of respect”.42
How does this help? Foot thinks that once we use a word such as rude to categorize
an action or thing, we open up other categorizations, such as ‘offence’ in this case. If a
disputant says that a man has caused offence (or someone thinks that offence has
been caused), yet our disputant denies that the man has been rude, we need to know
why it is that the behaviour is not rude. What reasons for exemptions are forthcom-
ing? What sorts of thing does our disputant consider rude? Foot considers certain
answers—‘a man is rude when he behaves conventionally’, or ‘a man is rude when he
walks slowly up to a front door’—and thinks that in such a case our disputant has left
behind the concept RUDE, assuming that no further explanation is forthcoming.43
Foot assumes, perfectly reasonably, that everyday ethical disagreements are awash
with thick concepts. When such concepts are used, there are fairly well-accepted criteria
of application and deﬁnition. Because of this, we cannot apply concepts willy-nilly. But,
when applied, and when seen to be applied, certain sorts of evaluative point follow.
There are points on which to challenge Foot. For example, a disputant might
refrain from agreeing that a piece of behaviour was rude simply because she does not
41 Foot (1958), p. 503. 42 Foot (1958), p. 507. 43 Foot (1958), p. 508.
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wish to condemn it. (Think again about Betty and Frank from Chapter Two, and the
various concepts they employ to describe people who are bigger than the average.)
But, in response, although that is an issue, Foot says towards the end of her piece that
disputants have to work within an accepted tradition and, by implication, a concep-
tual environment. We cannot choose to apply and withhold concepts as we wish for
we must respect certain traditions and norms. If someone has explicitly insulted
someone to their face and made them cry, say, it would have to be a surprising piece
of reasoning to conclude that the behaviour was not rude. And that is Foot’s point.
Evaluative concepts shape our argumentative landscape and there is not the freedom
to attach and detach evaluative point from descriptive content as noncognitivists
might think.
Foot repeats her argument, more or less, in Foot (1958–9). However, in this paper
she labels and makes explicit an important idea, namely that of an ‘internal relation’
between object and evaluation. Evaluation cannot apply to just anything. And,
further, speciﬁc sorts of evaluation cannot apply to just any sort of object. Or,
again, if someone does do something creative when judging, we require further
explanation, and if this explanation is accepted we can classify the use as creative,
rather than as bizarre or downright wrong. In Foot (1958–9) she uses the feeling of
pride as her main example. We do not see just anything as worthy of pride. It would
be odd to look at the sky and feel a sense of pride, as if one had stopped the sky
from falling, or if one had laid one hand on another.44 Again, we can make sense
of this if there is some special background. Perhaps someone’s arms are injured,
and so it is rational to take pride in his ‘ﬁnally managing’ to put his hands together.
Foot continues in this vein. It is simply strange to think that just anything can be
pride-worthy or dangerous or any such thing, at least rationally.
This shows the importance of Ryle. My use of ‘ﬁnally managed’ just now is meant
to be signiﬁcant. It is with these sorts of description that we can ﬁll out the
background in the right sort of a way in order to make sense of how it is that the
movement of hands can be considered to be worthy of pride. If we do not bother
about which description we use, then we cannot make sense of what is happening.
Further to this, I want to underline a key point that is riddled throughout all of my
discussion. What is absolutely central is the idea that mature users of concepts use
evaluative concepts while appreciating the point of their use: why they are used in a
certain way, and why certain sorts of activity and object are linked together (and
occasion positive and negative views, reasons for action, and the like). That may be
accepted by many, even some separationists on some understanding of the claim.
(We saw in Chapter Two that even simple separationists can claim that the thin
evaluation helps to determine the extension of the concept.) But the importance here
is that appreciation of such matters is part of the concept itself, and that goes
44 Foot (1958–9), pp. 86 and 87.
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especially for those occasions when we use concepts with positive and negative view.
As we use concepts and language, we know that not just any evaluation, in general
and on some particular occasion, can help with the application. Certain features of
the world go with certain sorts of evaluations, according to a certain reason and logic
that is socially special, and that is something that any account of the evaluative and
the thick must accommodate. In Foot’s view, which I share, it also must be central to
any account.
So ends my tying of a number of related points. But what of our overarching
accounts?
6.7 Separationism and Nonseparationism
Separationists restrict the idea of evaluation to PRO and CON. (When they try to extend
it, as Gibbard does, we see problems.) Doing so seems curious. The types of
deﬁnition or analysis that are then given for individual thick concepts rely on a
clear and obvious separation between the evaluative and the descriptive that seems,
after exploration, to be ﬁctitious. What are we to say about ideas such as WARRANTED,
USEFUL, and ALLOW, as well as all of those important qualiﬁers such as RELEVANT and
APPROPRIATE? Are we just to think of them as some descriptive material—completely
value-free—with some pro or con evaluation added? This is worrying on two counts.
First, it ignores the complaint that we do not simply approve of something, but do so
for a reason. This seems inevitably to invite thick concepts back in, as I indicated with
some examples. Second, it denies ﬂat out that there is anything to Foot’s insight that
certain internal relations have to hold if the norms of our everyday conceptual use are
to be respected. It is only in respecting such relations that we give structure and
reason to our evaluative practices.
We saw, in Chapter Four, the ﬁrst inklings of what was wrong with separationism.
Separationists wish to separate thick concepts into something descriptive and,
typically something thin. But as we saw, there are a number of different sorts of
thin concept and there seems to be a range of thicknesses among them, albeit a
smaller diet than is found across thick concepts. Yet, we see no harm in calling these
concepts thin, whether we wish to indicate a difference in kind or degree from thick(er)
concepts. And, further, we saw that separationists probably need this diet of concepts
to express different ideas. In this chapter we have simply expanded this suspicion.
Separationists ﬁnd it hard to justify their assumption that the thin is one thing and the
thick a divisible other, simply because the thin does not seem to be a uniﬁed single sort
of thing. It is certainly true that thin concepts typically carry (or essentially carry) a pro
or a con evaluation in a way that typical thick concepts do not. But the fact that thin
concepts come in a range of speciﬁcities should open our eyes to the possibilities of
thick concepts. It should also open our eyes to the idea that just as thin concepts might
still be thought to be ‘simply’ or ‘wholly’ evaluative, so wemight think of thick concepts
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in the same way, once we have thought about what conceptions of the evaluative are
available.
In short, separationism seems curious because it has a limited view of the phe-
nomena it is trying to account for. Separationists attempt to divide, isolate, and
sharply categorize that which cannot be treated in this way. It may go nicely with
some distinction between facts and values, but the phenomenon of thick concepts
calls into question that very assumption. That was what Foot and Murdoch were
doing all those years ago, and the moral still holds.
6.8 Some Objections
(a) Essentially evaluative? As advertised, there could be a fatal weakness in what
I have said in this chapter. I have laid out the positive view that concepts can be
essentially evaluative and yet, on occasion, not be used with an obvious pro or con
point. However, it is possible to draw a different conclusion from the phenomena:
that any concept that is used on occasion without a pro or con point is not essentially
evaluative. Those uses where it is used with pro or con point are the odd ones, even if
they statistically predominate, for such pro or con uses are accidental to the concept
and not an essential part of it. In brief, MACABRE and CAJOLE are a lot more like CHAIR
than they are like GOOD. They are descriptive concepts with accidental evaluative uses,
rather than essentially evaluative concepts. In short, the conservative view of evalu-
ation is still correct.
Chapter Seven sees me examine and attempt to rebut an argument for this line by
Väyrynen.
(b) Understanding others? Part of my position, and a traditional part of none-
parationism, has it that people master a concept only once they understand its
point and how it can be used. Some seem to think that this implies that people have
to share the evaluations that are the point of the concept in order to understand it.
This raises an interesting issue, which seems as if it could prove fatal to the whole
position. We routinely think that anthropologists, for example, can understand
other people and their culture. Indeed, we routinely think that they can understand
the concepts, including the evaluative concepts, that these people have. Sometimes
this may take a while and much effort, but we certainly think it is possible. But how
is this possible? Do anthropologists sincerely have to share the concept that they
are investigating? This challenge threatens not just the possibility of anthropology,
but of understanding anyone who is different. The challenge then is to articulate
what is involved in understanding a concept that allows us to master it and yet not
share it sincerely.
In Chapter Eight I articulate a way of setting up and thinking about this problem
that indicates what nonseparationists should say. As advertised, I also tie this to
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Williams’ pessimism about the possibility of evaluative knowledge. I have left
hanging the status of thin concepts: I think of them as separately understandable
but not conceptually prior to the thick. I comment more on this also.
(c) Evaluative realism? In Chapter Five, §5.3, I mentioned the idea that if we are
committed to there being unitary evaluative concepts, then it implies that these
concepts refer to something. And if they refer, it looks as if we are committed to
evaluative realism. I have made some progress in addressing this issue already, but in
Chapter Nine I review where we have got to and articulate, brieﬂy, what it would be
to be a nonseparationist and not be committed to an outlandish realism. Further-
more, we have to be conﬁdent that there is some way in which we can distinguish
legitimate, decent, genuine thick concepts from illegitimate ones.
I use this as a way of offering a conclusion for the whole book. Every so often,
including §6.7 just now, I have mentioned the fact–value distinction. I suspect that it
is a fear in losing this that motivates some people to worry about evaluative realism.
I brieﬂy address this idea in my ﬁnal chapter.
6.9 Concluding Thoughts
I began this chapter by diagnosing the failures of the disentangling argument. I then
moved on to the failures of Williams’ slogan and how it disguised much of his
thought. The moral of the story is that evaluative concepts seem to do more than
Williams’ famous slogan has them do, something that even he acknowledges. I then
isolated what had gone wrong by thinking about Ryle’s thoughts about thick descrip-
tion. This opened up the thought that not only can evaluative concepts do more than
guide action, they may do more than categorize in an explicitly pro or con manner.
I worked through that idea in a number of ways and in so doing elaborated a view of
how concepts work. This took me on to articulate and defend my particular version
of nonseparationism. Along the way I hope to have shaken up and cast doubt on
assumptions that separationists make.





In his The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty Väyrynen puts centre stage a very important
question:
Evaluation Question (EQ): How are thick terms and concepts related to the
evaluations they may be used to convey?1
Väyrynen is to be applauded for concentrating our minds on EQ. As indicated in the
previous chapter, his view is that while thin concepts can be and should be under-
stood as inherently evaluative (his phrase), thick concepts need not be at all, and
indeed we should assume that they are not. The assumption that thick concepts are
essentially or inherently evaluative is absolutely key in the whole debate about thick
concepts, and Väyrynen is right to focus on it. Not only does this assumption affect
the particular concerns of the last chapter, it affects other matters too. For example, if
thick concepts carry evaluations only ‘accidentally’, as I have labelled the idea, then
they are quite different types of thing from thin concepts, and the whole question of
whether conceptual models such as the genus–species model are applicable to their
relation falls away.
Straightaway we need to appreciate something about Väyrynen’s position. He is
asking a question before we even get to the debate between separationists and
nonseparationists, the debate that has occupied us thus far. He agrees with separa-
tionists that thick concepts are not inherently evaluative, but while most separation-
ists think that this is because they can be disentangled into evaluative and descriptive
aspects, Väyrynen thinks it because he denies they are evaluative in the ﬁrst place, at
least inherently so. His key positive contribution is to argue that the evaluative aspect
of thick concepts is something pragmatically given, by tone of voice and context, and
is not part of the semantics of the concept. (So one could be a separationist and think
the evaluation is part of the semantics of (some complex) concept, even if it is
something that can be separated from the descriptive parts.) Emphasis on the
pragmatics of evaluation is something he shares with Blackburn, although it is fair
1 Väyrynen (2013), chapter 1.3.
to say that Väyrynen in his work has given the most meticulous and careful treatment
of this idea to date, hardening it into a thoroughly worked-out position.2, 3
There are some things Väyrynen and I agree about. For example, although in the
end I am inclined, unlike him, to think we can make out some difference between
the thin and the thick, we both agree that more attention should be paid to the
assumption that some binary distinction exists. We also think there is a deep and
misguided assumption in the literature that all thick concepts work in the same way.
I also agree with him that we understand a lot about thick concepts by putting EQ
under the spotlight. However, we disagree about the answer we give to EQ, and this
disagreement is signiﬁcant.
I start in §7.2 by commenting on our different phrases: Väyrynen’s ‘inherently
evaluative’ and my ‘essentially evaluative’. This sets the scene for my argument. In
§7.3 I summarize Väyrynen’s view and the main arguments for it. (This is condensed
as his answer to EQ occupies his entire book.) In §7.4 I counter his arguments. In §7.5
I conclude.
7.2 Inherently or Essentially Evaluative?
Looking at philosophers’ labels can sometimes be a blind alley. It can appear that
much hangs on some term or phrase, but sometimes less is revealed than is predicted.
I am not sure how much Väyrynen’s language reveals about his intentions. But I can
say, conﬁdently, that it reveals something about my thinking.
There is a difference in English between ‘inherent’ and ‘essential’ even though it is
small. The idea of inherence is that there is some quality or some attribute or some
something that exists quite inseparably and essentially in another thing. That seems
to capture nicely a lot of nonseparationist talk about thick concepts. We have the idea
of something being inseparable and essential, and we can remain quite neutral on
how to characterize the thing credited with these qualities. It might be an element or
it might be an aspect, and this echoes my discussion early on in this book about these
two terms.
Yet, even though Väyrynen’s language is not completely misleading, it does still
assume, however implicitly, that evaluation is thought to be a quality or aspect of the
whole of the thick concept. We have one thing—the evaluation—in the thick concept.
This phrasing, however well-intentioned, still buys into and underscores the idea that
evaluation is something that is apart from the concept as a whole. For evidence,
see his use of phrases of thick terms and concepts ‘containing’ evaluation and of
2 How Blackburn would place himself in relation to this matter is an interesting question, but I leave it
aside here.
3 I could have started this whole study by rebutting Väyrynen’s argument, and followed that with the
debate between separationists and nonseparationists. But given the historical signiﬁcance of the ideas in
that debate, and given that some of my arguments against Väyrynen rest on my own view, I introduce his
view only now.
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evaluation ‘being built’ into the meaning of such terms and concepts.4 By use of this
word, then, perhaps Väyrynen shows his assumption about what evaluation is.
My use of ‘essential’ is supposed to bypass this worry. The key thing about
thick concepts is that they are evaluative and are so essentially. That is all. I leave it
open, at the beginning, whether the evaluation is an essential part or aspect of thick
concepts, or something else, such as the idea that the thick concept just is something
that is evaluative. Of course, I argued for this latter view in the previous chapter:
our familiar thick concepts simply are forms of evaluation. ‘Inherent’ shuts out this
important option.
I did speak of ‘aspects’ early on in this book, and I have run everything in terms of
evaluative and descriptive content, thus implicitly emphasizing some clear difference
of kind. But I turned the spotlight on this in the previous chapter and questioned this
type of talk. This is not to say that I disown all of my set up and see it merely as a
vehicle for ideas before we get here; a necessary journey before Nirvana. We can still
talk of thick concepts having descriptive and evaluative aspects. But that sort of talk
should invite questions and reﬂection into what is meant by ‘aspect’ and whether the
evaluation should, in the end, be seen in such-and-such a way. It should not indicate
a settled matter as we move onto other questions. Talk of thick concepts being
essentially evaluative is supposed to make us question how close talk of ‘evaluative
and descriptive aspects’ is to talk of ‘evaluative and descriptive elements’. For me
there is a world of difference. Further, I think we are better off characterizing the best
sort of nonseparationist position in terms of ‘essential’ and not ‘inherent’ evaluation.
From now on I switch between ‘essential’ and ‘inherent’ as necessary, in order to
stay faithful to Väyrynen’s expression of his view.
7.3 Väyrynen’s View and the Arguments for it
Väyrynen uses linguistic evidence and theory to discuss how thick terms are used in
everyday contexts. He claims, correctly, that not enough attention has been paid to
language in the debate about thick concepts and, further, that we can draw interesting
conclusions about concepts from what happens to their associated terms.
As mentioned, Väyrynen’s answer to EQ is that thick concepts do not convey or
carry evaluation inherently, and he criticizes those that think it does. He further
speciﬁes this idea by saying that to think of a thick term, and concept, as inherently
evaluative is to think that it has evaluation or evaluative content as part of the literal
meaning of the term (and associated concept), as used in a normal context. In
contrast, he thinks that evaluation is best understood as something that speakers
imply or suggest in using thick terms and what hearers typically from their uses, in
normal context, and such implications and suggestions are conveyed by the context,
4 Väyrynen (2013), p. 32, which echoes p. 9 and p. 31.
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by the tone of voice, and the like. According to him, pro and con evaluations are not
very reliable constraints on literal uses of terms in normal contexts, since such
evaluations do not behave as a semantic entailment is supposed to behave once we
consider many different linguistic phenomena. This is true even if we assume, as he
does, that the relationship between evaluations and thick terms is fairly robust across
different contexts. It is just that he prefers that this should be explained pragmatically
rather than by assuming that the evaluation is secured as part of the semantics of
the terms. He assumes a fairly clear and strict division between pragmatics and
semantics.5
In contrast, thin terms and concepts are understood by him to be the paradigmatic
type of evaluative term and concept; throughout the ﬁrst two chapters the question of
whether evaluation is inherent in thick terms and concepts is run in terms of whether
and how they convey good and bad evaluations.6 The following establishes his view
of what he means by ‘evaluation’:
My suggestion for characterizing evaluation without reference to pro tanto value is to under-
stand is as information that is somehow positive or negative in favour. This needn’t mean the
sort of bare ‘pro’ or ‘con’ assessment exempliﬁed by the proto-emotivist understanding of
evaluative judgement as an expression of a ‘boo’ or a ‘hurrah’. Evaluation might rather be
understood as information to the effect that something has positive or negative standing—
merit or demerit, worth or unworth—relative to a certain kind of standard. If we say further
that the relevant kind of standard must be of the kind that is capable of grounding claims of
merit or worth, this would explain why claims of merit and worth are often expressible by the
sorts of attitudes that we associate with evaluation, such as praise, admiration and criticism.
(A standard may be of a kind to ground claims of merit or worth without actually succeeding in
grounding them. Even if calling something lustful, for instance, implies a negative standing
relative to a standard that the speaker regards as grounding a claim of demerit, it is a further
question whether counting as lustful is in fact a demerit . . . )7
He goes on:
The characterization I offer is ecumenical in nature. It can allow the relevant kind of standard
to be vague, indeterminate or controversial. For instance, what counts as morally good, or even
as a good philosopher, is controversial and may be vague. The characterization is also ﬂexible
regarding the strength of the relevant kind of standard. The relevant kind of standard can
concern pro tanto value, the characterization allows also standards that ground evaluations as
5 This is very condensed. Across Väyrynen (2013), chapter 5, having dismissed semantic entailments
(which I focus on below), Väyrynen also considers that evaluation can be cast as something else (for
example, as conventional implicatures, conversational implicatures, etc.) before settling on his particular
pragmatic view. For reasons of space I ignore these discussions.
6 See also Väyrynen (2013), p. 208 as a summary: “I assumed [throughout this book] that what
distinguishes the thick early on from the thin is that thick terms and concepts somehow hold together
evaluation and nonevaluative description whereas thin concepts are purely evaluative. And I assumed that
the evaluations to which thick terms are concepts are most closely connected are claims to the effect that
something is good, or bad, in a certain way.”
7 Väyrynen (2013), pp. 29–30.
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good (or bad) in some other sort of way. To say of someone that she is a good assassin, or a
good football player, or good at cooking, is to say that she is good in some particular way or
respect. In this sense such claims are no less evaluative than claims to the effect that something
is morally good, or admirable, or just. On this view of evaluation, information that someone is
a good assassin counts as evaluative because it is information to the effect that she is good in a
particular way. Of course, some things will be bad in certain ways, such as morally, if they are
good in certain other ways, such as assassinating. But this is perfectly coherent if standards may
be relativized in ways that this view of evaluation allows.8
Standard thin terms may be employed in larger expressions, for example, ‘good
assassin’, and those expressions can end up having evaluative points different from
those that are usually associated with the terms on their own. This is to be explained
by the standards that apply to certain terms or phrases in those different contexts.
Similarly, a certain sarcastic tone of voice might alter ‘good’ to mean ‘bad’, but that is
easy to understand and ubiquitous. (Indeed, it seems right to say that the term ‘good’
said sarcastically is used to convey BAD or CON.) We can imagine that someone could
agree with Väyrynen and take this phenomenon on one step, and argue that concepts
such as JUST and WISE are inherently evaluative. Sure they can be transformed by tone
of voice and be used to convey con evaluations, but such instances are comparatively
rare. We could infer, following further investigation, that because of the character
and frequency of the transformations, such concepts are inherently (positively)
evaluative. That would make sense of the idea that such concepts are fairly close to
standard thin concepts and may even be classed under this heading. However,
despite this possibility, it is clear that Väyrynen accepts only a few examples into
the group of inherently evaluative concepts.9
More insight into Väyrynen’s views on evaluation comes from a view he sets aside
as extreme.10 This view states that a term or concept is evaluative if it has any
evaluative connotations. (Again, by ‘evaluative’ he means pro and con evaluations.)
He acknowledges that some linguists do think this, citing Adrienne Lehrer.11 In her
discussion of wine, she counts terms such as ‘buttery’, ‘sweet’, and ‘woody’ as
evaluative. Väyrynen rejects this view since it is obvious that a term can be used in
this way and yet not be inherently evaluative. Just think back, again, to my example of
CHAIR in Chapter Two, or to OLD from Chapter Six; we might feel uncomfortable in
saying that CHAIR or OLD were evaluative concepts even if on occasion we use them to
convey some positive or negative view or attitude. Just because there are a few
examples of contexts where a term or concept carries evaluative connotations, this
does not mean such a term or concept is inherently evaluative.
8 Väyrynen (2013), p. 30.
9 He never says as much, although it is a clear implication of the whole book and, as I read it, is
supposed to be a clear and direct implication of the whole book. However, the ﬁnal paragraph of Väyrynen
(2013), p. 185 is relevant. Here he discusses the possibility of ‘distributively just’ being classiﬁed as thin, just
as ‘ought’ is.
10 Väyrynen (2013), p. 33. 11 Lehrer (2009).
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That, then, is his view. He has three main arguments for it: (i) thick terms can be
objected to, in a way I set out momentarily, and the evaluations supposedly inherent in
them project to other contexts in a way that other semantic parts do not; (ii) thick
terms’ evaluations are far too defeasible in a way that semantic entailments are not; and
(iii) other features that supposedly support the view that thick terms are evaluative are
better accounted for in ways that show these evaluations to be given pragmatically.12
(i) It is routinely assumed in linguistics that if parts of a term or phrase are to be
considered part of its semantics, then they should not ‘project’ when that term or
phrase is embedded in certain contexts. We can use one of Väyrynen’s favourite
examples to introduce the idea. Imagine people saying these:
(1) Madonna’s show is expensive
(2) Nah, Madonna’s show is not expensive.13
When we say (2) the embedding means that we unambiguously say that Madonna’s
show is not expensive. The core meaning of the term ‘expensive’ is that something
costs a relatively large amount of money and by saying (2) someone clearly rejects the
view that it does. Or, in other words, embeddings such as (2) easily and unambigu-
ously cancel core semantic entailments. When we say that some part of the term or
phrase, some implication, ‘projects’ then we are saying that it survives such embed-
dings and remains uncancelled in some way.
What about thick terms? Väyrynen introduces the notion of an ‘objectionable’
term (or concept). This is any term that one could take objection to because, one
thinks, the pointed evaluation that is most closely connected with the term does not
ﬁt those items that are typically classiﬁed using the term. Väyrynen uses ‘lewd’ as his
main example and I construct the following scenario to illustrate his point.14
Imagine that Huey thinks Madonna’s show is lewd. Dewey disagrees. He thinks
the show is within appropriate boundaries. But the key point about them is that they
are both prudes: they typically go around saying that things are lewd, and praise
certain non-lewd things for their decency, and do so sincerely. They think that
categorizing things as lewd is important, illuminating, appropriate, and the like. So
in that broader sense they are in agreement, despite their disagreement about
Madonna’s show. In contrast, a third person, Louie, objects to the term ‘lewd’. He
objects to it being employed pretty much anywhere and everywhere, in part because
it classiﬁes certain sorts of activity as bad that he does not think should be classiﬁed
as bad. He thinks that using ‘lewd’ is itself a bad or unjustiﬁed or silly (or . . . ) thing
12 The ﬁrst and second arguments are in Väyrynen (2013), chapters 3 and 4 (especially 3.3 for the ﬁrst,
and 3.4 for the second), while the third (comprising a range of considerations) comes in the following
chapters, particularly chapters 7–9. See also Väyrynen (2009) for an earlier statement of the ﬁrst argument.
13 To be really clear, (2) does not express a double negative. The ‘Nah . . . ’ is supposed to reﬂect everyday
speech patterns.
14 For simplicity, I focus on negations, but Väyrynen also considers questions, epistemic modals, etc.
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to do.15 So Louie disagrees with Huey because he does not think the show is lewd. But
he also lacks the broad agreement that Huey and Dewey share.
To understand what is happening, consider:
(3) Madonna’s show is lewd.
(4) Nah, Madonna’s show is not lewd.
Huey says (3). Dewey says (4), but that might be a little unsatisfactory if we are
capturing real life. We can imagine that Dewey could and would offer some reasons
for asserting it. He might say something such as:
(5) Madonna’s show is sexually insinuating alright, but it’s not lewd because no
private parts are exposed.16
From this Väyrynen says:
What the speaker of (4) [i.e. Dewey] isn’t naturally heard as denying are some such
evaluations as the generic claim in (6) or the singular conditional in (7):
(6) Overt displays of sexuality that transgress conventional boundaries are bad in
a certain way. (Read as meaning: bad in a distinctive way that typical lewd-users
regard them as bad.)
(7) If Madonna’s show involves overt displays of sexuality that transgresses
conventional boundaries, then it is bad in a certain way.
So it is reasonable in the context primed above the speakers of (4) [i.e. Dewey]
accepts something like (6) or (7).17
Or, in other words, (6) and (7) are plausibly construed as implications that Dewey
accepts.
So what? Imagine a normal conversational context. Väyrynen imagines that Dewey
could happily say (4) while Louie cannot, at least without offering further explanation
of his view. Louie is liable to be misunderstood and there will be some ambiguity in the
situation. So he may be reluctant to assert (4) straightforwardly, even if he can do so
meaningfully.18 How come? It is because, says Väyrynen, that Louie does not accept
(6) and (7), or similar ideas, and people such as him typically do not succeed in denying
(6) and (7) by uttering (4). (Indeed, Louie’s reluctance might be because he knows that
this is how everyday communication and arguments work.)
This then gives us Väyrynen’s proposal, which is to treat evaluations such as
(6) and (7) as implications of utterances of (3) and to see them as implications that
15 More speciﬁcally, he may reject the particular conception of LEWD that Huey and Dewey employ with
that associated term. But to keep things simple we will ignore this wrinkle, even if it is important in real-life
situations.
16 Väyrynen (2013), p. 62. 17 Väyrynen (2013), pp. 62–3.
18 Louie’s situation is just like mine when I say, ‘That table is not blogon’ and where I think BLOGON is
not a meaningful or useful concept. When I deny that the table is blogon, I am saying something
meaningful and something I take to be true, but I could be taken to be a (sincere) blogon-user, who
would happily say, ‘While this table is not blogon, that one over there is.’
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project. They should be treated in this way because they are not cancelled simply by
uttering (4). (Remember, even if he is reluctant to say (4) in many conversational
contexts, Louie can still meaningfully say it.) And so if (6) and (7) are not cancelled
simply by being embedded in a context such as (4), then we should not treat them as
part of the semantic core of the term.
We need to realize that this generalizes. Any thick term (or concept) can be an
objectionable thick term (or concept), for there may be someone who rejects its
presuppositions and implications. An objector objects to a certain collection of
features being grouped in a certain way with either some pro or con evaluation
conjoined to it. ‘Lewd’ shows this well, and many people do not wish to be prudes.
Derogatory racial and sexual epithets show the phenomenon even better, since many
people object to and reject such terms. But we should realize that any thick term or
concept can be challenged: ELEGANT, WISE, and all the rest.
(ii) Väyrynen’s point about defeasibility is easier to state.19 Consider this:
(8) Whether or not Madonna’s show is lewd, it’s not bad in any way distinctive
of explicit sexual display.20
In short, if the con evaluation of ‘lewd’ were part of the semantic core of the term,
then we would ﬁnd (8) to be semantically improper. But we do not, says Väyrynen,
for (8) seems reasonable to say. So it is better if we do not treat the con evaluation as
part of the semantic core of the term, but instead assume that evaluations can come
and go more freely, and be offered and understood pragmatically.
(iii) In addition to these two arguments, Väyrynen considers a range of consid-
erations that have been given to support the view that thick terms are inherently
evaluative. These considerations include: evaluations help to drive the extensions of
thick terms and that one cannot understand the extensions without understanding the
evaluations; that thick terms are supposedly shapeless with respect to nonevaluative
terms; and the idea that evaluative and descriptive aspects are inseparable. He argues,
instead, that his preferred pragmatic view can easily explain these phenomena. He then
wields (a generalization of) Grice’s razor, that other things being equal it is better to
adopt the pragmatic view because it assumes fewer semantic properties.
7.4 Responses
(i) I use a suggestion from Debbie Roberts to help meet Väyrynen’s ﬁrst argument.21
The ﬁrst question—a revealing one—to be asked is whether a thin term or concept
19 However, I am summarizing and ignoring many of the interesting details Väyrynen works through,
again for simplicity’s sake.
20 Väyrynen (2013), p. 70. This is numbered (23) there.
21 Roberts (2015), especially pp. 3–4. Roberts also raises the general question of whether other things are
equal when considering Grice’s razor, which I mention in my response to the third question, although I put
forward points different from those she does.
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such as ‘good’/GOOD can be objectionable in the same way. That may seem a
startling question. After all, who could possibly imagine that ‘good’ could be objected
to? But, as Roberts notes, Väyrynen himself opens this avenue even if he does not
pursue it with as much vigour as she and I would want. Speciﬁcally he considers
whether JUST can be objected to and rejected in the same fashion as above, and
references Thrasymachus and Marxism.22 Alongside these people, we can think
about Milton’s Satan, at least on some readings. One may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to imagine
these as serious, real-life cases; and even if one accepts it for JUST one may ﬁnd it hard
to imagine if for GOOD. (Väyrynen himself notes this worry but mentions the
phenomenon of imaginative resistance in support of us being open-minded about
objection.) And, further, we have to remember that GOOD can and is objected to by
people, certainly if by this we mean MORALLY GOOD (and if we recall from
Chapter Four that we can distinguish between GOOD and PRO). We do not even
have to think about Marxists and Nietzcheans, but more philosophically mainstream
people such as moral error theorists, and artists and political agitators of various
stripes through the years.
So let us assume that there is enough motivation for GOOD and similar thin
concepts to work in the same way as LEWD and thick concepts. Louie, or someone
like him, may feel reluctant to enter a discussion in which others are debating
whether something is morally good, simply because he rejects the whole notion. In
which case, we then have to conclude that the pro or con evaluation that is seemingly
part of ‘good’ and GOOD is also detachable, and that thin terms and concepts such as
these are not essentially evaluative either. That seems like a crazy conclusion. If you
worry that running the worry in terms of GOOD is too far-fetched, then even running this
in terms of the slightly more speciﬁc MORALLY GOOD seems to result in a crazy conclusion.
Are GOOD and MORALLY GOOD really not going to count as inherently evaluative? Are
the only inherently evaluative concepts PRO and CON? Too much has been proved and
the situation or phenomena are more complex than Väyrynen makes out.23
Roberts argues that we need to make a key distinction between conceptual
evaluations and substantive evaluations. The former concerns the evaluation or
evaluations that are part of the concept, the latter concerns the evaluations that
one can make of the concept, its evaluative point, and how it is used. In the cases of
GOOD and MORALLY GOOD, the conceptual evaluation is clearly something pro. Most
people will then also have a positive, substantive evaluation of these concepts, but a
few people will not. They may reject them for many different reasons but at the core
will be a rejection of some positive assessment of ways of acting in some moral
fashion, where ‘moral’ is understood along some social or psychological lines that
22 See Väyrynen (2013), p. 150. I worry he is a little too dismissive on this point. His main response to
the consideration he raises is that the pragmatic account he forwards explains things better anyway.
23 A quick observation. Väyrynen devotes barely any space to thinking about the nature and character
of thin terms and concepts, even though evaluation is clearly identiﬁed with them.
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they think should not be viewed positively. Whatever the reasons for the rejection,
critics will have to understand the point of the concept and how it is used in order to
reject it.24 In all of this, if they reject, then this rejection does not show that the
evaluation is not an essential part of the concept. Indeed, the rejection may occur
because of the evaluative point of the concept, not just how it happens to be being
used on a particular occasion by some people.
We can repeat the point by making sense of Louie’s situation. He has to under-
stand what is going on when Huey and Dewey are talking. He has to appreciate that
they are using an evaluative concept and what the dialogue is about; if he does not,
then there is no meaningful rejection but just misﬁring communication. Louie
chooses not to use and apply ‘lewd’ and LEWD and refuses to enter into a detailed
and sincere discussion in the same way as the two of them, because he rejects the
evaluative point of the term and concept. (He may be rejecting the con evaluation
speciﬁcally because he enjoys displays of a sexual nature. Or, alternatively, he may
reject LEWD in a more holistic fashion: whether the pointed evaluation is pro, con, or
neutral, he dislikes a concept that groups together certain sorts of sexual activity and
then presents them positively or negatively.) He does so for reasons to do with how it
picks out actions and gives them evaluative sheen. All of this does not cast doubt on
the fact that LEWD is not an essentially evaluative concept. It shows only that Louie has
made an evaluation of some (evaluative) concept, and has chosen to reject it.
Similarly, we can presume that Huey and Dewey (if they are reﬂective) have evalu-
ated the concept and decided to use it sincerely. The fact that Louie judges and rejects
the concept after reﬂecting on its evaluative point and potential for use in a discus-
sion seems to strengthen the claim that it is to be treated as an evaluative concept.
We can even go further than Roberts’ line, if we need to. We could take any
concept, it need not be evaluative. Perhaps for some reason I object to the idea of and
application of BACHELOR or CHAIR or, for reasons of imaginative realism, some concept
used by some group alien to me involving how one should count objects or classify
actions. I might refuse to engage in meaningful, ﬁrst-order discussion using the
concept, just as Louie does in the case above. But would my rejection cast any serious
doubt on any aspect of the concept being essential to the concept? I do not see that it
would, at least without there being additional details provided for the rejection. In
which case, it would then probably be those details that would be the deciding factor,
not the overall nature of the concept itself.25
(ii) One can take three broad lines in response to Väyrynen’s second argument.
First, one can agree with Väyrynen: we have utterances such as (8) which do not
24 If they reject it but do so based on inadequate understanding, then I could be accused of changing the
rules of Väyrynen’s set-up, since the scenario of an objector makes sense only if we assume that there is
some meaningful dialogue between the parties and no talking past one another.
25 There is one potential ﬂy in the ointment of this entire counter. We assume that someone can
understand a concept without thereby sharing it. Why this could be a problem and how nonseparationists
can meet it is the topic of the next chapter.
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admit of any semantic impropriety, think that the evaluations that are part of the
concept cannot constrain one’s literal use of the thick term or concept, and hence
conclude that such evaluations therefore cannot be part of the semantic core of the
term. Second, one can disagree with Väyrynen and argue that utterances such as
(8) are semantically improper.26 Third, one can question Väyrynen’s set-up.
Throughout his discussion of ‘lewd’ and other terms, he presumes a single speciﬁc
evaluation, a pro or a con, and then the sort of tension in (8) arises because we seem
to be negating it. What if we assume, instead, that a thick term and associated concept
can embrace a range of different speciﬁc evaluations—pro, con, neither—in the
way I have discussed earlier in this study under the heading of ‘evaluative ﬂexibility’?
I take this third approach.
Väyrynen does consider this option, but what he says is not very convincing to my
mind.27 He notes that this position will make concepts and their mastery complex
affairs. I agree. Unfortunately, he does not provide any discussion to show that this is
implausible. (To my mind, it is a very plausible claim, given what we know about
humans, their thought process, and their communication abilities.) However, he does
say that even if concepts are complex, it is better to explain their evaluative com-
plexity in other ways, “on the basis of various pieces of world knowledge, substantive
evaluative beliefs and general-purpose abilities which aren’t speciﬁcally concep-
tual”.28 I do not know what it would be to separate such matters from our use of
evaluative concepts (or concepts that prima facie appear evaluative), especially
‘substantive evaluative beliefs’. This may reﬂect and continue the difference between
the two of us I expressed in §7.2 between essential and inherent evaluation.
The main point Väyrynen makes is to imagine that a proponent of the view will
claim that “many words are correctly interpreted in different contexts”. To illustrate
the contention he considers the use of ‘cut’ and CUT via considerations from John
Searle, who provides different examples of how ‘cut’ is used and what it implies:
cutting a cake with a lawnmower and cutting the grass with a knife both seem
wrong.29 (We can add ‘cut the cloth’, ‘cut to the chase’, ‘she cut me up’ (re. driving),
‘they cut in’ (re. queuing), and ‘he is all cut up’ (re. being devastated); we can talk of
the noun as well as the verb; we can distinguish piercing, slicing, separating, shaping;
and so on.) Väyrynen simply casts doubt on whether there is a single concept CUT that
the word refers to in all of its uses. But he does allow that there can be ‘free
enrichment’ whereby an expression or word is given a pragmatically derived inter-
pretation that is more speciﬁc than what the expression literally encodes. (So I take it
that by this he imagines that the literally encoding may be very general, and is given
different speciﬁc senses pragmatically.)
26 Bedke (2014) claims this.
27 Väyrynen (2013), pp. 226–9. As I do, Väyrynen refers to Dancy (1995) as the main source for
this view.
28 Väyrynen (2013), pp. 227–8. 29 Searle (1980), pp. 222–3.
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My response to this move is twofold. First, the conclusions Väyrynen draws might
be true for ‘cut’ and the (clearly) different uses of the word in different contexts. The
question that Väyrynen does not discuss head on iswhether the same is true of concepts
such as MACABRE, and even SIMILAR, which seem to have far fewer speciﬁc meanings
and uses. The proposal is only that there will be a little variety of speciﬁc evaluation
given, pro, con, or neither. Drawing doubt on the more varied ‘cut’ may do nothing to
shift the nonseparationist proposal of evaluative ﬂexibility that I favour.
Second, Väyrynen is happy to treat thin concepts as evaluative but not thick
concepts. Yet the phenomena that I have discussed in this book put pressure on
that clean division. DUTY for a start may convey different speciﬁc evaluations. In that
case, Väyrynen may not treat it and concepts like it as inherently evaluative. Fine. So
perhaps only those concepts that have a single speciﬁc evaluation whenever sincerely
used (with no sarcasm, etc.) have a chance of being classed as inherently evaluative.
But, even in that case, we saw that MORALLY GOOD, for example, may not ﬁt the needed
proﬁle, for it could be objected to (it can be sincerely used by some to criticize others,
and some nihilists may reject the concept altogether). In which case, it would be
better to read the evaluation it conveyed as pragmatically given. But now we are
getting fewer and fewer concepts counted as inherently evaluative. The whole picture
building up is one where Väyrynen has very tightly conceived notions both of what
evaluation is and of what inherently/essentially evaluative concepts are, and these
may be applied to very few concepts.
This is reﬂected in the fact that he has quite a different view of concepts and
conceptual understanding from that which I have offered. This takes me to my
response to his third set of considerations.
(iii) The details of the considerations Väyrynen offers (shapelessness, etc.) need
not hold us up. The key point to focus on is whether Grice’s razor can be invoked and
whether other things are equal. In his use of this philosophical principle, Väyrynen is
raising the question of whether thick concepts are somehow special in how they
relate to the evaluation that they carry and convey. He is, relatedly, questioning
whether such concepts are any different from those obviously nonevaluative concepts
such as CHAIR and OLD that can convey evaluation but which we would not want to
classify as evaluative. He thinks that there is no difference in kind, at least in respect
of the evaluation being inherent, and that any of the phenomena standardly invoked
in the literature do not justify the classiﬁcation of thick concepts as special. What
difference or differences there are are differences of degree: certain concepts convey
evaluative points more often than others (and far more often in some cases) and in
certain ways that others do not, but the way in which they carry such points should
be explained pragmatically, just as it is for OLD and CHAIR.30
30 See, for example, Väyrynen (2013), p. 10.
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There are three sorts of response to this challenge. The ﬁrst is to show that
Väyrynen is wrong in what he says about the various phenomena such as shapeless-
ness. I do not take this route here, in part because I think that Väyrynen says some
interesting and plausible things about the phenomena he discusses along the way.
The second is to choose a different phenomenon that Väyrynen has not discussed in
order to prove the special nature. I do not take this route because I think that sucks
me into a position that I do not wish to defend, namely that the evaluative and the
descriptive are starkly different. I prefer a third strategy, namely to question and
undermine some of Väyrynen’s assumptions; I have already begun to raise these at
the end of the previous sub-section.31
He assumes that there has to be some division between evaluative and non-
evaluative concepts or, better, some division between those concepts that are inher-
ently evaluative and those that are not and which convey evaluation accidentally. As
shown in the previous chapter, I think that the examples do not show this at all, even
if we may wish to mark out some concepts as clearly and unquestionably evaluative,
and mark others as nonevaluative even if they can be used to convey evaluative point
every so often, such as CHAIR.
This links to how we regard differences among concepts. I think that there are
differences, but I argue that we can determine what those differences are and where
they lie through judgement, perhaps on a case-by-case basis, and indeed presumably
we can spot trends. Inevitably there will be disagreements and, indeed, some grey
area as to which concepts are evaluative and why. This, I very strongly suspect, will
not satisfy Väyrynen (and others). He wants us to be able to say clearly, using a set of
conditions (which may well be necessary and sufﬁcient conditions in some form),
what it is for a concept to be evaluative. Indeed, putting matters like this is one way of
framing the narrative of his entire book. But imposing this sort of injunction on the
phenomena creates problems, as we have seen in this chapter. He stresses at various
points in his book that if we have a mass of concepts all treated as evaluative, then
we will not be able to mark as we should important differences between concepts.32
I agree that we should spot trends and differences. But I deny that all of these
differences have to be so distinct as Väyrynen makes out, and one has to nail them
with conditions that apparently have to be so clear-cut and ﬁnal.
31 Väyrynen does try to make sense of the type of position I mark out, namely that evaluation is not
exhausted by PRO and CON; see Väyrynen (2013), pp. 208–13. Two points are worth making. First, by his
own admission he struggles to make sense of this position, although to be fair there have been very few
pieces of work to reference and work with, and no extended discussions at the time of his writing. Second,
he latches onto the idea, from Roberts, that there could be marks of the evaluative, and then seeks to show
that these marks do nothing to single out supposed evaluative concepts as special. I discussed this in
Chapter Six, note 29.
32 For example, see Väyrynen (2013), p. 37: “Moreover, even if paradigmatic thick terms and concepts
turn out not to be inherently evaluative, a characterization that sorts chocolate and athletic into the same
conceptual bin as cruel, just, selﬁsh and courageousmight still be thought to ignore important differences in
evaluative depth and signiﬁcance.” I have not detailed it here, but he is interested in comparing and
contrasting regular thick terms with pejoratives among other examples.
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All of this reﬂects the different view of concepts we have, and a difference between
us when it comes to semantics and pragmatics. I am not about to try to undermine
this important linguistic distinction completely, but it is instructive to question the
supposed clarity and strictness of it, and as Väyrynen’s example of Lehrer shows,
some linguists query how clear the divide is.33
Once we start to focus on terms exclusively, and assume that what goes for terms
has implications for concepts, we can get sucked into the assumption that there is a
clear difference between semantics and pragmatics: a clear difference between the
literal meanings of terms and what they can be used to convey (and how they do so).
We get sucked into thinking that, on the one hand, there are the terms in ‘the page
and the air’, and what they standardly mean in the abstract, and, on the other, the
meanings that are conveyed beyond this. Once this move is made and accepted,
Väyrynen is able to identify his target. To say that a thick term (or concept) has
inherent evaluation is to say that this is part of the meaning of the concept, which
means that, because it is inherent, it is part of the literal meaning of the concept. But,
as Väyrynen can show, when we think about how terms (and concepts) are used, we
can see that the evaluations seemingly do not act as standard semantic entailments
are supposed to act. So it is seemingly natural to infer that they are accidental to the
thick terms (and concepts), and not inherent in them.
My counter-move from above, in (i), can be made to this. But we can also unpick
the background assumptions. I prefer to focus on concepts rather than terms, even if
I agree that we should pay attention to how terms are used. Terms and concepts are
different, and not just because—very crudely—terms are ‘speech-things’ and con-
cepts are ‘idea-things’. It is not as if there is no link at all between the terms we use
and the concepts that are employed, nor no link at all between the semantics of a
term and the content of a concept. However, I am more liberal than Väyrynen.34 The
ways in which we use a concept build from a range of uses of a term in various
contexts. To reuse previous thoughts, we understand what the concept THINKING
means only by considering the various contexts in which it is used and how it is
used. Aside from some simple and trivially correct synonym such as ‘mental life’, we
develop and understand characterizations of ‘thinking’ (and ‘mental life’) only by
appreciating various examples, their similarities and differences. And, yes, sometimes
a term can be used in a wide variety of ways, and we may wish to resist the idea that
all of those ways are part of the ‘core’ of the term or concept. ‘Cut’ and CUT show this
phenomenon well. But just because some examples are like this, it does not mean that
we then have to restrict the core meaning of every term and concept example in some
very narrow fashion. I think that our use of concepts (and terms), and the variety of
33 For more on this see Travis (1997). Despite his obvious commitment to a sharp division between the
two, even Väyrynen acknowledges that the world of language is messy. See Väyrynen (2013), pp. 51ff.
34 The relevance here of themes in the thought of the later Wittgenstein will be obvious to many
readers.
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uses that there may be, feeds into the meaning of the concept. It is clear that
Väyrynen is far more resistant to this idea than I am.
That is why Väyrynen’s citing of Lehrer’s discussion of wine is interesting, and it
also indicates the worry that he focuses too much on terms. Off the top of my head
the term ‘sweet’ can be used to indicate at least three different concepts: the non-
evaluative concept pertaining to a ﬂavour, such as the ﬂavour of normal cane-sugar;
to indicate PRO, as in ‘Look at my sweet set of wheels, man!’; and, third, the evaluative
concept that typically indicates something pro, but which need not always.35Now, all
three concepts may be at work in wine conversation, although the ﬁrst is most likely
to be used literally when thinking about something such as dessert wines. I presume
that the concept Lehrer focuses on in wine conversation is something evaluative that
can often be used to convey pro and con ideas. Is any evaluation of pro and con that
comes forth in such wine conversations accidental to the concept as understood in
this way? No. It is an important part of the concept that it has the potential to be used
in these pointed ways, and the fact that it can be used in such ways, and that it is
pregnant with these ideas itself all of the time, makes any use of it evaluative. We get
speciﬁc ideas and it helps to build a certain context and picture of the wine. This leads
into my ﬁnal point in this sub-section.
All of this reﬂects the different views of how concepts can carry or convey
evaluation that Väyrynen and I have. Evaluation is not a separate thing conveyed
by concepts. I regard evaluation as something that is both conceptually basic and also a
complex aspect of our lives that, in turn, is given life only by the concepts which are
considered by mature users as evaluative. Although appealing, thinking of evaluation
as something exhausted by PRO and CON and hived off from the concepts, even if such
notions live in a few of them inherently, seems to me to be too narrow a view of
evaluation and our evaluative lives. In this way Väyrynen shares a great deal with all
separationists. And it is a view I have sought to challenge in this study.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have outlined some arguments against the idea that thick concepts
are inherently or essentially evaluative. We have seen that these arguments can be
questioned and found wanting. Their failure helps to cement my view. By saying that
thick concepts are essentially evaluative we are indicating that certain concepts have
certain roles and jobs to do, and we have a certain need for concepts that have as their
prime and essential role the conveyance of evaluation. Even if we allow that such
concepts can, even individually, carry a whole host of evaluations and be used in
many ways, that does not detract from their essential role.
35 Just to follow through on that, we might say that something is sweet (and I do not mean too sweet),
where in fact we want something a bit edgy and dangerous, or something with a bit of bite. Sometimes we





In Chapter Two, §2.6(d), I indicated two worries for nonseparationists, among four.1
In this chapter I address them.
First, nonseparationists routinely say that in order to understand and fully master
a concept one has to ‘latch onto’ the point of it and why people use it. It is a claim that
has been prominent in the literature. But what does ‘latch onto’ mean? Does it mean
sharing the evaluation involved in the concept and the entire point of it? If it does,
that seems strange because it appears we can easily understand other people’s
evaluative concepts without sharing such concepts and sincerely agreeing with
their point and use.2 If such ‘latching onto’ is interpreted strongly and if it is further
viewed as a necessary condition for understanding, then it would seem to make the
understanding of others’ concepts and points of view impossible.
Second, we saw that nonseparationists are accused of not having the resources to
explain how normative criticism of others is possible. (Blackburn used the example of
CUTE to make the point.) Apparently, if nonseparationism is correct, people can
merely describe the fact that other people hold concepts different from theirs, and
they must uncritically accept that there are just different ways of valuing the world,
different ‘organic whirls’.
1 They were listed as the third and fourth concerns.
2 For a detailed discussion of this and other issues, see Sreenivasan (2001). I do not have the space to
discuss Sreenivasan’s argument in detail, but it is worth sketching. His target is a combination of ideas, due
to Hurley and Donald Davidson, such that if we assume an anthropologist has understood (supposedly)
alien ethical evaluations and conceptual schemes then we must assume both that such evaluations and
schemes are not so alien and, crucially, that our anthropologist must sincerely accept those evaluations.
Sreenivasan argues that we can understand others (and treat them still as alien) without acceptance. I agree,
although I believe he is too hard on the ‘Hurley–Davidson’ position and, unlike him, I do not believe at all
that this position is committed to what he calls the ‘descriptive equivalence thesis’, which is the claim we
met in Chapter Five: for every thick concept there is some nonevaluative equivalent concept that matches
the thick concept extension perfectly.
For a standard-deﬁning discussion about this issue from an anthropologist’s point of view see Geertz
(1973).
These are more or less the worries, but I articulate them further below. I begin
with the ﬁrst criticism, in §8.2, and explain why it is supposed to be a worry for
nonseparationists. In §8.3 I show how we can solve it or, rather, show why it is not so
much a problem at all. I do not have the space to pursue all of the details of a solution,
but all that is needed here is an indication of how the problem is resolved. The real
value, I think, is not in solving a potential problem, but in making explicit how
understanding others’ evaluations works from a nonseparationist point of view.
Along the way I contrast nonseparationism with separationism again. This allows
me to accommodate one of the desiderata mentioned in Chapter Two, namely an
explanation of how disputes work. (The other desideratum mentioned was evaluative
ﬂexibility.) I also highlight a problem for separationism. I take this problem to be an
echo of the problems discussed in Chapters Five and Six rather than a substantially
new and different point. But it is worth highlighting all the same since it contributes
to the narrative that separationism ends up looking odd.
In §8.4 I address the second concern. In §8.5 I move the discussion on a little, while
staying within the general topic of encountering and trying to understand
others. I discuss Williams’ view of what is likely to happen when we meet other
societies and consider how their members categorize matters evaluatively. I use this
to provide perspective on the previous discussion. I do not have much to say about
Williams’ own account, aside from the fact that I believe he is slightly too pessimistic.
At the end I introduce a criticism of separationism based on Williams’ ideas due
to A. W. Moore. This again echoes comments of mine from Chapter Six. In §8.6
I also offer a note on the thin in the light of Williams’ views, as promised. In
§8.7 I conclude.
8.2 The Problem of Understanding Others
Recall that Williams, in referencing the idea of a thick concept, cites Foot and
Murdoch. His full words are:
The idea that it might be impossible to pick up an evaluative concept unless one shared its
evaluative interest is basically a Wittgensteinian idea. I ﬁrst heard it expressed by Philippa Foot
and Iris Murdoch in a seminar in the 1950s.3
This is ambiguous as we will see. (We will also see that Williams clariﬁes what he
means.) But one way of reading this—perhaps the natural way of reading this—is to
think that if an anthropologist, say, is to understand the evaluative concepts of some
group she is investigating, then we must assume that she holds and applies such
concepts sincerely. That is, she is in agreement with the group’s evaluations. If she is
not in agreement, then she will fail to understand how their concepts should typically
be withheld and applied.
3 Williams (1985), note 7, pp. 217–18.
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We normally think that anthropologists can easily understand other people and
their concepts without sincerely holding the evaluations associated with such a
concept. McDowell, in a throwaway line, assumes this is the case and the possible
worry no worry at all.4 Why, then, is this supposed to be a problem for nonsepar-
ationism? Recall that nonseparationists say that evaluative concepts are shapeless
with respect to the descriptive because they are human tools and lying behind such
things are highly complex human interests and motivations. The suspicion is that
nonseparationists then have to say that unless you share the interests and motiv-
ations that shape, and are reﬂected by, an evaluative concept you will fail to judge
what falls under it correctly. And if you fail to do that, then it (supposedly) shows you
have not understood the concept. So it seems as if nonseparationists are committed
to an implausible view of how people come to understand other people’s evaluative
concepts and outlooks.
Separationists are seemingly on ﬁrmer ground. (I mentioned this in Chapter Two
§2.6(d) also.) If we assume that there is a division between descriptive and evaluative
stuff, then we can easily conceptualize the success of anthropological investigation
along separationist lines: an anthropologist follows and transcribes all of the situ-
ations to which a concept applies in descriptive terms, and then she can choose to
apply or withhold some pro or con evaluation afterwards, in accordance with the
group she is investigating or otherwise. Some separationist positions may complicate
that story, but the core idea remains intact.
Furthermore, despite my use of anthropology and of ‘seemingly alien groups’,
this is a worry for any sort of situation where we are called upon to try to understand
those who evaluate differently from how we do. That includes understanding
your neighbours and your close loved ones, as well as understanding societies
that are quite different from you such as those on the other side of the world or
on Mars.
8.3 Soothing the Worry
I introduce two examples so as to make some ideas clear. These pick up the ﬁnal
thought of the previous section. It may be that members of a group have a concept
TABOO that is just like ours, and thus are somewhat close to us. However, they apply it
to actions, people, and other things that an anthropologist would not normally think
of as taboo. Second, and more radically, in a second case a group has a concept
SCHMABOO. This is like TABOO but which incorporates interesting twists and grave
departures; for example, ‘it does not apply after dark’, ‘it applies only to the activities
of physically disabled people’, and ‘is punishable by death’. They are a group that are,
in conceptual terms, a lot further away from our anthropologist. Of course, an
4 McDowell (1981), p. 144.
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anthropologist and her team will need to exercise skill and judgement in working out
the differences between these two cases.
How do we solve the problem or, better, soothe the worry and show that this is not
such a problem after all? The key thing to note is that there is a shift across a vague
and grey area. Nonseparationists are committed to thick evaluative concepts being
evaluative, and therefore that in order to understand others’ evaluative concepts you
have to take that into account. Indeed, it is often said that non-users of the concept
have to ‘appreciate’ its point. (I made much of this idea in Chapters Five and Six.) But
to appreciate the point is one thing; to sincerely hold the evaluation expressed using
the concept is another. It is this last possibility that creates the problem, and so
nonseparationists need tomake sure they can resist it and remain true to their position.
In order to show how they can easily do this, let us begin by returning to Williams.
His wording of “shared its evaluative interest . . . ” may suggest ‘holding sincerely’ the
speciﬁc evaluation expressed by the concept, and even the reason or reasons behind it
being used in the ﬁrst place. Yet one can also read this remark as suggesting
something else, namely that what must be held is some more general interest or set
of interests that are given voice by the concept. (Indeed, in the main text, Williams
voices this.5) Even if our anthropologist does not hold sincerely the speciﬁc
evaluation expressed by SCHMABOO (that is, some con evaluation towards particular
activities done by particular types of person on particular days), she has some general
evaluative interests that the concept taps into, namely taking some negative evalu-
ative stances to (non-speciﬁed) certain people in certain circumstances. After all,
there will be concepts in her repertoire, such as TABOO as well as (perhaps) BLAME,
APPROPRIATE, LIMIT, and REASONABLE (and LEWD, GRUESOME, and BARBARIC), that will have
clear links and import. Indeed, TABOO is a thick concept. ‘Taboo’ means more than
just ‘impermissible’. It means that in certain, many, or all contexts a certain sort of
behaviour is unacceptable because it contravenes serious rules and norms, with
signiﬁcant consequences to follow if certain actions are done. Taboo activities are
‘beyond the pale’. With that in mind, our anthropologist will be able to make ﬁner
discriminations and interpretations of what the group does and how it categorizes.
There is a keen interest among humans to conceptualize some matters in this fashion:
to indicate things that are seriously wrong in a certain manner.
Indeed, this now shows us how the nonseparationist can resist the problem. When
we compare the two concept examples I presume that attention focuses immediately
on the radical SCHMABOO. But let us instead start with the case of TABOO. We imagine,
indeed stipulate, that our anthropologist has TABOO. Part of her task is to work out
whether the group has any concepts that map onto hers. After a while she is able to
conclude that, although it maps onto different things—perhaps different foodstuffs,
play activities, and sexual orientations—the concept is the same. She concludes there
5 Williams (1985), pp. 141–2. See also Williams (1995), p. 206.
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is just a difference in application. Part of the skill of being an anthropologist, at
least through a philosopher’s eyes, is being able to distinguish a situation where
there is a difference in applications of the same concept and different conceptions
of the same concept from a situation where there are just different concepts at
issue. (And the criteria for this will be complicated and possibly difﬁcult or
impossible to articulate in a highly speciﬁc way.) The former sort of case places
the anthropologist closer to the group, and we can use that to understand the latter
sort of case.
In the former case she may employ the same concept, but she does not apply it to
the same items. This may mean that there is a difference in conception of the
concept.6 Yet, despite this, it is easy to see how she could understand the different
conception. Why? She holds the general evaluative interest of the concept—as we just
saw when discussing the Williams’ quotation—and, because of this, she is able to
appreciate why the concept is applied to the items it is applied to, even if she is
slightly surprised every so often with how the concept is used.
It is a short stretch from here to the more radical sort of case of SCHMABOO. For
then she begins to note that not all is at it is in her social world. She ﬁnds that the
word applies to types of thing she does not normally think it should apply to at all,
and she ﬁnds that certain limits are put on the concept that, in her normative view,
make little sense. This could be a long, frustrating process as she tries to make sense
of what exactly is going on. Part of this process will be questioning whether she is
dealing with TABOO or whether she is justiﬁed in describing the tribe as using a
different, but related, concept altogether.
This is still all perfectly ﬁne on the nonseparationist reading. As I have tried to
draw out, understanding can occur while keeping fast to the chief nonseparationist
idea, that evaluation is essentially what a thick concept is all about. So long as our
anthropologist shows an appreciation of the evaluation involved in the concept, she
6 I think that there can be a difference between these two cases: two people having the same concept and
applying it differently, and two people having different conceptions of the same concept. But articulating
clearly what that difference amounts to at a more speciﬁc level of detail than these two general descriptions
will be hard if not impossible for many concepts. One may have to fall back to judging and commenting on
any differences on a case-by-case basis. It will be hard because presumably any difference in conception will
be shown mainly by the same term and concept being applied differently anyway. I do not attempt to say
more about this topic here. However, I ammerely indicating that in the scenario I envisage we should make
space for there being these possible differences. As well as some radical tribe using SCHMABOO, our
anthropologist may come across a people that she can justiﬁably say are using TABOO, but just with a
different sharpening of that concept from her. This latter case is different again from a case where she
disagrees with a colleague in her anthropology department who has similar cultural beliefs to hers. In that
case the two of them differ merely on a few applications of TABOO, but where there are so few differences, or
ones of such little signiﬁcance, that it does not seem justiﬁable to label this difference between them as a
difference in conception of the same concept. At this point it seems better to conceptualize this as a
difference in application of the same concept. I say all of this while acknowledging that there may well
be no difference in kind between these cases, certainly no stark ones, and much will depend on the
narrative and reasons we can give for these summarizing labels in the cases we encounter.
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will be able to understand it. We can see how she is able to do this by linking it to
what she does know and how she does evaluate.
Two further points emerge. First, in this book I have often talked of the ‘evaluative
point’ of the concept, or similar, something that we must appreciate. This is normally
in the context of appreciation of the point of the concept, one’s reason or reasons for
holding it and applying it. Such a matter will be quite a complex affair, and mastery of
a concept may sometimes not be easy. This connects with other times I have used the
phrase ‘evaluative point’, to indicate some speciﬁc pro, con or neutral evaluation
(of some strength) of some item. These two uses come together, of course: in
appreciating what a concept is and how it should be used, one has to appreciate
when and why one should take some pro or con stance towards something. What an
anthropologist has to do is appreciate this range of speciﬁc evaluations, and under-
standing why it is that they apply and when.
This complicates our question, for we should strictly ask whether an anthropolo-
gist has to hold sincerely all of the speciﬁc evaluative points that a concept is used to
convey across many contexts. But that is no real problem. And, all of this ﬁts nicely
with the above train of thought. For there is a general evaluative interest in using a
concept and using it to express a range of ideas and seeing it function.
Second, I have set things up so that we have a difference between appreciation and
sincere holding, and tried to articulate how ‘appreciation’ is consistent with non-
separationism. As we see when we read anthropological accounts, and as we can
easily suppose anyway, when understanding others and their concepts, certain states
of mind, such as imagination, pretence and role-play will be used. We can under-
stand other people’s concepts only if we can draw on our own. Part of that process
involves imagining what we would do in this situation and seeing how that possibility
compares with what happens. Further, we might pretend to be the sort of person
we are investigating: drawing on our concepts as a way to think our way into their
mind. So in our imagined scenario, our anthropologist looks at the types of thing
that the group is averse to, and plays around with her concepts that express types
of impermissibility. She notes that that sort of impermissibility seems very similar
to what she thinks of as being taboo, even if there are a few differences in some cases.
All the time she has to have some general appreciation of the type of thing going
on and what the concept is used for, and she can do that only if she has in mind
her concepts.
This whole section is simply a sketch of what a nonseparationist can say. One
question worth pursuing is how the different stances and states of mind, such as
imagination and pretence, work in this context and how we can ﬁnely distinguish
them. This would be interesting work in philosophy of mind, say. For reasons for
space I do not do that work here.
So even if the details require more work, I think we can safely put the ﬁrst worry of
this chapter aside. Two last topics are required, however.
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First, I have made out that we would expect that an anthropologist would draw on
her concepts to understand others. But does she have to? Or, to ask this question in
another way, where does separationism stand? Could an anthropologist understand
others’ concepts by thinking only in purely descriptive concepts?
What seemed to be a good position now looks odd, and its oddity underscores
some of the points from Chapter Five. Is it really possible to note down all of the
descriptive information in order to form the concept? We might be able to do that
with a friendly insider’s help, but after she leaves us would we be able to go on with
conﬁdence that we had mastered or captured the concept? It is only by appreciating
the contours of our own concepts, and thinking about why they group certain events
and situations together, that we can even hope to map the contours of other people’s
concepts and, at a second-order level, judge how alien or close to our own concepts
they are. Separating the evaluative from the descriptive does not seem the best way to
understand, simply because we are trying to understand other human’s evaluations.
Putting our evaluations aside and focusing just on the descriptive when understand-
ing other evaluative concepts (or potentially evaluative concepts)—when put plainly
like that—seems a recipe for disaster.
Furthermore, there is an oddity to be repeated from Chapter Six. There I cast
strong doubt on there being a clear split between evaluative and descriptive concepts
anyway. Trying to understand the contours of how a tribe uses a concept, which
seems like a good candidate for our concept TABOO, and then deciding whether
it is TABOO or perhaps even SCHMABOO, will require use of many concepts and ideas
in the anthropologist’s repertoire. What types of concept will be off-limits, accord-
ing to separationists? Presumably INAPPROPRIATE, ILLICIT, and IMPERMISSIBLE. But what
also of FORBIDDEN, PROHIBITION, VETO, and the like? The separationist response is
obvious. With all of these we can supposedly offer some sort of separationist
analysis: something descriptive combined with some negative element. The points
I raise now are twofold. First, it is unclear to me whether these concepts are free
from evaluation, or are simply nonevaluative, in the way separationists think.
Second, even assuming that there exist some clear descriptive concepts (and
I have allowed that), then this group may not be an adequate basis for an anthro-
pologist to do her work effectively. CHAIR, TABLE, and their ilk will be in the group
of kosher concepts, but they hardly make for a good basis for anthropological
understanding. I have raised doubts about concepts such as JUSTIFIED, SIMILAR, and
many more such concepts in Chapter Six. (This is just restating the ﬁrst worry
above, again.) I think it highly doubtful that unarguably nonevaluative concepts such
as LEFT, RIGHT, TABLE, CHAIR, and their ilk, plus some separable and separated PRO and
CON, will be enough basis on which to understand other societies, let alone allow one
to achieve mastery of alien concepts.
A second topic needs to be cleared up. Recall that in Chapter Two I said that any
account of thick concepts should explain how disputes work. I indicated that there
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was a tension between the two broad types of separationism. Simple separationists
seemed better at accommodating (a type of) evaluative ﬂexibility while complex
separationists seemed better able to accommodate disputes and to ensure that people
could understand one another and not talk past one another.
I have already shown how nonseparationism can accommodate evaluative ﬂexi-
bility. Everything is already in place to show how disputes work. The key, put simply,
is that right at the heart of any nonseparationism is a focus on mastery of concepts
and an appreciation of the point of their use, including the evaluative aspect. When
one turns one’s attention to others’ concepts, one does so through the language of
understanding their concepts. Right at the start the theorist states that one can
understand others only by understanding their concepts. From here one can get
easily to a point to explaining how disputes work, because unless one understands the
concepts at issue, one will not be able to criticize.
So we have here a tightly drawn circle. But this is still an improvement on anything
in separationism. In complex separationism, people were assumed to be speaking
roughly about the same terms and using roughly the same concepts because there
were general ideas that were exactly the same, with any differences (which are
necessary for there to be a dispute) characterized with separable Xs, Ys, and Zs.
The problems here are manifold, most of which I have just given above. Although
this complex separationist analysis may seem neat and tidy on the page, it does not
survive sustained thought. Communication, agreement, and disagreement are far
more complex phenomena than such a separationist analysis can capture.
Here end my comments on this supposed problem of how we can understand
others. In ending, we should notice one thing. When imagining our anthropologist
encountering and interpreting groups and their concepts, we have not commented
on any evaluative judgement she makes about them. Are they decent concepts?
Illuminating? Awful? Evil? Silly? What do they tell her of her own concepts? These
are questions that I now think about.
8.4 Criticism of Others
Recall that Blackburn thinks that nonseparationists cannot make room for normative
criticism, and uses CUTE to support his claim. We can add to the examples. We are
discussing disagreements and criticism that relate both to different and controversial
applications of a shared concept (such as TABOO and CUTE) and the application and
embracing of concepts that one would never use (such as SCHMABOO and also various
common-or-garden racist and sexist epithets and slurs).
There are two parts to Blackburn’s criticism. First, when explaining the situation of
those that encounter others with whom they disagree, nonseparationists are sup-
posedly committed to an overly conservative acceptance of anyone’s use of thick
concepts, such as CUTE. They cannot say more than the fact that people are so
committed to seeing the world a certain way. Second, Blackburn thinks that
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separationists can explain how we can criticize normatively and, by implication,
indicates that this is the best if not only way to criticize: namely to separate
description of the world (a certain way of dressing, speaking, walking, and acting,
for example) from one’s evaluative stance towards it (seeing it as something to be
encouraged in and emulated by women, for example).
I think that both of these claims are wrong.7 I see no reason to think that
separationism—and the sort of noncognitivistic, quasi-realism that Blackburn has
long advocated—is better able to explain how we can criticize others. I have already
worried about whether we can split evaluation from nonevaluative, descriptive
content as cleanly as he may think. But we can put that aside and see that the
criticism falls short anyway. First of all, it is not quite true that nonseparationists can
literally say nothing. I see no reason to think that nonseparationists who encounter
others (or who are explaining what people do when they encounter others) are stuck
with merely describing the fact that others have different concepts. Nonseparationists
can easily say that different way of viewing the world is an unjustiﬁed one, one that
expresses unkindness, cruelty, or whatever else. Indeed, if we think through the more
different types of concept, such as SCHMABOO and controversial slurs, when one is
working out that they are different and how different they will be, one will realize that
one would not adopt them oneself. It is but a short step from there to wish to criticize,
if any step is required at all. The key question that Blackburn should raise, and which
he may have in mind anyway, is whether one can criticize with any hope of one’s
judgement acquiring legitimacy. By this I mean that one hopes that one’s judgement
is more than just a disguised description of the fact that someone else’s use of some
concept is something that one would not adopt. One wishes to say that this other
view is bad and hopes to at least have a chance of convincing others of this. One’s
view has to seem and be justiﬁable outside of one’s own viewpoint and society. Again,
I see no reason to think that nonseparationists cannot hope for this. They can point
to how the use of the concept may create upset and hurt, may lead to certain lives
going less well than they might, and so on. They reason and attempt to justify using
their own concepts and, if they do seek to convince, attempt to ﬁnd ideas and notions
that provide bridges between their views and others’.
So I think that nonseparationists can explain how criticism of others is possible.
It is just that they do it by using other thin and thick evaluative concepts. This takes
me to the second part of Blackburn’s worry. I do not see that assuming some sharp
split between the evaluative and the descriptive helps in any way, even if we assume
that this can be achieved. Imagine that us and them agree on a set of some
evaluatively neutral descriptions of actions, styles of dress, and all the rest, and that
while we take a negative view towards such actions, they take a positive view. We are
then left with saying to them, and to any third parties who can hear us, that they
7 I ﬁrst considered this issue in Kirchin (2000).
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should not take such a positive view. And why not? ‘Because doing so is wrong’, we
will say. What is there left to defend such a position? Perhaps we can point to the
upset, harm, and the like, all of the matters that nonseparationists will point to as
well. There is as much chance of separationists convincing them and neutrals as there
is of nonseparationists doing so.
As far as I can see, this supposed advantage of separationism over nonseparaton-
ism is nothing of the sort, but is instead a red herring. The result applies not only to
CUTE but, as I have indicated, it covers many concepts and their applications where we
might not only differ but disagree. Nothing within nonseparationism says that we
must accept what there is without challenge. Nonseparationists have as many, or as
few, resources to criticize and do so legitimately. The difﬁculty lies not with the
adoption of nonseparationism, or even separationism. The difﬁculty lies with trying
to justify one’s own view and being able to convince others to act differently. These
are everyone’s problems in philosophy, and are as old as the subject itself.8
8.5 Williams on Evaluative Knowledge
Some of Williams’ most famous ideas in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
concern the encounters we have with societies who categorize differently from
how we do.9 Some of it has a decidedly pessimistic ﬂavour, although there are
points of optimistic relief. I summarize what he says below, before linking it to what
we have just discussed.
Williams imagines a ‘hypertraditional’ society, a society which is maximally
homogenous and is given to minimal reﬂection about its practices. Williams asks
whether such a society (or its members) can possess evaluative knowledge, speciﬁc-
ally expressed using thick concepts. He uses this question to introduce a key
distinction. If we think completely in terms of ‘objective knowledge’, that is (roughly)
how the world is and exists outside of any human perspective, he thinks it is unlikely
(to say the least) that the members of such a society possess evaluative knowledge.
We can talk of scientiﬁc claims being claims of knowledge in this sense, but not
evaluative ones. However, we can instead think in terms of ‘nonobjective knowledge’,
and see evaluative claims as being both cultural artefacts and embodying ideas about
how to live. In this sense members of the society could possess evaluative knowledge.
8 An aside. Väyrynen mentions racist and sexist epithets and slurs more often than I do in Väyrynen
(2013). But he does not discuss this worry of normative criticism, let alone argue that his pragmatic view
has some advantage over a semantic view regarding it.
9 This is drawn from across Williams (1985), although chapters 8 and 9 are particularly important.
There are a number of good discussions about Williams’ ideas. See in particular Altham (1995); Chappell
(2010); Fricker (2001); Moore (2003); Thomas (2006), pp. 153–7; and Thomas (2007). Williams asks his
question with regards to ethical knowledge alone because he thinks that the aesthetic, say, raises issues of its
own (1985), p. 135. (Which is itself interesting in the light of my discussion in Chapter Six.) I run things in
terms of evaluative knowledge since I see no reason why Williams’ comments about ethics do not apply
broadly to other forms of evaluation.
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Yet, Williams then compares members of this hypertraditional society with mem-
bers of a society that is not immune to reﬂection at some higher level, as the
hypertraditional society is really introduced so we can think harder about ourselves.
What happens at this level is that members of the group consider whether they really
are categorizing as they should, whether the world is as they depict it with their thick
concepts, and so on. In brief, Williams thinks that once we or any members of a
group think at the reﬂective level we will see our thick concepts for what they are:
local attempts to capture what we think the world is like. For Williams, reﬂection
“characteristically disturbs, unseats or replaces . . . traditional concepts” and it leads
him to say “if we agree that, at least as things are, the reﬂective level is not in a
position to give us knowledge we did not have before—then we reach the decidedly
un-Socratic conclusion that, in ethics, reﬂection can destroy knowledge”.10
As A. W. Moore points out in a nice discussion, this sort of reﬂection is interesting
because it undermines some of the concepts (perhaps all of the concepts) that are
required to think in the relevant terms to justify our concepts. (This sort of role
Moore labels ‘constitutional’.) Some of the justiﬁcation for ethical concepts may itself
be ethical. Someone might ask, ‘Should we really continue to justify our actions in
this way?’ The worry here is obvious. Moore continues from this point and says:
The people engaged in reﬂection can no longer make judgements of the relevant kind that
constitute the knowledge, although they can still have enough grasp on concepts of that kind,
from without, to see that they constitute knowledge. They may eventually recover the know-
ledge: various social forces may bring this about. But such forces may also prevent them from
thinking, at the relevant level, about what they are up to. They will never recover the knowledge
in the full light of reﬂection.11
We can pick up on the last comment. Once we are in the grip of reﬂective thinking it
is very hard, if not impossible, for us to see our ethical justiﬁcations of our ethical
concepts, say, in a genuine way: we will always be drawn to the thought that this is all
local. In addition, we will no longer see such judgements as embodying any sort of
knowledge.
Some claims may survive such reﬂection, however; Williams’ example is ‘one has
to have a special reason to kill someone’. But he remarks that this and similar beliefs
fall short of what will be required by an extensive and practical body of evaluative
knowledge. Furthermore, as I have mentioned in other parts of this book, he has little
time for thin concepts, given that they are, in effect, pale abstractions from the
evaluative concepts that do some real justiﬁcatory and categorizing work. Assuming
that we can have a system of evaluative knowledge based around some network of
thin concepts is, for Williams, a rose-tinted view and shows the false ambitions of
much of modern philosophy. Thin concepts are simply not world-guided in the right
sort of way.
10 Williams (1985), p. 158. 11 Moore (2003), p. 344.
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I have so far not pointed out something obvious, but very important. Clearly
societies and their individual members will be shaken to think reﬂectively about how
they justify and categorize if there is some encounter with a society that thinks in
different ways. Not every society will matter. On reﬂection, we may think there are
some societies that are so different from ours that any comparison with them—
certainly an evaluative comparison—will make no sense. There is a certain ‘relativism
of distance’, whereby it is only if a society is close to ours, if it thinks and justiﬁes in
ways we judge to be similar to our own, that we can talk of one or other of us being
correct and incorrect. Williams uses these thoughts to distinguish between ‘real’ and
‘notional’ confrontations: those ways of thinking and living which could be possible
for us and those which are not.
Within these thoughts he makes an optimistic claim.12 He admits that some thick
concepts can be seen to be the best and most appropriate ones to use. But this
optimism is couched in a pessimistic general discussion that compares science with
ethics. The former can aspire to objectivity, and even societies that are conceptually
distant from our own can be correct or incorrect, for science aims to depict the world
as it really is, free from human perspective. Ethics (and evaluative knowledge) can
never aspire to this sort of objectivity, but it can try to ape some of it, simply by
thinking through what sort of society is best. Williams entertains the idea that we
could try to base the best sort of society on ideas of human nature.13 Although he
admits that this is a “comprehensible” project, he is pessimistic about it, for he thinks,
chieﬂy, that any theory of human nature will radically underdetermine what ethical
options there will be in particular situations and in societies as a whole.
So, in short, the particular ideas of Williams add up to a general idea: that when
we come into contact with people from a society who think differently from how
we think, be they fairly close or somewhat distant, we may well reﬂect on how we
categorize and justify using our thick concepts. What we will see is that our way is
one way among others, and that is likely to unseat our concepts and, probably,
destroy our use of them. We could try to get back to a more innocent and pre-
reﬂective time but, as Williams points out, we cannot do that consciously, and it may
be hard to do that as a society.14
For those who ﬁnd this discussion too pessimistic there are two bright spots. The
ﬁrst I ﬁnd curious. Williams accords a special place to JUST or JUSTICE, particularly
related to social organization.15 He makes a case for thinking that we can usefully
apply this notion to past societies, while acknowledging that it need not apply to
every society. We can put the thought thus: the idea of justice may transcend the
phenomenon of the relativism of distance more than other ethical notions. He
speculates as to why this is. One reason is that many older societies had notions of
justice. Another is that we ﬁnd echoes of these notions in our notions, and hence they
12 Williams (1985), p. 155. 13 Williams (1985), pp. 153–4.
14 Williams (1985), pp. 163–4. 15 Williams (1985), pp. 164–7.
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may not be as far away from us with regards to justice as they are when it comes to
other evaluative ideas. Other considerations may apply, such as the fact that many
medieval societies, for example, had knowledge of different social organizations and
could not excuse their arrangements on the basis of ignorance.
Why do I ﬁnd this curious? Quite simply because these considerations seem to
apply to more than JUST or SOCIAL JUSTICE. They apply to KIND and BRAVE, I think.
They may not apply to more speciﬁc and related concepts, such as COMPASSIONATE
and VALOUR. But the change in these concepts is itself something that shows how we
have different conceptions of KIND and BRAVE from many medieval Europeans, just
as Williams claims about JUST. And, there may be rival conceptions of KIND and
BRAVE in today’s society (and philosophy), and these ﬁnd echoes in conceptions
from the past. Also, many of his other points repeat, as far as I can see. Further-
more, they seem to repeat for evaluative concepts other than ethical ones, such as
BEAUTY and WISDOM. Perhaps there is something special about these thinnish sorts of
thick concept. Although, to pick up on an example from earlier in this book,
perhaps the same can be said for a speciﬁc concept such as VOCATION, and if we
want to make out that JUST is special, I am pretty conﬁdent that DUTY will get in as
well, and if it does it raises the question of what we say about thin concepts.
Of course, in one sense Williams keeps to his ideas regarding the relativism
of distance. Recall that he thinks that JUST is special because more meaningful
comparisons can be made, not that there is some sharp cut-off point indicating
some difference in kind between it and other concepts. My comment is that he
should be more optimistic—if that is the right word—here, and see that his thoughts
apply to many evaluative concepts.16
For those who ﬁnd Williams’ ideas too pessimistic, the second bright spot opens
up things quite generally. After articulating his worries about knowledge, Williams
introduces the notion of conﬁdence. In short, he thinks that when we lose knowledge
we still go on living. We go on making ethical judgements and using ethical and
evaluative concepts. We do not forget completely the fact that we no longer have
knowledge. And, we may well not have conviction that we have the correct cognitive
capacities and ideas. But there is something to support and underpin our use and this
something is a conﬁdence in how we think and act. Although he does not use the
word, I suspect Williams is not talking about ‘blithe’ conﬁdence: it is a certain
doubting conﬁdence, constantly on the watch for worries and challenges. (At one
stage he contrasts this state of mind with optimism, citing Nietzsche’s ‘pessimism of
strength’, and also contrasts conﬁdence with dogmatism.17) Williams thinks it is a
social and psychological matter which concepts are retained and which we have
conﬁdence in, and this may be one of the ways in which his book’s title is justiﬁed:
16 For an excellent discussion and continuation of Williams’ thoughts on justice, see the exchange
between Brady (2010) and Fricker (2010).
17 Williams (1985), p. 171.
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philosophy’s limits are shown because which concepts survive and thrive is not
strictly or mainly a matter of philosophers arguing which concepts are better.
There ends my whistle-stop summary of Williams. I offer one point of criticism
and draw out one idea about separationism. Both relate to our earlier discussion.18
First, as indicated, I ﬁnd Williams slightly too pessimistic, as do some other
commentators.19 We need not doubt that when someone comes into contact with
other societies who think differently from her, she will reﬂect on the fact that hers is
not the only way to think. (Presumably this does not describe our anthropologist, for
she would be poor at her subject if she had not realized this already!) But, having had
this thought and lived with it for a while, why assume that the eventual outcome has
to be something negative? There may be some unseating and unsettling, but only in
the sense that further thought is required. If our imagined person is of a certain cast
of mind she may realize that what she is making claims about are of a practical
nature, in the wayWilliams discusses. And, from that, she may conclude that her way
is at least as good as any other way, if not better. She may trace in a tight fashion
which set of concepts is illuminating and allow for neat expressions, but she may also
think more broadly and compare how much pain is generated in a society, whether
certain groups are marginalized, what art and medicines have been produced, and
which society has the better average life expectancy. In short, she may have the
conﬁdence both to justify her way of living and set of concepts as good ones, and also
criticize others. There need be no reason to think that an initial unsettling will lead to
a pessimistic conclusion.
I detect in Williams the idea that the pre-reﬂective state comprises much false
knowledge, and people will be in an optimistic state of ignorance. After the Fall, as it
were, we can get along, but we will be pessimistic at best. (This is crude, but not a
hopelessly false reading.) Yet, why not assume a different mythology: the scales fall
from our eyes, and in treating our evaluative concepts as they really are we can be
more optimistic about us and how we judge, even if we constantly question whether
we are judging correctly. When we look to other societies we can be conﬁdent
about what we do as well as learn from them. Comparison can lead to a loss of
knowledge, and a loss of conﬁdence. But there is no reason to think it cannot lead to
an increase as well.
This is just a claim about those cases where we feel conﬁdent in our judgements. But
beyond that we have seen that Williams can be challenged about the number of times
such comparisons can be made. This was the curiosity involved in his treatment
of JUST. Williams makes an exception of it, but it is less exceptional than he thinks.
18 There are many other things to comment on, but I restrict myself. One interesting idea is whether the
existence in a society of claims that are treated as knowledge (such as the earlier example about killing) will
itself effect how much conﬁdence (rather than knowledge) we have in other claims. Categorizing them in
this way seems to involve an explicit acknowledgement that they are of a lesser sort, and this in turn may
lead us to have even less conﬁdence in them. See Altham (1995), p. 157.
19 For example, of those mentioned in an earlier footnote, Altham and Fricker stand out.
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Second, despite what I have just said, I ﬁnd much of Williams’ discussion
healthily refreshing. Evaluative concepts do fade away or are abruptly dropped,
and often there is no way to think in those terms again. Such change is often caused
by reﬂection. (So the best way to read my ﬁrst criticism is that while Williams is
correct in claiming that reﬂection can destroy knowledge, he may overstate the
case.) This raises an issue for separationists. Here is Moore again. He imagines
what separationists have to say about reﬂection destroying knowledge in the way
Williams sketches:
If [separationism] were right, and if what reﬂection did were simply to undermine the
evaluative component in thick ethical concepts, then there would be a clear sense in which
what had strictly speaking been known, in a way that had found expression through judge-
ments involving the concepts, was still available to be known, in a way that could ﬁnd
expression through judgements involving purely factual counterparts of the concepts. The
claim that reﬂection can destroy knowledge, in the sense intended by Williams, would then be
a needlessly paradoxical way of putting something innocuous.20
Moore’s point is that separationism does not seem to respect the phenomenon of
reﬂection destroying knowledge in the right way. After a concept is dropped we
should, if separationism is correct, be able simply to pick up similar, nonevaluative
categorizations with the only difference being that now there is no attachment of
some pro or con evaluation. Yet, for Moore, Williams’ point is that this fails to capture
the phenomenon adequately. For using such categorizations is also a matter of caring
about our use of them. What seems pertinent is not that we would be unable to adopt
a purely descriptive version of a concept (although that may the case), but the very
fact that we do not adopt such a version and do not attempt to.21
The fading of the concept is primarily caused by us not wanting to evaluate this
group of things in a certain way, and our evaluation of them is precisely what makes
them a group. Or, to put it another way, we could continue to group these things
using a different descriptive concept, but there would be no point because we have
lost the evaluative reason for doing so. For Moore, Williams is not simply saying that
after reﬂection we no longer want to group together, it is that we now judge the
evaluative point of such a grouping as being silly, unjustiﬁed, hopelessly biased, or
something else. And that is why such knowledge is destroyed. Why bother grouping
these things after that revelation?
All of this second point echoes Foot’s point outlined in Chapter Six. There is
some internal relation between a thing as categorized and our attitude towards the
thing. We cannot just attach and drop evaluations at will. There has to be some
point and justiﬁcation to our doing so, which will in some inevitable way call
20 Moore (2003), p. 345.
21 We very often speak of medieval Europeans’ concept of VALOUR, but that is a different thing: that is a
reference to some others’ concept, not the sincere use of a different, wholly descriptive replacement
concept.
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forth more evaluative concepts, and thick ones at that. Importantly, we work
within a tradition and social context, so any justiﬁcations have to make sense
within certain conﬁnes.
8.6 A Note on the Thin
I think Williams is wrong about many things he says about thin concepts. He may be
correct to think that philosophers, or at least some of them, concentrate too much on
thin concepts and try to magic too much out of them. But he goes wrong in claiming
that thin concepts are just pale abstractions of the thick and that they can do little
justiﬁcatory work of importance.
Throughout this book I have indicated that thick concepts are best seen as doing
certain sorts of job. We have a need for evaluative concepts and, at least for a society
at a certain point in its history, we have a need for these concepts. The same is true,
I think, of thin concepts. They may be less speciﬁc, but they can justify as much as
thick ones. As I said in Chapter Four, sometimes we need a clear and direct ‘right’ or
‘wrong’ to tell us whether to do something. There is a clear need for them to fulﬁl and
a role for them to play.
I certainly appreciate whyWilliams was led to say what he said. In some ways thick
concepts are closer to everyday concerns. But I cannot see that thin ones have no
purchase either. I have earlier captured Williams’ thinking in this book with reference
to the idea of an ‘abstraction tree’. One may suggest the following: thin concepts can be
seen as abstractions from thick concepts, so that is the best and only way of viewing
them. But that latter claim does not follow. Just because thin concepts can be seen as
linked in this way to thick concepts, this does not mean that they are lesser sorts of
concept, just as one should not conclude that thick concepts are lesser than thin ones
because they can seemingly be created from thin evaluation and something else.
There may be some genetic aspect to Williams’ view. Perhaps humans use thick
concepts and then thin ones come later only because we notice points of comparison
among the thick and want to record such comparisons. This story can be told at the
level of individual families of concepts, or it can be told as part of some evolutionary
story about how humans and our concepts arose, or it can be told with reference to
how societies meet and share points of comparison among how they compare. Even
if—if—there is some truth in these just-so stories, why assume that these histories
should determine our view of thin or thick concepts? What matters, I think, is that we
can easily understand the idea of a thin evaluation, see how it justiﬁes, and see how
it can have and does have a life of its own apart from the thick. Surely it is this set of
thoughts that is key. To put the point provocatively, one person’s justiﬁcation
trading on the (true or mythical) genealogy of a concept or idea is another person’s
genetic fallacy.
 UNDERSTANDING OTHERS AND HAVING CONF IDENCE
8.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I have dismissed two problems for nonseparationsism. Nonsepara-
tionists can explain how it is that we can understand others’ evaluative concepts
without sharing them, and they can explain normative criticism as well as separationists.
In contrast, we have found echoes of my previous criticisms of separationism when
we dig deeper into these worries.
Chapter Eight has tied a few ends together. The ﬁnal chapter, Chapter Nine seeks
to face up to a challenge that has been lurking in the background throughout much of
my discussion. If thick concepts are nonseparable concepts, what does this mean for
how we conceive the world to be? Or, in other words, if we have thick concepts, do we
also have thick properties? Despite my criticism of Williams in this chapter, his
thoughts show us a plausible and mature response to this question.
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9Evaluative Cognitivism
9.1 Introduction
As advertised, this concluding chapter deals with an issue that has bubbled up every
so often, namely what we are to say of the ontology that lies behind our conceptual
categorizations? This is, to be frank, a topic worth a book or more itself.1My aim here
is very modest, namely to sketch some recent philosophical currents and draw
together some of my thoughts to show what we may begin to say on this issue in
connection with points made in this book. Although this chapter uses ‘cognitivism’ in
its title, ‘realism’ could have been used in its stead.
In §9.2 I set out a train of thought that leads us into territory that I regard as
incorrect. In doing so I am offering a deliberately broad sweep of recent metaethical
thought. In §9.3 I respond to that train of thought to show the possibility of a better
position. In §9.4 I conclude, both this chapter and the overall book. However,
I cannot resist a look beyond the conﬁnes of my main focus and so in §9.5
I permit myself one last thought.
9.2 A Train of Thought
The concepts that we use are typically couched in and expressed by various judge-
ments we make.2 It is natural to think that many of these judgements can be true or
false, correct or incorrect, and we think it is important that such judgements are this
way. The truth value of ‘Jupiter is bigger than Saturn’ really matters for many reasons,
one of which is just that we think there is a fact of the matter about the comparative
sizes of planets. Some judgements and issues are more important than others. It really
matters how those bacteria behave and what we say about their nature, for people are
getting very ill and the bacteria may be the cause. In contrast, it is typically not so
important exactly how many worms are in my compost heap.
1 As noted earlier in this book, I discuss ontology and metaethics generally in Kirchin (2012). In that
book I also discuss all of the main metaethical positions, questions, arguments and ideas in far more detail
than in this brief chapter.
2 Wemight replace ‘judgement’ here with ‘sentence’, ‘proposition’, ‘belief ’, etc. Because I focus on other
things, I am being deliberately broad and unspeciﬁc here.
We often express thick concepts in ways that indicate we are trying to make
judgements about the world. We are categorizing the world in certain ways, and want
to present it correctly. And, when it comes to evaluations, we are often doing things
of importance. It really matters whether the action was cruel or kind, and it really
matters whether the dress is classy or vulgar. If so, and if they are important, we had
better make sure that we can support the idea that evaluative judgements get to be
true and false.
When it comes to many other sorts of judgement and concept, we typically
assume that we should look to the world. Rightly or wrongly we might assume a
sort of correspondence theory of truth: our linguistic expressions are attempts to map
onto the world in some way, and when they do it successfully we call such expres-
sions true, and when they fail we call them false. Now, there is much to be said about
the correspondence theory of truth, and the problems it faces, but it has a strong grip
on people, be they philosophers or not. If we go down this path, we confront the
obvious question, ‘What sort of thing is there which makes evaluative judgements
true?’ The obvious answer is to postulate the existence of a type of evaluative entity: a
property, fact or similar thing. There is some evaluative stuff that is real and which is
such that if judgements correspond with it (whatever ‘correspond’ may mean), such
judgements are true. If we do not postulate the existence of such stuff, then it is
unclear how such judgements could be true. When it comes to evaluations and
evaluative concepts, in particular, people have different views and employ different
concepts. There is no way that there can be truth unless there are things—evaluative
things—that anchor all of those judgements.
Indeed, once we reﬂect on that last point we must realize that we have to conceive
of the existence of these evaluative things in some way which is free of human
inﬂuence. Built into the train of thought I am following is the idea that people
have all sorts of views and employ all sorts of concepts. We can thus distinguish
two ways of going wrong: applying a concept to the wrong thing (because we are
foolish, or uninformed, or mad, say), and using a bogus concept in the ﬁrst place
(perhaps by using SCHMABOO instead of TABOO, perhaps by using racist slurs). If we
base the existence of the evaluative things that make judgements true and false on
anything to do with humans and our inﬂuence then we are basing them on biases,
prejudices, and other undesirable things. We need to assume such things are created
and maintained in some mind-independent fashion. Or in other words, while it is a
human matter which judgements we make, if we want to ensure the legitimacy and
authority of evaluative judgements, we should say that the things which the judge-
ments are judgements of, are decidedly not human matters: humans do not deter-
mine or inﬂuence what evaluative things exist and their nature.
So, in short, when we say that some action is cruel, or some dress is vulgar, there
really is a fact of the matter that determines whether we speak truly. Further, this fact
of the matter is not itself based on anything human, be it whim or something more
solid and measured. It is determined mind-independently. Indeed, once we think like
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that, it could be that the dress is neither vulgar nor elegant. That is, the concepts and
terms we use are all hopeless; none of them capture or ‘cut’ the world correctly. Why
think that our human-based concepts are correct, particularly as we have now invoked
the notion of mind-independence? Perhaps there are better ways to categorize the
world, such as those the Martians use. Perhaps the dress is schmelegant not elegant.
9.3 Thoughts about that Train of Thought
There is a lot that goes wrong in this train of thought. I will not worry too much
about the end point. Mind-independent evaluative realism, particularly in ethics, will
always have its supporters, both within philosophy and outside. It is easy to see why.
It is fuelled by a fear of relativism and clamour for a certain sort of certainty. While
some people (even philosophers) may be more inclined towards relativism of at least
some variety when it comes to aesthetics, in ethics the stakes seem higher. Even if we
care passionately about the transcendence of art, in ethics we are thinking about
suffering and death, and prolonged happiness and freedom. We may feel happier to
live and let live in art, but in ethics we cannot leave things there. (Or so many
philosophers assume.) It seems to matter strongly whether we keep promises and
whether a society is just. And these matters cannot be left to human judgement alone.
We had better get these judgements right, and getting it right cannot simply be a
matter of reﬂecting our own prejudices and biases, because for all we know we may
be simply repeating what we are comfortable with, not getting at the truth.
I can understand why this view of ethical matters has it adherents, and why the
quest for truth turns into a postulation of mind-independent ethical or evaluative
entities. I believe, however, that this position is fundamentally misguided. But I am
not going to argue against it here, and instead I turn to think about the various ways
in which we can respond once we recognize it as an option.3
Many different sorts of theorist will reject this notion of an ethical or evaluative
property. Some will think we can do away altogether with any notions of truth and
will fall back on to a type of relativism or nihilism. Others will try to retain something
of the idea of truth while rejecting the ontology. These are the more interesting
positions in contemporary metaethics.
But of these more interesting positions some still go wrong, in my view. Let me
sketch two. Error theorists, particularly those inﬂuenced directly by the arguments of
John Mackie, think that the ethical properties—or ‘objective prescriptions’—that
everyday moral thought and language can be seen to rely on simply do not exist.
Why not? Because, according to those that follow Mackie, the sort of conception of
ethical properties to be found in everyday moral thought and language is that given
above, and the idea of a mind-independent value property is an incoherent notion. So
3 For arguments against, again see Kirchin (2012).
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ethical thought as a whole is in systematic error, for we are making judgements using
a bogus notion. There is a lot to say about Mackie’s version of error theory, and error
theory generally.4 One main worry is that Mackie and others have misidentiﬁed their
target. It is unclear how strong this conception of ethical properties is in everyday
moral thought and language. If other options are on the table, ones that make the
truth of true moral judgements more palatable, then we should not reject something as
old and as useful as ethical thought at all. And, further, what are we to say about other
sorts of prescription and evaluative property, particularly such as those found in epis-
temology where there seem to be requirements or reasons to believe such-and-such?5
A second position that goes wrong is noncognitivism/expressivism.6 Things are
tricky here. Noncognitivism is, strictly, a view about the mental states that typically
accompany everyday ethical judgements (or should be viewed by philosophers to
accompany them). Similarly, expressivism is strictly a view about how language
works (or how it should be seen to work). It is not, strictly, a view about ontology.
However, ontological and conceptual claims about ethics come in noncognitivism’s
(and expressivism’s) wake. For if we can show that ethical language and thought
work in a certain way, and work fairly well in a certain way, without the need for a
postulation of ethical properties at all, then why bother postulating such things?
Why and how does noncognitivism go wrong? Again, there is much to comment
on, and some of this has already occupied us in this study. As with error theory,
I think its failure is due to a misunderstanding about what a sensible sort of realism
could be: a realism that can respond to the challenge of relativism sensibly, yet which
does not go as far as postulating mind-independent properties and which accom-
modates some of what is good in noncognitivism.
During the 1980s and beyond, analytic philosophy saw the rise of this sort of
sensible position, labelled in various ways. For simplicity’s sake, let me call it
‘sensibility theory’. (The name relates to people’s sensibility, not the fact that many
regarded it as sensible.) It was associated most famously with the work of McDowell
and Wiggins. In short, values were seen to be analogous to Locke’s idea of secondary
qualities.7 There were not mind-independently existing things, but things whose
reality could be said to depend, in some way, on human beings and how they perceive
and experience the world. In forming his view, McDowell was, famously, explicitly
arguing against error theorists and noncognitivists.
There are questionable aspects of this view. For example, we require details of how
some natural stuff and some human stuff combine to create some value stuff that in
turn can be seen, by philosophers, to constitute the stuff to which our judgements are
4 See Kirchin (2010b) for commentary and discussion.
5 See Cuneo (2007) for an extended discussion of this idea.
6 Schroeder (2010) is a great survey and history of noncognitivism.
7 McDowell (1985) is the locus classicus. See also some of the essays in Wiggins (1998), especially
III and IV.
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answerable. There is devilish detail here. Despite that detail, I believe this view
broadly get things right, or at least it is better than error theory and noncognitivism.
And yet . . . the sort of realism that is developed is, perhaps, far too optimistic.
(In fairness, as I read them Wiggins was more reluctant than McDowell in his use of
‘realism’ and ‘features’.) There is a conﬁdence that ethical judgements are true
and false, and that we can determine which ones are which and why. There is a
conﬁdence that we can indicate the better sorts of judge—the virtuous and wise
judges—who will act as our determiners (if not stipulators) of the moral compass.
Williams’ views on these matters, which I summarized in the previous chapter, are
more nuanced. They are also more realistic, realistic in that everyday sense of the
word that sometimes goes unconsidered in philosophical debates. Forming moral
judgements is a hard process, and not just because there may be many considerations
to bring to bear. It is hard because there is no clear sense that we have a best judge
who can determine what we should say; even a philosophical ﬁction of such a person
designed to further certain intuitions may stand in the way. It is also hard because it is
one thing to say that we want to be able to distinguish the better concepts from the
worse concepts; far harder to arrive at neutral criteria that would enable such a
comparison. Perhaps the conﬁdence on show in sensibility theory is misplaced.
This is, as advertised, deliberately sketchy. Let me break out of this survey to make
three points relevant to our concerns in this book. First, recall one of the notes from
Chapter Five. It seems as if a commitment to the shapelessness of KIND involves a
commitment to existence of something we can call kindness. The challenge is to
reﬂect on the reality of kindness. I pointed out there that cognitivism and realism are
distinct positions, just as noncognitivism and non-realism are distinct. However, this
is not to say that the two cannot be embraced by one overall stance, nor that the
insights of one position cannot be shared by the other. Williams and McDowell have
their differences, a few of which I have touched upon in this book. The best hope
I can see of forming a position concerning the reality of the thick, if we call it that, is
one that, like Williams’ position, does not give in to easy views about realism but
which, unlike him, is optimistic about our conﬁdence in forming views and using
evaluative concepts. In the previous chapter I indicated the ways in which we should
be more conﬁdent than Williams is. If, over time, we ﬁnd that our use of concepts
results in a better life—I leave this notion vague here—then why should we not be
conﬁdent in how we live, categorize, and justify? Given that we categorize and justify
by looking at how the world works, why not call this position a type of realism? Why
not assume that we can, within our own justiﬁcatory system, have the resources to
draw meaningful divisions between the better and worse and, therefore, between the
true and the false? Why not think that such divisions and justiﬁcations that started
from within a worldview could not gain legitimacy and authority that reached
beyond these initial conﬁnes? This would take, of course, a focus on what sort of
theory of truth we would wish to adopt.
We can also call this position ‘cognitivism’. I am, as a second point, not too fussed
about labels here. Despite my use of labels through this book, what really matters to
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me are the ideas that stand behind them. (And I hope my dissection of various labels
shows how important that is to me.) Blackburn has often criticized McDowell, and
other realists, for a seemingly simple postulation of something within one’s philo-
sophical view—reality, truth, knowledge—that really should be earned through
honest toil, by which Blackburn means analysed, justiﬁed, and constructed in a
plausible fashion. I am all for honest toil. Yet, in my view what we can earn has the
right to be called a realist account, even if it falls short of the mind-independent
realism I sketched earlier. Blackburn’s position is labelled by him, accurately, as
‘quasi-realism’. In my view there is no reason to think that we have to retain the
‘quasi-’ preﬁx, even if such a view postulates the existence of evaluative stuff that
exists in a way different from the way in which, say, some scientiﬁc properties exist.
But this brings me to a third and most important point. Every so often I have
mentioned the fact–value distinction, and I have discussed it earlier in this book.
Thick concepts, it has been said, hold out the hope that this distinction is erroneous.
A sensible challenge to those that advocate it does not claim that there are no value-
free facts. Rather, it claims that there may be some things that appear to be factual but
which, on closer inspection, are not as value-free as one thinks and, further, that the
division between the two supposed groups is blurred. One reason noncognitivists,
and possibly error theorists, go wrong is that they begin by thinking there is such a
clear distinction, possibly inﬂuenced by the thought that if there are clear examples of
both groups, then there must be a clear dividing line between the two groups (and, in
effect, label them as two distinct groups). Ethical and other evaluative talk has to be
part of one or other group, and therefore it is clearly not factual.
This is not, as I indicated in Chapter Five, to signal that ethical and other evaluative
facts and properties are of the very same ontological cast as scientiﬁc properties and
entities, and facts based on scientiﬁc ideas. To end on this point would be madness,
I think. Yet, the importance of reﬂecting on thin and thick concepts is to show how far
evaluative thought can go and how factual it can be. Understood in the right way, such
thought can be the vehicle for claims that can be seen as true and as claims to
knowledge. My discussion of Williams in the previous chapter began us on that road.
Williams was right, I think, to contrast the conceptual schemes of our making with
the absolute conception of the world. Yet, the conceptual schemes that are imposed
on such a world can be seen as better and worse than other schemes, and we can be
conﬁdent, I think, in saying which ones are better.
9.4 Overall Conclusion
There were few details in the previous section. As I said, providing those details is
a book in itself. The main point, instead, is that we should not think we have an
impossible task here. We are not fated to embrace mind-independent evaluative
realism, nor a type of relativism. And, within the middle ground, we are not
forced to say that because the stuff of evaluative concerns is not science, it
therefore cannot be factual or truth-apt. To echo a thought from Chapter Five,
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we can say that these issues call into question what might be meant by ‘truth’ and
‘fact’. We should not cut off potential routes before we have begun: we need to
think hard about truth and the factual, not assume we know about them already.
Perhaps the correspondence theory of truth is not the right theory for evaluative
concerns, for example.
That is one of the lessons of this study. In Chapter Seven I criticized Väyrynen. He
argues that most standard thick concepts are not inherently or essentially evaluative
because they do not conform to certain rules and norms about core semantic
meaning. My criticism was partly based on the idea that we should think through
how concepts are used and use this as a prompt to think about how the evaluative
may be a broader category. In microcosm that is the overarching conclusion of this
study. What I hope I have shown is that evaluation, and evaluative concepts, come in a
variety of guises, but they are all no less the evaluative for that. Part of the point and
joy of philosophy, particularly in its modern analytic variety, is an attempt to make
clear various ideas. Yet it goes astray too often when it fails to realize that the
phenomenon with which it is dealing is neither clear nor clean. It is pretty straight-
forward to say that thick concepts are just speciﬁc types of evaluative concept, but
beyond that there is not as much clarity as some suppose. Separationism imposes a
clear division on matters where they may not be a division. Nonseparationism is to
be preferred because it tries to understand thick concepts on their own terms. Thick
concepts are simply evaluations of a sort different from thin ones.
9.5 One Last Thought
Having seemingly concluded, I break the rules and make one last point. In both
Chapters Six and Eight I hid away in the main text and in footnotes a topic that could
be one of the most important questions in this book. It is important to question how
a concept can be held together as a single concept. We often ﬁnd people agreeing
about some idea, yet disagreeing because they have different conceptions that clash.
The real-life debate between Rawls and Nozick over what it is for a distribution of
resources to be just is one such example. Despite their differences—over particular
points and over starting assumptions—no one could doubt that Rawls and Nozick
were engaged in a dispute about the same concept, and had points of contact. But is
it possible to pick out certain traits, or even necessary and sufﬁcient conditions, that
enable us to say when we have two ideas that are properly classed as conceptions of
the same concept, and when those two ideas are just different concepts? If we can,
what are they? And, further, do different sorts of concept (and conception) admit of
different answers to these questions? Probing these ideas will give us a sense of
some of the most everyday and fundamental of human social activities: communi-
cation with other people, understanding them, and agreement and disagreement
with them. By getting a sound understanding of what it is for a concept to be
evaluative, and what it is for it to be thick or thin, we can begin to make progress on
these broader issues.
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